the page on “all SCOTUS cases and links” is restored

Thanks to the Wayback Machine and a little patience. You’ll notice that the Wayback Machine also provides the older links.

Posted in Uncategorized |

D.N.M.: Impoundment of backpack not shown proper under police procedures

The impoundment of defendant’s car and his backpack from an apartment complex parking lot was not shown to be within the standardized procedures of the department. That’s the government’s burden. Motion to suppress granted. United States v. Majedi, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14588 (D.N.M. Jan. 27, 2026).*

In a “rough ride” case, there was no case law close enough to say that the law was clearly established. Johnson v. Edwards, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 2057 (7th Cir. Jan. 27, 2026).*

Defendant’s stop for a broken taillight lacked reasonable suspicion because there was at least some red light showing, and that satisfies Colorado law. United States v. Forrest, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14154 (D. Colo. Jan. 20, 2026).*

There was no reasonable expectation of privacy under the Florida wiretapping statute in a recorded business zoom call over FDA regulatory matters of the business. Aguila v. RQM+ LLC, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14013 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026).*

E.D.Tenn.: No showing of nexus to cell phones in pharmacy fraud

In a pharmacy fraud case, there was no showing of nexus to pharmacists’ cell phones. Motion to suppress cell phones is granted. Also, under Franks, with an omission a higher standard of intent to mislead applies. Also, the affidavit is viewed as a whole, no line-by-line. United States v. Haney, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14804 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 27, 2026).*

There was plenty for nexus to defendant’s house. “Even if a probable cause nexus did not exist, a hypothetical hard to square with existing precedent, the good faith exception would apply.” United States v. Sullivan, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14829 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 27, 2026).*

After the ticket was issued, reasonable suspicion existed: “Any one of these factors, standing alone, would be insufficient to support reasonable suspicion. In isolation, no single fact is dispositive of wrongdoing. However, when they are considered together, as required by the totality of the circumstances test, reasonable suspicion is met. Specifically, it was reasonable that Sergeant Kilpela suspected Ms. Conchas was trafficking narcotics. Thus, although the mission of the traffic stop had concluded when Sergeant Kilpela requested her consent to search the vehicle, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment to extend the seizure.” United States v. Conchas, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15022 (D. Mont. Jan. 27, 2026).*

CNS: Maryland man argues arrest using cellphone tracking device violates the Fourth Amendment

CNS: Maryland man argues arrest using cellphone tracking device violates the Fourth Amendment by Sydney Haulenbeek (“His attorney argued the police ‘basically seized’ his phone with the equipment police used to locate him. [¶] “A Maryland man arrested after police used a device mimicking a cellphone tower to find his phone — and him — argued before a Fourth Circuit panel Tuesday that police needed a warrant. The Baltimore Police Department, which was attempting to arrest Kerron Andrews on charges of triple attempted murder after a shooting during a drug deal, secured a court order allowing them to use a cell-site simulator to obtain his real-time location information in May 2014. The police’s court order did not satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, Andrews said, and the officers are not protected by qualified immunity because they did not disclose their plan to use a specific device when seeking the order.”)

[I usually don’t mention pending matters until they’re ruled on, but some just need to be mentioned as a heads up.]

WaPo: Families of men killed in boat strikes sue Trump administration

WaPo: Families of men killed in boat strikes sue Trump administration by Mariana Alfaro & Dan Lamothe (“The families of two Trinidadian men killed in October during a U.S. strike on boats off the coast of Venezuela filed a wrongful-death lawsuit against the Trump administration on Tuesday. The lawsuit is the first filed against the White House in federal court in response to President Donald Trump’s lethal attacks on boats that the administration alleges were carrying illegal drugs to the United States. In the suit, the families of the two men accused the U.S. government of conducting extrajudicial killings and of falsely characterizing the men as drug smugglers. They asserted that their intent is to hold the Trump administration accountable for what they and many legal experts say is an unjustifiable use of deadly military force.”)

Posted in Excessive force, National security |

VA: Exclusionary rule does not apply in animal cruelty forfeitures

The exclusionary rule does not apply in animal cruelty forfeitures, distinguishing One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania. Mogensen v. Cty. of Rockbridge, 2026 Va. App. LEXIS 46 (Jan. 27, 2026).

Defendant’s stop for a broken taillight lacked reasonable suspicion because there was at least some red light showing, and that satisfies Colorado law. United States v. Forrest, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14154 (D. Colo. Jan. 20, 2026).*

There was no reasonable expectation of privacy under the Florida wiretapping statute in a recorded business zoom call over FDA regulatory matters of the business. Aguila v. RQM+ LLC, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14013 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026).*

D.Minn.: The stated reason for the stop was pretextual, but it was with PC

There was probable cause for the stop and search of defendant’s car before the pretextual stop. Therefore, it was all valid. United States v. Nieves, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 272309 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025).*

Defendant’s stop was with reasonable suspicion of speeding two miles over the speed limit, then he crossed the fog line twice before the stop. But the CI provided probable cause for a stop anyway. United States v. Lombida, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13790 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2026).*

Looking in defendant’s vehicle while closing the door was a plain view. United States v. Shaw, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13454 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2026).*

Defendant consented to the search of his cell phone, and giving the password. He contends it was limited to a Reddit thread, which it was. The next day the officer got a warrant for the phone, and it was with probable cause. United States v. Nigro, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 272270 (D.S.D. Dec. 11, 2025).*

IL: Failure to conduct a preliminary hearing for PC mooted by conviction

Failure to conduct a preliminary hearing to establish probable cause is mooted by defendant’s conviction after trial. People v. Chambliss, 2026 IL 130585, 2025 Ill. LEXIS 7 (Jan. 23, 2026).

