In Europe, there is a strong desire to make sense of the current madness unfolding in the United States. After all, this shift toward authoritarianism is occurring in one of the world’s oldest democracies and the Western world’s cultural focal point for over a century. The US remains by far the world’s greatest military power, with a defense budget that exceeds the combined spending of the next eight nations—and Donald Trump wants to double it again, even if that is currently fiscally unrealistic.

Donald Trump comes from the world of entertainment, and that is exactly how he governs. He is a high-performance “bullshit machine,” an obvious narcissist, and a breathless agitator against anyone who stands in his way. It is therefore easy to get lost in the daily announcement machinery of the White House: the large and small smoke screens, the vulgarities, the constant attacks on the media and the opposition, and the many small news items that mark the transition from a functioning democracy and the rule of law toward authoritarianism.

When analyzing this long-term shift, staccato, Twitter-style outbursts are unhelpful. Instead, it is useful to zoom out from the day-to-day madness. Viewed soberly, there is one clear primary cause for why quasi-fascist ideas have suddenly become so attractive to a large portion of the population in one of the oldest and wealthiest democracies: the fear of national decline amidst the transition from the unipolar era (US dominance) toward an asymmetric bipolarity between the US and China.

All the shouting, the lashing out, and the disturbing fixation on a supposedly golden past within the MAGA movement is essentially this: fear of the end of an era in which the US was the only remaining superpower on Earth, setting the tone not only militarily but also economically, culturally, and politically.

The irony of history is, of course, that Trump’s lashing out—even toward historically allied nations in Europe and Canada—has de facto divided the West and NATO, further accelerating this very decline.

The Thucydides Trap

The systemic rivalry between the US and China is the central axis we must examine to categorize further developments in world politics. According to Power Transition Theory, the phase in which a challenger (China) reaches 80 to 120 percent of the hegemon’s (USA) capacity is the most dangerous. In the coming ten years, China will struggle with structural problems (demographics, debt), which could close a "window of opportunity" for risky foreign policy (such as Taiwan). Paradoxically, according to the theory, this further increases the risk of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Harvard political scientist Graham T. Allison describes this as the "Thucydides Trap."

The theory: When a rising power threatens to displace an established leader, the resulting geopolitical tension frequently leads to war. The name traces back to the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who wrote about the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC): "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable."

Graham Allison and his team at the Belfer Center examined 16 historical cases from the last 500 years in which an "upstart" challenged an established power. Out of these, twelve ended in war and only four peacefully.

Source: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Multi-Alignment States as Winners in a Bipolar World

Middle powers such as India, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia will play a central role in future geopolitical developments because they are unlikely to join fixed blocs. Instead, they practice "multi-alignment" to extract concessions from both sides. This makes the international system more volatile, but also less rigid than it was during the Cold War.

India, in particular, as a rising emerging market that cannot be clearly assigned to either power bloc, has strong prospects. While China struggles with massive aging and a shrinking working-age population, India possesses a "demographic dividend": a young population reservoir. Its rise to become the third-largest economy is imminent, making India appear as an indispensable partner for the West. However, multi-alignment states like India will likely not be reliable partners, but rather "transactionalist powers" acting opportunistically.

Europe, meanwhile, struggles with skilled labor shortages, high pension burdens, and resulting internal distribution conflicts that dampen its global power ambitions. Furthermore, strong population growth in sub-Saharan Africa combined with low economic growth will continue to create migration pressure toward Europe.

Techno-Geopolitics

One battlefield where the systemic competition between China and the US is being fought is, naturally, the field of technology and artificial intelligence. The internet will continue to divide into the "splinternet." States will increasingly rely on sovereign IT—their own hardware and software infrastructures—to reduce dependence on US or Chinese ecosystems. Here, too, Trump—driven by fear of decline—has triggered Europe’s decoupling from US systems, further accelerating the transition into asymmetric bipolarity.

In the integration of AI into military command and control systems, there is a risk of a new type of security dilemma: out of fear of the speed of enemy AI decisions, states may increasingly automate their own systems—a modern update of the dynamics of nuclear deterrence.

The Decline of Petrostates Like Russia

The decarbonization of the economy will continue—with or without the US. It is simply too economically rewarding. Old geopolitical dependencies on Russia and the Arab world are slowly being dissolved, while new ones are being built.

Dependency on lithium, cobalt, and rare earths—currently dominated by China—will gradually replace oil dependency. This could lead to a modern version of the Scramble for Africa and increased activity in Latin America.

States like Russia or Iran, which depend heavily on fossil fuel exports, will experience a further relative loss of power. This could lead to destabilizing "last-ditch" attempts to secure regional influence through military means while resource coffers are still full. However, Russia will likely lack the resources for this following the exhausting war in Ukraine.

Most recently, Russia had to stand by as the allied regime in Syria was toppled; allied President Nicolás Maduro was overthrown in Venezuela without any Russian resistance; and Russia failed completely as Armenia’s regional protective power. Following Russia’s lack of support in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (2023), Armenia froze its membership in the CSTO defense alliance. Where Russia fails as a protector, a power vacuum arises that is filled either by regional forces like Turkey in Syria or by the West.

The long-serving Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, who pushed significant energy and infrastructure projects with Russia, was overthrown after mass protests. And in Sri Lanka, the pro-Russian and pro-Chinese Rajapaksa family had to leave the country following an economic collapse and protests. With massive protests in Iran and a potential US intervention on the horizon, Russia could be facing its next geopolitical defeat.

Conclusion

The frantic and erratic actions of Donald Trump and the dismantling of decades-old alliances will damage trust in the US for decades—even if the MAGA Republicans lose their power base again. A country that elects an unpredictable narcissist with authoritarian tendencies like Trump as president will find it difficult for decades to rebuild trust within the established democracies of Europe, Canada, and other nations like Japan.

Trump promises a return to unipolarity ("MAGA") but, through his isolationism, de facto accelerates bipolarity.

The coming ten years are therefore likely not an era of cooperation to solve global problems like the climate crisis and pandemics, but rather an era of risk management. Power is increasingly defined by technological autarky and the resilience of one’s own supply chains, rather than by international treaties.

The article is an automated translation of an article originally published in German.