Key takeaways

• While the U.S.’s share in global exports and output has declined, the dollar’s transactional dominance is still evident in areas including FX volumes and trade invoicing.
• On the other hand, de-dollarization is unfolding in central bank FX reserves, where the share of USD has slid to a two-decade low.
• In fixed income, the share of foreign ownership in the U.S. Treasury market has fallen over the last 15 years, pointing to reduced reliance on the dollar.
• De-dollarization is most visible in commodity markets, where a large and growing proportion of energy is being priced in non-dollar-denominated contracts.

The U.S. dollar is the world’s primary reserve currency, and it is also the most widely used currency for trade and other international transactions. However, its hegemony has come into question in recent times due to geopolitical and geostrategic shifts. As a result, de-dollarization has increasingly become a substantive topic of discussion among investors, corporates and market participants more broadly.

What are the potential implications of de-dollarization, and how is it playing out in global markets and trade?

In short, de-dollarization entails a significant reduction in the use of dollars in world trade and financial transactions, decreasing national, institutional and corporate demand for the greenback.

“The concept of de-dollarization relates to changes in the structural demand for the dollar that would relate to its status as a reserve currency. This encompasses areas that relate to the longer-term use of the dollar, such as transactional dominance in FX volumes or commodities trade, denomination of liabilities and share in central bank FX reserves,” said Luis Oganes, head of Global Macro Research at J.P. Morgan.

Importantly, this structural shift is distinct from the cyclical demand for the greenback, which is shorter term and has in recent times been driven by U.S. exceptionalism, including the relative outperformance of the U.S. equity market. “The world has become long on the dollar in recent years, but as U.S. exceptionalism erodes, it should be reasonable to expect the overhang in USD longs to diminish as well,” Oganes said.

There are two main factors that could erode the dollar’s status. The first includes adverse events that undermine the perceived safety and stability of the greenback — and the U.S.’s overall standing as the world’s leading economic, political and military power. For instance, increased polarization in the U.S. could jeopardize its governance, which underpins its role as a global safe haven. Ongoing U.S. tariff policy could also cause investors to lose confidence in American assets.

The second factor involves positive developments outside the U.S. that boost the credibility of alternative currencies — economic and political reforms in China, for example. “A candidate reserve currency must be perceived as safe and stable and must provide a source of liquidity that is sufficient to meet growing global demand,” said Alexander Wise, who covers Long-Term Strategy at J.P. Morgan.

Fundamentally, de-dollarization could shift the balance of power among countries, and this could, in turn, reshape the global economy and markets. The impact would be most acutely felt in the U.S., where de-dollarization would likely lead to a broad depreciation and underperformance of U.S. financial assets versus the rest of the world.

“For U.S. equities, outright and relative returns would be negatively impacted by divestment or reallocation away from U.S. markets and a severe loss in confidence. There would also likely be upward pressure on real yields due to the partial divestment of U.S. fixed income by investors, or the diversification or reduction of international reserve allocations,” Wise said.

The U.S.’s share in global exports and output has declined over the past three decades, while China’s has increased substantially. Nonetheless, the transactional dominance of the dollar is still evident in FX volumes, trade invoicing, cross-border liabilities denomination and foreign currency debt issuance.

In 2022, the greenback dominated 88% of traded FX volumes — close to record highs — while the Chinese yuan (CNY) made up just 7%, according to data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).

Likewise, there is little sign of USD erosion in trade invoicing. “The share of USD and EUR has held steady over the past two decades at around 40–50%. While the share of CNY is increasing in China’s cross-border transactions as it moves to conduct bilateral trade in its own currency terms, it is still low from a global standpoint,” Oganes observed.

The dollar has also stoutly maintained its superiority when it comes to cross-border liabilities, where its market share stands at 48%. And in foreign currency debt issuance, its share has remained constant since the global financial crisis, at around 70%. “The daylight from the euro, whose share is at 20%, is even greater on this front,” Oganes added.

On the other hand, de-dollarization is unfolding in central bank FX reserves, where the share of USD has slid to a two-decade low in tandem with its macro footprint. “However, the dollar share in FX reserves was lower in the early 1990s, so the recent decline to just under 60% is not completely out of the norm,” said Meera Chandan, co-head of Global FX Strategy at J.P. Morgan.

While much of the reallocation of FX reserves has gone to CNY and other currencies, USD and EUR still dominate levels. “The CNY footprint is still very small, even if growing, and its push for bilateral invoicing is likely to keep this trend on the upswing,” Chandan noted.

