Paper 2025/2302

Attacking and Securing Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption Against Power Analysis

Maciej Czuprynko, Graz University of Technology

Nedžma Musovic, Graz University of Technology

Emira Salkić, Graz University of Technology

Sujoy Sinha Roy, Graz University of Technology

Abstract

We present the first power side-channel analysis of a Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption (HHE) tailored symmetric encryption scheme. HHE combines lightweight client-side Symmetric Encryption (SE) with server-side homomorphic evaluation, enabling efficient privacy-preserving computation for the client and minimizing the communication overhead. Recent integer-based HHE designs such as PASTA, MASTA, HERA, and Rubato rely on prime-field arithmetic, but their side-channel security has not been studied. This gap is critical, as modular arithmetic and large key spaces in integer-based schemes introduce new leakage vectors distinct from those in conventional Boolean symmetric ciphers. In this work, we close this gap by presenting the first power side-channel analysis of an HHE-tailored scheme - HERA. Our results demonstrate a successful key recovery from as few as 40 power traces using Correlation Power Analysis. In addition to showing that such attacks are feasible, we develop the first masking framework for integer-based SE schemes to mitigate them. Our design integrates PINI-secure gadgets with assembly-level countermeasures to address transition leakage, and we validate its effectiveness using the Test Vector Leakage Assessment. Our experiments confirm both the practicality of the attack and the strength of the proposed countermeasures. We also demonstrate that the framework extends to other integer-based HHE schemes, by applying our technique to PASTA. Thus, we provide leakage models, identify relevant attack targets, and define evaluation benchmarks for integer-based HHE-tailored SE schemes, thereby filling a longstanding gap and laying the foundation for side-channel-resilient design in this area.

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/2302,
author = {Aikata Aikata and Maciej Czuprynko and Nedžma Musovic and Emira Salkić and Sujoy Sinha Roy},
title = {Attacking and Securing Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption Against Power Analysis},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/2302},
year = {2025},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2302}
}