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Regulation 2023/2675European Union regulation TitleRegulation (EU) 2023/2675 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 November 2023 on protecting the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries ApplicabilityEuropean Union Made byEuropean Parliament and Council of the European Union Made underArticle 207(2) TFEU Journal referenceOJ L, 2023/2675, 7.12.2023 History European Parliament vote3 October 2023 Council Vote22 November 2023 Date made22 November 2023 Entry into force27 December 2023 Applies from27 December 2023 Preparative texts Commission proposalCOM(2021) 775 final – 2021/0406(COD) ReportsA9-0246/2022 Current legislation

The Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), also called the trade bazooka,[1] is a regulation of the European Union proposed in December 2021,[2] adopted in November 2023, and that entered into force on 27 December 2023.[3][4] It aims to protect the EU and its member states from economic coercion by third countries and provides a framework for EU action, including examination, engagement, and the adoption of countermeasures.[4]

Combining security policy and trade policy, it is a defence and deterrence tool designed to prevent coercion by creating penalties for whichever country is performing the coercion.[5] Analytically, one conference proceeding from 2025 introduces the term "geo-legality" to describe how the EU deploys its legal-normative authority, including the ACI, as leverage to counter external (economic) pressure.[a][6]: 138, 142–143

Among the coercive measures against which it could be used are boycotts and trade restrictions.[7] In addition, an earlier version of the ACI contained proposed mechanisms for compensation to affected member states; the final Instrument, instead, provides a framework for seeking reparation from the coercing country.[2]

The ACI had originally been developed primarily as a deterrence tool against China.[8] As of January 2026, the ACI has not yet been used.[9] In 2026 EU leaders are weighing its potential first use against the United States in response to the Greenland crisis.[10]

The ACI was designed in part to address the requirement for unanimous consent among EU member states when adopting certain trade-restrictive measures. Under the Instrument, the veto power is removed for these cases, and trade restrictions in response to coercion are now adopted through two qualified majority votes.[5][2] Episodes of pressure on the EU and its member states, such as United States sanctions against companies involved in constructing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline around 2019[2][11] and the implementation of steel and aluminum tariffs in 2018,[7] also informed debate on the Instrument. Another important driver was China’s use of trade restrictions against countries such as Lithuania and Norway.[2][12]

As early as in 2021, notably, Lithuania permitted Taiwan to open the Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania, after which China responded with wide-ranging trade measures; this situation has been discussed as a paradigmatic prototype-case for utilizing the ACI.[6]

Alternatively, the New York Times has linked the Instrument’s use to the Belarus–European Union border crisis, during which Belarus threatened to shut down natural gas shipments to the European Union.[7]

Under the regulation, "economic coercion" refers to a situation in which a third country seeks to pressure the European Union or a member state into making a particular policy choice by applying, or threatening to apply, measures affecting trade or investment.[4] The procedure is activated when the European Commission examines a potential case of coercion, either on its own initiative or following a substantiated request, and then submits a proposal to the Council of the European Union to determine whether economic coercion exists.[4][12] If the Council, acting by qualified majority, confirms that coercion is taking place, the Commission engages with the third country to seek a resolution, including through negotiations, mediation, or adjudication.[4] If those efforts fail, the EU may adopt "response measures" such as tariffs, restrictions on trade in goods and services, limits on access to public programmes and financial markets, or measures affecting intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment.[4][12] These restrictions can be targeted at states, companies, or individuals, thereby deploying EU legal authority as leverage. Through a "geo-legal" lens, then, this pattern of legal responses situates the ACI within a broader EU toolkit of counter-coercive instruments.[6]: 136, Table 3

As of January 2026, President Macron of France has urged the EU to consider the use of the Anti-Coercion Instrument in regard of tariffs imposed on some EU members by US President Trump as part of Trump’s proposal for a forced United States annexation of Greenland.[13]

1. ^ Namely, Vartanian (2025) reports drawing on a Delphi-style consultation with twenty-three EU institutional officials and experts, including participants from the European Commission’s Legal Service and Directorate-General for Trade, to inform an account of how EU institutions understand and might operationalize counter-coercive tools such as the ACI when responding to pressure by China, the United States, and other third countries.

2. ^ Hawser, Anita (7 April 2025). "How the EU’s ‘trade bazooka’ could impact banks". The Banker. Retrieved 13 July 2025.

3. ^ a b c d e "Effective Deterrence? The Coming European Anti-Coercion Instrument". Institut Montaigne. Retrieved 2025-04-09.

4. ^ "EU Prepares to Counter US Tariffs with Anti-Coercion Instrument". National Law Review. Retrieved 2025-04-09.

5. ^ a b c d e f "Protecting against coercion". European Commission. Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security. Retrieved 14 November 2025.

6. ^ a b "The EU’s New Anti-Coercion Instrument Will Be a Success if It Isn’t Used". Internationale Politik Quarterly. Retrieved 2025-04-09.

7. ^ a b c Vartanian, Peter H. (2025). "EU (Legal) Statecraft in an Age of Coercion". Proceedings of the Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union. Vol. 2025. doi:10.5642/urceu.VGLR6395. Retrieved 6 November 2025.

8. ^ a b c Pronczuk, Monika (2021-12-08). "Proposal Would Allow E.U. to Retaliate Against Economic Pressure". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2025-04-09.

9. ^ "EU considers retaliatory measures over Trump Greenland tariff ‘blackmail’". The Guardian. Retrieved 18 January 2026.

10. ^ "What is the EU anti-coercion ‘bazooka’ it could use against the US over Greenland?". France24. January 19, 2026. Retrieved January 19, 2026.

11. ^ "After Trump Reignites a Trade War Over Greenland, Europe Weighs Going All-Out". The New York Times. Retrieved 18 January 2026.

12. ^ "Nord Stream 2: Trump approves sanctions on Russia gas pipeline". 2019-12-21. Retrieved 2025-04-09.

13. ^ a b c Tzifa, Georgia; Shulha, Mariia (19 May 2025). "The EU Anti-Coercion Regulation: A New Tool Against Economic Pressure". CELIS Institute. Retrieved 14 November 2025.

14. ^ "Macron urges EU to deploy trade ‘bazooka’ against US as Trump ramps up tensions". POLITICO. 2026-01-18. Retrieved 2026-01-18.

• Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 November 2023 on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries