BAKU, Azerbaijan, January 21. When China’s 15th Five-Year Plan came into force at the start of 2026, it did not look revolutionary at first glance. Five-year plans rarely do. But behind the familiar language about high-quality growth sits a clearer and narrower goal than before: reduce dependence on foreign technology in areas where external pressure has proven costly. Chips, artificial intelligence and quantum systems are no longer just priorities. They are framed as vulnerabilities that need to be closed within one planning cycle.

The shift becomes clearer when compared with the previous plan. The 14th Five-Year Plan, covering 2021–2025, focused on dual circulation, an attempt to balance domestic demand with continued openness to global markets. That approach delivered measurable results. GDP growth averaged above 5% despite the pandemic years, domestic consumption accounted for more than 86% of growth, and spending on research and development rose by nearly 50% compared with 2020. China moved into the top ten of the Global Innovation Index and became the world’s largest source of patent applications.

Yet those gains did not translate into security in the technologies that matter most. Semiconductor self-sufficiency remained around 30% by the end of 2025. Advanced manufacturing equipment, particularly in lithography, stayed heavily dependent on imports. U.S. export controls made these gaps visible and, from Beijing’s perspective, politically unacceptable. The 15th plan is a response to that experience rather than a continuation of earlier optimism about globalization.

The promise of the new plan is straightforward. If China can reliably supply its own chips, AI hardware and next-generation computing systems, it reduces the risk of external disruption across its economy. Manufacturing, energy, transportation and defense all become less exposed to decisions made abroad. In AI, where China already hosts more than 4,500 companies and has models approaching global benchmarks at lower cost, deeper integration could raise productivity in traditional sectors rather than just create new tech firms. Quantum technologies, where China has invested early and heavily, could give it advantages in secure communications and specialized computing well before these systems mature elsewhere.

There is also an economic logic behind the strategy. During the 14th plan, high-tech manufacturing value added rose more than 40%, and R&D intensity approached the OECD average. The leadership’s argument is that the next stage of growth cannot come from more infrastructure or property investment, but from applying technology to raise efficiency. If that works, China could sustain moderate growth even as its workforce shrinks and external demand becomes less reliable.

But the risks are equally concrete. Building full technology stacks domestically is expensive and slow. Semiconductor manufacturing is not just about fabs; it depends on ecosystems of materials, precision components, software tools and accumulated know-how. Despite massive state investment - more than $150 billion directed into chips over the past decade - China still lags in key equipment segments. Catching up by 2030 is possible in some areas, but unlikely across the board.

There is also a question of efficiency. State-led investment can mobilize capital quickly, but it can also lead to duplication and weak incentives. China’s chip sector already shows signs of overcapacity in mature nodes, while advanced processes remain constrained. If similar patterns appear in AI hardware or quantum systems, the result could be high spending with limited commercial payoff.

Internationally, the plan cuts both ways. A push for technological independence reduces China’s openness in sensitive areas and may accelerate fragmentation in global supply chains. At the same time, Beijing has been careful not to close the door entirely. The 2026 tariff adjustments lowered import duties on hundreds of products that China still cannot supply at scale, from advanced manufacturing components to medical technologies. That suggests policymakers recognize the need for foreign inputs during the transition, even as they plan to replace them over time.

For foreign companies, this creates a narrow and shifting window. In the short term, there are opportunities to supply components and materials that China lacks. In the longer term, successful localization will reduce that space, particularly in strategic sectors. Whether this leads to a cleaner division of technological blocs or continued interdependence at lower levels remains an open question.

The 15th Five-Year Plan does not guarantee success or failure. What it does signal is a clearer set of trade-offs. Greater resilience may come at the cost of higher spending and slower efficiency gains. Reduced exposure to sanctions may also reduce the benefits of global collaboration. For China, the challenge is to convert political urgency into usable technology without locking itself into rigid systems that are hard to reform later.

Whether this strategy strengthens China’s economy or narrows its options will depend less on slogans and more on execution. The plan has only just begun. What it produces - autonomy with flexibility, or insulation with friction - will become clearer long before 2030.