The main de-dollarization trend in FX reserves, however, pertains to the growing demand for gold. Seen as an alternative to heavily indebted fiat currencies, the share of gold in FX reserves has increased, led by emerging market (EM) central banks — China, Russia and Türkiye have been the largest buyers in the last decade. Overall, while the share of gold in FX reserves in EM is still low at 9%, the figure is more than double the 4% seen a decade ago; the corresponding share for DM countries is much larger at 20%. This increased demand has in turn partly driven the current bull market in gold, with prices forecast to climb toward $4,000/oz by mid-2026.

The dollar’s share of FX reserves has declined in tandem with the U.S.’s share of global GDP and exports.

In a sign of de-dollarization in bond markets, the share of foreign ownership in the U.S. Treasury market has been declining over the last 15 years.

USD assets, principally liquid Treasuries, account for the majority of allocated FX reserves. However, demand for Treasuries has stagnated among foreign official institutions, as the growth of FX reserves has slowed and the USD’s share of reserves has dropped from its recent peak. Similarly, the backdrop for foreign private demand has weakened — as yields have risen across DM government bond markets, Treasuries have become relatively less attractive. While foreign investors remain the largest constituent within the Treasury market, their share of ownership has fallen to 30% as of early 2025 — down from a peak of above 50% during the GFC.

“Although foreign demand has not kept pace with the growth of the Treasury market for more than a decade, we must consider what more aggressive action could mean. Japan is the largest foreign creditor and alone holds more than $1.1 trillion Treasuries, or nearly 4% of the market. Accordingly, any significant foreign selling would be impactful, driving yields higher,” said Jay Barry, head of Global Rates Strategy at J.P. Morgan.

According to estimates by J.P. Morgan Research, each 1-percentage-point decline in foreign holdings relative to GDP (or approximately $300 billion of Treasuries) would result in yields rising by more than 33 basis points (bp). “While this is not our base case, it nonetheless underscores the impact of foreign investment on risk-free rates,” Barry added.

“Today, a large and growing proportion of energy is being priced in non-dollar-denominated contracts.”

Natasha Kaneva

Head of Global Commodities Strategy, J.P. Morgan

De-dollarization is most visible in commodity markets, where the greenback’s influence on pricing has diminished. “Today, a large and growing proportion of energy is being priced in non-dollar-denominated contracts,” said Natasha Kaneva, head of Global Commodities Strategy at J.P. Morgan.

For example, due to Western sanctions, Russian oil products exported eastward and southward are being sold in the local currencies of buyers, or in the currencies of countries Russia perceives as friendly. Among buyers, India, China and Turkey are all either using or seeking alternatives to the dollar. Saudi Arabia is also considering adding yuan-denominated futures contracts in the pricing model of Saudi Arabian oil, though progress has been slow.

Notably, cross-border trade settlement in yuan is gaining ground outside of oil too. Some Indian companies have started paying for Russian coal imports in yuan, even without the involvement of Chinese intermediaries. Bangladesh also recently decided to pay Russia for its 1.4 GW nuclear power plant in yuan.

“The de-dollarization trend in the commodity trade is a boon for countries like India, China, Brazil, Thailand and Indonesia, which can now not only buy oil at a discount, but also pay for it with their own local currencies,” Kaneva noted. “This reduces the need for precautionary reserves of U.S. dollars, U.S. Treasuries and oil, which might in turn free up capital to be deployed in growth-boosting domestic projects.”

At the other end of the spectrum, deposit dollarization — where a significant portion of a country’s bank deposits are denominated in the U.S. dollar instead of the local currency — is still evident in many EM countries. “The tendency of EM residents to dollarize in times of stress appears to be correlated across markets,” said Jonny Goulden, head of EM Fixed Income Strategy at J.P. Morgan.

According to J.P. Morgan Research, dollar deposits have grown mostly uninterrupted over the last decade in EM, reaching around $830 billion for a sample set of 18 EM countries (excluding China, Singapore and Hong Kong). “While there are large regional divergences in deposit dollarization across EM, all regions are more dollarized now than they were a decade ago,” Goulden noted. Latin America is the most dollarized region, with an aggregate dollarization rate of 19.1%. EMEA’s rate stands at 15.2%, while Asia (excluding China, Singapore and Hong Kong) has the lowest rate at 9.7%.

China is the exception, as its dollarization rate has been persistently falling since 2017. “This is not surprising, as this was around the time when U.S.–China relations began shifting into their current state, marked by the trade war and growing diplomatic, security and geopolitical tensions,” Goulden said. “This suggests that China, alongside progress on de-dollarizing its own cross-border transactions, has effectively been de-dollarizing the deposits of Chinese residents, adding another dimension to its efforts to separate from U.S. dominance.”

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