“Lucas claims that Rubenstahl violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force during an arrest or investigatory stop. … But we need not decide whether a constitutional violation occurred because Lucas has not shown that her arrest violated clearly established law. In other words, Lucas has not shown that she had a clearly established right to be free from arm-pulling, a takedown, or a knee-to-the-back during the particular circumstances of her arrest.” Lucas v. City of Reynoldsburg, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 1837 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 2026).*

Defendant’s Franks challenge fails because of a lack of a substantial preliminary showing. And, even if he could satisfy that, he can’t show materiality. United States v. Luxon, No. 25-20742, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13118 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2026).*

Posted in Excessive force, Franks doctrine |

N.D.N.Y.: Being told you’d be arrested for trespassing if you didn’t leave isn’t a seizure

Being told you’d be arrested for trespassing if you didn’t leave isn’t a seizure. Keith v. Romain, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13105 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2026).

Police responded to a bar on a ShotSpotter report, but it was for naught. No shots fired. While there, they saw defendant stumbling in the parking lot. That and a traffic offense justified the stop. Commonwealth v. McCuiston, 2026 Ky. App. LEXIS 13 (Jan. 23, 2026).*

Plaintiff was convicted of assaulting a VA police officer and the video shows he clearly did, and that undermines his claim he was arrested without probable cause. Wohlrabe v. Brown, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 1832 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, 2026).*

The CI’s photographs were objected to at trial (apparently for lack of foundation). Other photographs came in. Defendant wasn’t denied confrontation. State v. McCurdy, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 24 (Jan. 22, 2026).”

WaPo: How officers used new ICE memo to forcefully enter a Minneapolis home

WaPo: How officers used new ICE memo to forcefully enter a Minneapolis home by Arelis R. Hernández (“With long guns pointed in her direction, Teyana Gibson repeatedly demanded that federal immigration officers show her a warrant as she stood between them and her immigrant husband inside her Minneapolis house. ‘What are you doing?’ she yelled, as the officers burst through the front door with a battering ram, according to a cellphone recording of the chaotic encounter on Jan. 11. Officers handcuffed Garrison Gibson — a Liberian national who for years had reported for regular check-ins with Immigration and Customs Enforcement — and took him away in a government vehicle. Then they handed Teyana Gibson, who is a U.S. citizen, a photocopy of a document that purported to give them the legal authority to enter and search her home without consent. But it was not a judicial warrant authorized by a federal judge — rather, the document was an administrative warrant signed by an ICE supervisor, according to court documents.”).

All things considered, what happens when they argue the good faith exception? The good faith exception requires a judicial warrant. Remember Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971)? There the warrant was issued by the Attorney General, not a neutral and detached magistrate within the judicial process:

The classic statement of the policy underlying the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is that of Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court in Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14:

The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate, instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity, and leave the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police officers …. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.

Johnson was 1948.

Posted in Uncategorized |

Reason: ICE Tells Legal Observer, ‘We Have a Nice Little Database, and Now You’re Considered a Domestic Terrorist’

Reason: [ICE Tells Legal Observer, ‘We Have a Nice Little Database, and Now You’re Considered a Domestic Terrorist’](https://reason.com/2026/01/23/ice-tells-legal-observer-we-have-a-nice-little-database-and-now-youre-considered-a-domestic-terrorist/) by C.J. Ciaramella (“Video taken this [Friday] in Maine shows an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer taking pictures of a legal observer’s car. When she asks why he’s doing that, he says, ‘Because we have a nice little database, and now you’re considered a domestic terrorist.’ The video is the latest example of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) labeling anyone who engages in First Amendment–protected activity opposing the Trump administration’s mass deportation program as a ‘domestic terrorist’ and suggesting they’ll be subject to federal investigations.”)

Posted in Body cameras, Reasonable expectation of privacy |

KS: Geofence warrant valid under GFE

This geofence warrant was valid by the good faith exception. State v. Mitchell-Pennington, 2026 Kan. App. LEXIS 6 (Jan. 23, 2026).

The omitted facts merely clarified, not defeated, probable cause. The motion to suppress was properly denied. Urrutia v. State, 2026 WY 14 (Jan. 23, 2026).*

Defendant was being interviewed by the police and he gave up his phone password. Later, the officer asked for specific consent to search the phone, which defendant gave. United States v. Nigro, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12715 (D.S.D. Jan. 21, 2026).*

Plaintiff’s claim that excessive and brutal force was used on him during his arrest was a new Bivens claim covered by the FTCA. He has that remedy. Richardson v. Drug Enf’t Agency, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 272087 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2025).*

E.D.Pa.: The exclusionary rule doesn’t apply to grand jury evidence

Under Calandra (1974), there’s no basis for dismissing an indictment because it might be based on an illegal search. The search was valid anyway because it was based on the consenter’s apparent authority. United States v. Jones, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11888 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2026). [I haven’t seen Calandra cited for this in ages.]

