The popular image of the Cossacks lends itself to folklore: fearsome soldiers galloping on horseback across the steppes of Eastern Europe, sabres drawn to fight enemies of the Tsar.
But in Russia today, the Cossacks have reemerged as familiar figures in the public sphere. They work as uniformed authorities alongside the police, carrying out street patrols and helping to maintain order at sports games, religious gatherings and cultural events.
They are also being mobilised by the Kremlin to bolster numbers on the battlefield – of around 180,000 registered Cossacks, more than [60,000 have fought i…
The popular image of the Cossacks lends itself to folklore: fearsome soldiers galloping on horseback across the steppes of Eastern Europe, sabres drawn to fight enemies of the Tsar.
But in Russia today, the Cossacks have reemerged as familiar figures in the public sphere. They work as uniformed authorities alongside the police, carrying out street patrols and helping to maintain order at sports games, religious gatherings and cultural events.
They are also being mobilised by the Kremlin to bolster numbers on the battlefield – of around 180,000 registered Cossacks, more than 60,000 have fought in Ukraine since 2022.
‘Guardians of Russia’s soul’
The Cossacks’ reintegration into Russian society under Putin has been a gradual process.
Historically, they have gone from being semi-nomadic horsemen who lived in autonomous communities in present-day Ukraine and southwest Russia to subjects of the Tsars under the expansion of the Russian Empire in the 18th century.
They fought for the imperial army in exchange for a high degree of self-governance, and also for Emperor Nicholas II during the 1917 revolution, for which they were ostracised and persecuted under communism.
Traditionally, the Cossack identity is hereditary, but it is also an administrative status that can be obtained by registration with the authorities.
After the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991, the Cossack population began to gradually regain its place in Russian society.
“In the 1990s, there was an anarchic, grassroots revival of Cossack culture,” says Pierre Labrunie, a specialist in Russia’s Cossacks at Paris’s École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS).
“Some Cossacks emphasised the ethnic aspect of Cossack identity and demanded greater autonomy, while others wanted Cossack culture to regain its social standing.”
The Russian state was aware of the potential threat the group posed – along with its strong military history, the majority of Cossacks were armed – and coopted this revival to begin a formal reintegration of the Cossacks in the 2000s.
Russian leadership formalised the Cossacks’ work as border guards and urban militia – functions which the group had performed under the Tsars.
“For the Russian state, this had the dual advantage of responding to the Cossacks’ demands for reintegration by drawing on their tradition of service and filling a void left by the failure of the state, as Russia had been terribly weakened by the ‘shock therapy’ of transitioning to a market economy in the 1990’s,” Labrunie says.
Ever since then, the Cossacks have operated as auxiliaries to the police force while also playing a large role in the national imagination.
A popular Russian saying states that “a Cossack without faith is not a Cossack”, and the group has close links with the Russian Orthodox church.
“They are the guardians of Russia’s soul, its traditions and its good character,” says Labrunie.
The Kremlin “presents them as a model of what the perfect Russian citizen should be”, he adds. “They represent loyal commitment and voluntary service, and they are a counter-model to the ‘decadent’ West.”
There is “deliberate ambiguity” over exactly how the roles of the police and the Cossacks intersect, Labrunie says, but the Cossacks’ informal role as moral police was made clear during the 2014 Winter Olympics in the southern Russian town of Sochi.
On the sidelines of the event, members of the feminist group Pussy Riot staged a protest, singing a song that was hostile to Putin. Rather than the police, it was a Cossack patrol who led a violent confrontation beating the activists with whips – the traditional weapon used to maintain order in imperial Russia.
A Cossack militiaman attacks Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and a photographer as she and fellow members of punk group Pussy Riot stage a protest in Sochi, Russia, on February 19, 2014. © Morry Gash, AP
A military force in Ukraine
Russia has undergone rapid militarisation under Putin’s rule, ramping up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Faced with a protracted conflict, the Kremlin is keen to avoid another wave of general mobilisation and has turned to paramilitary forces to fuel its war effort.
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If the Africa Corps, formerly known as the Wagner Group, has played a leading role in providing “cannon fodder” on the front lines in Ukraine, the Cossack Cadet force is not far behind.
“There are specialised schools where cadets study the national curriculum alongside Cossack and military components. They teach the history of the Cossacks, traditional songs, horse riding, fighting and how to handle weapons,” says Labrunie.
In 2023 there were known to be 31 of these institutions in Russia preparing thousands of young Russians to fight the nation’s enemies.
Although the Cadet Corps is most active in southwest Russia (the historical home of the Cossacks, and where most still live today), there are units across the country.
Two new Corps have recently been introduced in Ukraine’s Luhansk region, which has been occupied by Russia since 2014.
Others are being created in Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson – regions currently or partially occupied by Russia – as part of an ongoing effort by the Kremlin to colonise and indoctrinate Ukrainian inhabitants.
Cossack communities are also active in “humanitarian” efforts to support soldiers on the front lines by organising collections of food, clothes and equipment from the local population.
Since their reintegration in the 1990s, Cossack volunteers have fought in all of Russia’s wars: Chechnya in the 1990s, Ukraine’s Donbas and Crimea in 2014, and again in Ukraine in 2022 – this time on a much larger scale and under increased control by Moscow.
Under Putin’s leadership, 11 registered Cossack armies have been consolidated under a single authority, the All-Russian Cossack Society, of which Putin has the exclusive right to appoint the leader.
Map showing the various Cossack armies of Russia, with their emblems. © the All-Russian Cossack Society
In March 2023, the president began a process for establishing a “Cossack reserve army”. It is estimated that this reserve force could provide an additional 60,000 Cossack troops to fight in Ukraine.
A ‘new elite’ – but how loyal?
During his televised speeches, Putin has repeatedly called for the emergence of a “new Russian elite” to replace the technocrats and oligarchs, whom he considers selfish and corrupt.
According to the president, this new upper class should possess military skills, respect for the law and absolute loyalty.
The Cossacks tick all the boxes for this militarised form of patriotism – but their loyalty to Putin may not be guaranteed.
After previously experiencing rapid growth, the number of Cossacks registered in Russia fell by 9,000 in 2024.
The decline could be partly explained by losses suffered in Ukraine or by demographics. It could also be a sign the of Cossacks’ “disenchantment” with their status as auxiliaries of the Russian State, Labrunie says.
In Ukraine, Cossack fighters are mostly grouped in 18 battalions, whose insignia and names refer to Cossack – rather than Russian – history.
Ironically, there are also Cossacks on the other side of the front line fighting in the ranks of the Ukrainian army.
Russia’s Cossack fighters are theoretically controlled by Russian military command, but there are reports that they have become uncontrollable in Ukraine, particularly during fighting in the separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk.
There, the Cossacks’ dreams of setting up an independent state conflicted with the goals of pro-Russian Ukrainian proxies and Putin’s imperialist project.
This article was adapted from the original in French.