The rhetoric and optics of the Russian president Vladimir Putin’s visit to India last week allude to the strength of the bilateral relationship: Narendra Modi greeted Putin at the airport with a hug, and the leaders shared a car journey (echoing the “limo diplomacy” when Putin and Donald Trump met in Alaska earlier this year). In his remarks, Modi referred to Putin as “my friend” and the India-Russia relationship as a “guiding star”, built on “mutual respect and deep trust” that had “stood the test of time”. This was Putin’s 10th visit to India since he assumed power 25 years ago, and his 20th meeting with Modi since the latter became prime minister in 2014.

However, there is a gap between the symbolism and the substance of this relationship. While Putin pledged “uninterrupted fuel supplies” to India, the country’a companies are buying less Russian oil in the face of US tariffs and sanctions. Russia and India concluded a string of memorandums of understanding in areas from migration and mobility to health and food security, maritime cooperation, fertilisers, customs, and academic and media collaboration. But the anticipated announcements on major defence deals did not happen. India has not concluded any major defence deals with Russia since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This has been fuelled by delays in the delivery of several platforms and spare parts as Moscow has prioritised its own defence needs. This is a trend that predates the war in Ukraine as New Delhi has sought to diversify its defence imports and strengthen its domestic production.

This all suggests that the India-Russia relationship does not hold the same geopolitical heft it once did. During the cold war, India maintained preferential barter arrangements and market access to the Soviet Union and its satellite states. This privileged relationship reached its pinnacle in 1971, when New Delhi and Moscow concluded a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation ahead of a war that India fought with Pakistan, during which Islamabad was backed by the US and China. While both countries have sought to maintain a semblance of this relationship through their “special and privileged strategic partnership”, announced in 2010, the reality is that their engagement does not hold the same significance as New Delhi has deepened relations with the west.

New Delhi will not sever its important** relationship with Moscow. But as the west applies pressure on India to reduce its Russian oil imports, both countries are seeking to diversify the relationship into other areas. During Putin’s visit, India and Russia announced an economic cooperation programme lasting until 2030 that aims to make their relationship “more diversified, balanced and sustainable”. This includes improving market access for Indian products to address a trade imbalance that is heavily skewed in Russia’s favour, amid a sharp increase in India’s buying of Russian oil **(up from less than 1% before the war in Ukraine to 35% – though many Indian refiners paused buying Russian oil in October). Cooperation between the two countries spans several strategically important sectors – from space and nuclear to defence and food security.

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At an ideological level, there is still a high degree of affinity with Russia, particularly among the older generation of policymakers in New Delhi, who remember the pivotal role Moscow played in supporting India during the cold war. This has translated into a degree of sympathy for the Russian narrative of the war in Ukraine – that it was triggered by Nato expansion into Russia’s self-perceived sphere of influence. Amid the recent war of words between India and the US, with Trump and his officials referring to India as a “dead” economy and a “laundromat for the Kremlin”, many in India see Russia as a more reliable partner.

And yet it is also important to recognise what hasn’t happened. During Modi’s visit to China in August, much was made of the photos showing Modi, Putin and the Chinese president, Xi Jinping with each other. While this prompted speculation about an emerging triple entente, it did not translate into a formal revival of the Russia-India-China trilateral relationship that Moscow spearheaded in the 1990s, but which has lost momentum in recent years. Modi did not attend a military parade in Beijing where several world leaders, including Putin and the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, were present. This reflects New Delhi’s desire to project a worldview that is non-western but not explicitly anti-western.

This does not belie the fact that there are inherent contradictions in India’s foreign policy. It is set to conclude a free trade agreement with the EU, following a trade deal with the UK earlier this year. On the sidelines of the G20 summit in South Africa in November, Australia, Canada and India also announced a trilateral technology and innovation partnership. There are 10 times as many Indian students studying in the US than there are in Russia, although efforts are being made to strengthen people-to-people contacts between India and Russia with the opening of two new Indian consulates there, a simplification of visa regimes and a labour mobility agreement.

The challenge, of course, is the ongoing war in Ukraine. The 70-point joint statement concluded during Putin’s India visit made no reference to Ukraine, although it ironically makes reference to the India-Russia relationship as an “anchor of global peace and stability”. Despite Modi’s much-touted statements that “now is not the era of war”, New Delhi’s actions regarding the conflict in Ukraine have been limited (at least publicly).

How will India square this circle? New Delhi will be hoping that the ongoing peace negotiations will bear fruit, leading to a cessation of hostilities and a removal of a key thorn in India’s relations with the west. However, even when a peace deal is reached, if this remains short of a “just peace” that upholds Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, scrutiny of the India-Russia relationship will continue in western capitals.

Dr Chietigj Bajpaee is senior fellow for south Asia at the thinktank Chatham House