Being an alleged illegal alien alone isn’t probable cause. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 407 (2012) (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984)). “In sum, ICE officers violated Petitioners’ Fifth Amendment due process rights by detaining them and holding them in custody without any pre-deprivation notice or hearing, and they executed unlawful warrantless arrests that violated the INA, the APA, and Petitioners’ Fourth Amendment rights.” A.B.D. v. Wamsley, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11720 (D. Or. Jan. 22, 2026).*

When raising a Fourth Amendment claim in federal court, the question is the process, not the outcome. McGee v. Warden, Belmont Corr. Inst., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11818 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 22, 2026).*

SC: DNA taken on 2007 arrest didn’t need to be suppressed because he was acquitted back then

Defendant’s DNA was taken when he was charged in 2007 and later acquitted. The DNA sample should not be suppressed because it was lawfully taken at the time. State v. Harrington, 2026 S.C. App. LEXIS 7 (Jan. 21, 2026).

Defendant’s false LPN was reason for the stop. United States v. Ford, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 271810 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 23, 2025).*

Since defendant’s statements weren’t suppressed, the search that resulted thereafter isn’t suppressed. United States v. Davis, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10922 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 21, 2026).*

The court declines to expand Stanley v. Georgia (1969) and protections of the home to a cell phone. United States v. Yener, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11379 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2026).*

Posted in Cell phones, DNA, Reasonable suspicion |

WaPo: As ICE arrests surged, Trump administration sought to cut bodycam program

WaPo: As ICE arrests surged, Trump administration sought to cut bodycam program by Maria Sacchetti (“A string of violent incidents has added fresh urgency to calls for more body-worn cameras. But DHS proposed reducing spending on them in its initial budget proposal.”)

Posted in Body cameras |

DC: Detention at park for talking to another person was without RS

Defendant was at a park with his child and he saw someone he knew who he went to and talked to. Police started coming for the other person, so he left him and went back to his child. Then two police officers came to him. Then three more. He was “encircled” and questioned about a gun, which he admitted having. His detention was without reasonable suspicion. The gun should have been suppressed. Ervin v. United States, 2026 D.C. App. LEXIS 11 (Jan. 22, 2026).

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging the warrant here where defendant admitted to having drugs when detained. Miles v. Stonebreaker, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 271770 (D.S.C. Dec. 30, 2025).*

There was reasonable suspicion for the stop then furtive movements in the car, and defendant was on supervision with a search waiver. State v. Strasser, 2026 Wisc. App. LEXIS 42 (Jan. 21, 2026).*

S.D.N.Y.: Email SW with “practical accuracy” particular enough

Email warrant was particular enough with “practical accuracy”: “But the Second Circuit has upheld the validity of warrants without the presence of exacting, rigid limitations, noting that the focus is ‘on practical accuracy, as opposed to technical precision.’ United States v. Tompkins, 118 F.4th 280, 287-88 (2d Cir. 2024); see also Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 102 (rejecting defendant’s argument that ‘the warrant was insufficiently particular because the government and the magistrate judge failed to specify the search terms and protocols ex ante in the warrant’).” United States v. Guan, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11221 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2026).*

Minor discrepancies between the officer’s testimony, police report, and bodycam don’t undermine his credibility. The bodycam shows the probable cause. United States v. Darwah, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10143 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2026).*

Failure to timely signal justified appellant’s stop. United States v. Ausherman, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 271733 (D. Neb. Dec. 10, 2025).*

CA4: Def’s pants transported from hospital to jail were searched, and inevitable discovery applies

Defendant’s pants were transported from the hospital to the jail, and inevitable discovery covers their search. United States v. Gibbins, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 1432 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 2026).

The warrant for five cell phones was executed within the 14-day limitation. The fact one was searched again wasn’t sufficient grounds to suppress. Nor did it violate Rule 41. United States v. Medina, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9926 (D.R.I. Jan. 20, 2026).*

The prosecutors who sought these warrants and the judge who signed off on them were absolutely immune from suit. Ornelas v. California, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9953 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2026).*

Defendant argued below that the lack of a proper return voided the search, but the court held that a return was ministerial and didn’t prejudice him. He abandoned that argument on appeal. Wright v. State, 2026 Miss. App. LEXIS 20 (Jan. 20, 2026).*

D.Md.: AG’s admin. investigative demand for improper purpose and quashed; constitutional right of privacy in medical records

The AG issued a subpoena to a hospital for records of adolescent gender affirming care. The subpoena is quashed. The subject has Art. III standing. There is no allegation of a health care offense to support the subpoena. In addition, the subject has a constitutional right of privacy in their records. In re 2025 Subpoena to Child.’s Nat’l Hosp., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10523 (D. Md. Jan. 21, 2026):

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