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For years, quantum computing felt like an exciting theory with no immediate risk, but that’s no longer the case.

The gap between theory and application is steadily being closed by rapid advances made in quantum research.

Senior Product Manager at Fastly.

The looming danger is what attackers are already doing and can already exploit today, such as harvesting encrypted data intending to decrypt it later using quantum-powered tools.

It’s a tactic known as “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later”, and it’s reshaping how organizations need to think about security.

Quantum disruption isn’t hypothetical anymore

The countdown to quantum relevance is well underway. Governments and technology leaders alike are pouring billions into quantum research. Companies like Google, IBM and others have made public strides in error correction and quantum bit (qubit) stability. And crucially, attackers are already planning for the day quantum cryptanalysis becomes viable.

This is obviously a concern for governments and larger research institutions. But businesses that handle intellectual property, health records, financial transactions or sensitive communications are also potential targets. The risk is especially acute for data with long-term value, because once quantum capability arrives, encrypted archives will become easy targets.

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TLS is the first line of defense, and why it’s vulnerable

TLS underpins most internet security - encrypting everything from ecommerce transactions and email to banking and APIs. But TLS today relies heavily on classical cryptographic algorithms like RSA and ECC, both of which are vulnerable to Shor’s algorithm, a quantum method capable of solving problems once thought computationally unfeasible.

Using larger key sizes won’t provide protection. Quantum attacks completely shatter all forms of encryption. A 4096-bit RSA key, secure against classical brute-force attacks, would fall in minutes to a sufficiently powerful quantum computer. Once that happens, someone could decrypt intercepted TLS sessions retroactively. This would compromise the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of past communications.

Hybrid post-quantum cryptography is TLS’s lifeline

Recognizing this threat, the global cryptographic community has rallied around a new generation of algorithms that resist quantum attacks. Among the most promising is ML-KEM (formerly known as Kyber), a lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism now standardized by NIST.

ML-KEM withstands attacks from both classical and quantum adversaries. Its mathematical foundation - the Module Learning With Errors problem - remains difficult even for quantum computers to solve. Therefore, it is a cornerstone for post-quantum security in TLS 1.3 when you deploy it as part of a hybrid key exchange with classical algorithms like X25519.

This hybrid approach is vital because it ensures backward compatibility and smooth transitions. This allows clients and servers to negotiate connections using both classical and quantum-resistant keys. A hybrid deployment allows organizations to have a higher security posture for ‌modern devices while still being able to support legacy devices that are still in their fleet.

The industry scramble and the race to readiness

Tech giants are already moving. Several companies have launched experimental or production-grade support for hybrid TLS using ML-KEM. Organizations must adapt or face compromise; it’s no longer a question of "if" but "when."

Beyond technical readiness, regulatory pressure is building. The White House has issued post-quantum cryptography transition mandates for federal agencies. The EU is working on similar standards. And forward-looking companies are positioning quantum readiness as a competitive differentiator, showing customers and partners they take long-term security seriously.

What organizations should do now

Waiting for a quantum attack is not a viable strategy, and organizations should act now to begin the transition to post-quantum security. Taking a comprehensive inventory of all systems that rely on public-key cryptography - including TLS, VPNs, internal APIs and messaging platforms - is the first step to creating visibility into areas of vulnerability.

From there, teams should begin testing hybrid TLS 1.3 configurations using cryptographic libraries such as OpenSSL that support ML-KEM. It’s equally important to check-in with vendors and partners to assess their post-quantum cryptography (PQC) readiness and ensure their products support the transition.

Internally, IT and security teams need education and training on the key differences between classical and quantum-resistant algorithms, so they can make informed implementation decisions.

Finally, organizations should begin building a phased migration roadmap that integrates hybrid or post-quantum cryptographic support into upcoming IT infrastructure upgrades. Taking these steps now ensures long-term security without compromising today’s performance.

Organizations can adopt Hybrid TLS incrementally. Some platforms already offer support for hybrid key exchanges using ML-KEM, allowing organizations to test and deploy without disrupting existing traffic. Clients that support post-quantum algorithms will use them; others will continue to work with their existing methods.

Future-proofing security starts today

The same quantum capabilities that will break classical encryption will also empower attackers in unforeseen ways. Businesses must adapt now rather than reacting later down the road because cyber threats are not standing still.

Post-quantum security revolves around staying in the race because when quantum arrives, it won’t send a warning. Those who have acted early in the transition to quantum-resilient TLS will have the trust, compliance and resilience to meet the challenges ahead.

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Senior Product Manager at Fastly.

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