Warfare is governed by two inherently opposing logics: the “economic” logic of optimization and balance, and the logic of decision—overwhelming force at a critical point that decides an outcome. This tension runs through all levels of war. 🧵
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The logic of economics encompasses purely attritional warfare, although it also extends far beyond: warfare by balance sheet, allocating forces to where they can get the best casualty ratios, while defending terrain whose capture might improve the enemy’s ratio. **
This can apply to anything from tactical dispositions to force structure. Exploiting Ricardian advantage—itself a concept borrowed from economics—to maximize…
Warfare is governed by two inherently opposing logics: the “economic” logic of optimization and balance, and the logic of decision—overwhelming force at a critical point that decides an outcome. This tension runs through all levels of war. 🧵
**
The logic of economics encompasses purely attritional warfare, although it also extends far beyond: warfare by balance sheet, allocating forces to where they can get the best casualty ratios, while defending terrain whose capture might improve the enemy’s ratio. **
This can apply to anything from tactical dispositions to force structure. Exploiting Ricardian advantage—itself a concept borrowed from economics—to maximize cost-effectiveness is an application of economic logic to grand strategy.
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The opposite of attrition is not maneuver, but decision. Its corresponding logic demands large concentrations of force to snatch fleeting opportunities which bring disproportionate rewards—this makes it worth a high price in blood and wasted resources.
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War is fluid, and neither logic prevails throughout. Repeated attempts at decision can exhaust a combatant, while applying purely economic logic makes war more costly in the long run and cedes the initiative to the enemy. But it can be hard to gauge which predominates. **
A good illustration is Napoleon at Borodino. By pursuing the Russian army past Smolensk, he far exceeded the bounds of his logistical support in order to clinch a decisive victory—a victory he needed *quickly* lest he fall prey to the inexorable logic of his supply situation. **
Borodino was therefore his last chance to fight the Russians on anything near favorable terms. For all that, he was surprisingly cautious in the battle itself: he rejected Davout’s proposed flank attack and numerous pleas to commit the Old Guard at the end of the battle. **
It’s impossible to say whether either course of action would have paid off, and things are always clearer in hindsight. Nevertheless, Napoleon’s refusal to gamble at the one moment it made most sense suggests he didn’t grasp the full implications of the competing logics at play. **
German logic through WWI demonstrates another confusion. After their attempt at rapid decision in the west foundered in 1914, they were left with excellent ground, dominating the high ground along much of the front. **
The natural move was to exploit this economic logic and remain on the defensive in France, then concentrate forces in the east to win a decisive victory there, following the example of their crushing victory at Tannenberg.
Instead, they continued to seek a decision in the west. **
They further confused the issue by trying to bleed France white at Verdun—seeking a decisive outcome through inherently economic logic.
As such, they were unable to win a decision on either front until after America entered the war, fatally tipping the balance against them. **
Correctly assessing the prevailing logic is extremely difficult—fluid situations, sunk costs, delayed outcomes, and the fog of war make it inherently uncertain. Yet it remains essential to crafting a workable theory of victory.
Read the full piece here: dispatch.bazaarofwar.com/p/economics-vs… **
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Oct 27
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