Abstract
An increasing number of authors are proposing that we have a moral obligation to conduct large scale systemic interventions into ecosystems to ameliorate wild animal suffering not caused by humans. I will call this position ‘Wild animal suffering interventionism’ (WASI). I will not challenge that WASI is ‘good in theory’ within utilitarian and rights-based animal ethics. I will focus on Delon and Purves’s argument against the justifiability of WASI interventions in the foreseeable future, arguing that it fails. Such interventions are unjustifiable in the foreseeable future but not for the reasons they think. To argue this, I show that Delon and Purves’s argument implies that WASI is ambivalent regarding ecosystem destruction. I also show that WASI has a strong motiva…
Abstract
An increasing number of authors are proposing that we have a moral obligation to conduct large scale systemic interventions into ecosystems to ameliorate wild animal suffering not caused by humans. I will call this position ‘Wild animal suffering interventionism’ (WASI). I will not challenge that WASI is ‘good in theory’ within utilitarian and rights-based animal ethics. I will focus on Delon and Purves’s argument against the justifiability of WASI interventions in the foreseeable future, arguing that it fails. Such interventions are unjustifiable in the foreseeable future but not for the reasons they think. To argue this, I show that Delon and Purves’s argument implies that WASI is ambivalent regarding ecosystem destruction. I also show that WASI has a strong motivation to justify ecological destruction, as wild animals suffering cannot be significantly ameliorated in ecology without destroying the ecosystem. This makes it plausible to propose that some WASI interventions can have a predictable and positive effect on WAS, namely those that intentionally reduce wild animal populations through ecosystem destruction. We would be then placed to govern smaller wild animal populations effectively, significantly reducing wild animals suffering. This means that WASI faces a trade-off between the welfare of present generations of animals and the welfare of future generations of animals. I show why this trade-off is unjustified through McMahan’s population ethics-informed deontic framework. Therefore, WASI interventions, in having to cause ecological destruction, are unjustifiable for the foreseeable future.
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Notes
R-strategists refers to animals who produce large numbers of offspring that have a low chance of reaching maturity. Most fish, amphibians and small mammals are r-strategists. Pointing out the numerical dominance of these individuals in ecosystems combined with their very low average welfare is used by WASI authors to show that welfare in ecology is very low. 1.
WASI disturbs the assumption that ecology is the appropriate or unavoidable setting for wild animals, just as reform movements in the Victorian era disturbed the assumption that an urban slum was the appropriate or unavoidable setting for the poor.
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Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Professor Robert Sparrow and Dr Gene Flenady for the considerable effort they took to copy edit and critically discuss the many earlier versions of this paper with me. I also thank the more than human worlds for keeping me on track with my writing.
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Research done in the capacity of being a PhD candidate at Monash university.
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Monash University, Wellington Rd, Clayton, VIC, 3800, Australia
James Curtin
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Curtin, J. Wild Animal Suffering Interventionism and Ecological Destruction. J Agric Environ Ethics 39, 3 (2026). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-025-09968-y
Received: 29 March 2025
Accepted: 13 November 2025
Published: 03 December 2025
Version of record: 03 December 2025
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-025-09968-y