Julia Demaree Nikhinson, Associated Press

President Trump speaks at a dedication ceremony for a portion of Southern Boulevard, which the Town of Palm Beach Council recently voted to rename,”President Donald J. Trump Boulevard,” Jan. 16, 2026, at his Mar-a-Lago Club in Palm Beach, Fla.

Just over two weeks ago, in a “one-day war,” the U.S. launched a mission that seized Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro and his wife. As of a few days ago, in response to President Trump’s threat to acquire Greenland, several NATO allies deployed a small number of forces to prevent its NATO partner from invading a fellow NATO partner.

Given the bizarre nature of these events, it’s hard to believe they actually happened.

What hasn’t happened is another question. Why has the U.S. not yet attacked Iran to protect the Iranians rioting in protest against an incompetent and autocratic government? Let’s pose an entirely speculative thought experiment to address that question.

First, press reports have been vague as to why no strike has occurred. Trump was adamant. Many, myself included, believed that when the U.S. had sufficient forces in the region, an attack would be launched. For the time being, Trump has backed off that threat arguing that the mullahs in Tehran are no longer killing their citizens protesting their rule.

Whether that assessment is correct or not, it makes sense that a president would declare victory if they believed the killing had stopped. But let us speculate a bit more.

No doubt Trump was serious in making that threat. With the success of Maduro’s capture behind him and the assurance of America’s military prowess in the Midnight Hammer missions last June that hammered Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, taking on the ayatollahs would seem easy. But what might his advisors cautioned?

Before Midnight Hammer and in his first term, Trump halted a retaliatory hit against Iran after it had shot down a U.S. Reaper spy drone. Why? The reason given was the possibility of collateral civilian casualties. Would that be repeated if the U.S. struck a range of Iranian targets?

Someone might have briefed the president on Operation Eagle Claw, the failed 1980 hostage rescue mission to free U.S. citizens held in the former U.S. embassy in Tehran. That fiasco ended in disaster almost before it started, with a collision between one of the mission’s CH-46 helicopters and a C-130 refueled at Desert One in a remote part of Iran.

Operation Eagle Claw, in part, cost Jimmy Carter the 1980 election. With U.S. elections in November, would Trump risk another failure? While there were not sufficient forces in the Gulf to assure a successful strike to halt the violence, no doubt planning was completed on what to hit and what not.

One can assume that cyberattacks to immobilize Iranian defenses, much as in Venezuela, would be carried out. Attempts to restore the internet or not would be considered. And no doubt greater sanctions against the mullahs and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps would be imposed. But what other targets might be struck?

The fundamental question must be: What is the strategic purpose of any action in Iran, kinetic or otherwise? Is it to prevent the further slaughter of Iranians? Is it to foment a regime change? Is it to punish the theocracy? Or was it to force the mullahs from further violence against the public?

Given the broad nature of the riots, preventing further violence would require striking many targets, presumably of the Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Basij units. Although the Quds force primarily acts abroad to support allies, it might be called into action against civilians. So it is unclear how, other than punitive strikes, a sufficient number of regime elements could be targeted to stop violence against protesting Iranians.

On regime change, who would govern once the mullahs were out? There is no sign of an internal government that is ready to take charge. If external leaders such as Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, the shah’s son, were to return — as was tried in Iraq — the chances of success would be slim. And the Revolutionary Guard Corps might be even more radical than the clerics in putting down any protests and even restarting the nuclear program. And punishing the regime made little sense.

So what is the administration’s Iran policy today? While awaiting the arrival of a carrier strike group to the Gulf, here is a radical idea. Why not negotiate with the mullahs to determine if the regime will be prepared to allow more freedoms to its people? Can the nuclear agreement be restarted? And can Iran return to the international community?

Perhaps the answers are no. But why not try?

Harlan Ullman, Ph.D., is UPI’s Arnaud deBorchgrave Distinguished Columnist, a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council, the chairman of two private companies and the principal author of the doctrine of shock and awe. He and former United Kingdom Defense Chief David Richards are the authors of a forthcoming book on preventing strategic catastrophe.

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