Rhetoric

By Aristotle — Stylized and condensed in the manner of Strunk & White

Presented without commentary, save the following Editor’s Note:

I constructed this because I tried to read the original text (which may be found here) and struggled over many inverted turns of phrase. This version tries to make accessible the core ideas, while preserving the exact paragraph structure of the original. I hope you find it of use.

BOOK I

Part 1

Rhetoric corresponds to Dialectic. Both concern matters common to all men, not specific sciences. Thus, everyone uses both; everyone attempts to discuss, maintain, defend, and attack statements. Ordinary people do this randomly or through practice. Since both ways work, we can handle the subject systematically. We can inquire why some succeed through practice and others spontaneously. Everyone agrees that such inquiry belongs to an art.

Current treatises on rhetoric cover only a small part of the art. Persuasion is the art’s only true constituent; the rest is accessory. These writers ignore enthymemes, the substance of persuasion, and focus on non-essentials. Arousing prejudice, pity, and anger appeals to the judge, not the facts. If all trials followed the strict rules of well-governed states, these writers would be silenced. Ideally, laws should define rules, leaving little to the judge’s discretion. This prevents perverting the judge with emotion—like warping a carpenter’s rule. A litigant should only prove the facts: what happened or did not happen. The judge must decide on justice and importance, not take instructions from the litigants.

Well-drawn laws should define nearly every point, leaving little to the judges. First, finding a few sensible legislators is easier than finding many just judges. Second, laws result from long consideration, whereas court decisions are hasty. Third, the lawgiver judges prospectively and generally; the jury decides definite, present cases. Often, friendship, hatred, or self-interest obscures the jury’s vision. Therefore, the judge should decide as little as possible. He must decide only whether something happened, since the lawgiver cannot foresee the future. Consequently, writers who theorize about the ‘introduction’ or ‘narration’ ignore the art’s essentials. They only teach how to manipulate the judge’s mind, not how to use enthymemes.

Although political and forensic oratory share the same principles, and political oratory is nobler, authors focus solely on pleading in court. In political oratory, non-essentials matter less. It is less unscrupulous because it treats wider issues. The judge in a political debate decides his own interests. The speaker need only prove the facts. In forensic oratory, however, one must conciliate the listener. The judges, intent on their own satisfaction, often surrender to the disputants rather than judge them. Thus, many courts forbid irrelevant speaking; in public assemblies, the judges protect themselves.

Rhetoric, strictly speaking, concerns modes of persuasion. Persuasion is a form of demonstration; we are most persuaded when we consider a thing demonstrated. The rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme, the most effective mode of persuasion. The enthymeme is a syllogism. Dialectic studies syllogisms. Therefore, he who understands the syllogism best will best understand the enthymeme, provided he knows its subject matter. The faculty that recognizes truth also recognizes probability. A man who guesses well at truth will guess well at probabilities.

We have shown that ordinary writers on rhetoric treat non-essentials and favor forensic oratory.

Rhetoric is useful for four reasons. First, truth and justice naturally prevail. If judgments fail, the speakers are to blame. Second, exact knowledge does not always convince an audience; we must use notions possessed by everybody. Third, we must be able to argue on opposite sides—not to deceive, but to understand the facts and confute unfair arguments. Only dialectic and rhetoric draw opposite conclusions impartially, though truth is easier to prove. Fourth, it is absurd to be ashamed of physical weakness but not of mental weakness. Rational speech is more distinctive of man than physical strength. If one argues that an unjust orator harms others, this applies to all good things except virtue—strength, health, wealth, and generalship can all be misused.

Rhetoric is not bound to a single subject; it is as universal as dialectic and clearly useful. Its function is not simply to persuade, but to discover the available means of persuasion in each case. In this, it resembles other arts. Medicine does not always heal, but it treats the patient as well as possible. Rhetoric discerns both the real and the apparent means of persuasion, just as dialectic discerns the real and the apparent syllogism. A ‘sophist’ is defined by his moral purpose, not his faculty. In rhetoric, however, ‘rhetorician’ may describe either the speaker’s skill or his purpose. In dialectic, a ‘sophist’ has a specific purpose; a ‘dialectician’ has a specific faculty.

Let us now account for the systematic principles of Rhetoric. We must define rhetoric anew.

Part 2

Rhetoric is the faculty of observing, in any given case, the available means of persuasion. No other art shares this function. Medicine instructs on health, geometry on magnitudes, arithmetic on numbers. Rhetoric, however, observes the means of persuasion on almost any subject. Therefore, it is not concerned with any special class of subjects.

Some modes of persuasion belong to the art of rhetoric; others do not. The latter—witnesses, evidence under torture, written contracts—exist beforehand. The former we construct ourselves. The one kind we use; the other we invent.

Spoken persuasion has three kinds: personal character, audience emotion, and proof. Character persuades when the speech makes the speaker seem credible. We believe good men more readily, especially where certainty is impossible. This persuasion should result from the speech, not from the speaker’s prior reputation. Contrary to some writers, the speaker’s character is his most effective means of persuasion. Secondly, persuasion comes through the hearers when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgments vary with our feelings—pleasure or pain, friendliness or hostility. Present-day writers focus almost exclusively on this. We will discuss this later. Thirdly, persuasion comes through the speech itself when we prove a truth or an apparent truth.

To command these three means, a man must reason logically, understand human character and goodness, and understand the emotions—their nature, causes, and excitation. Thus, rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and ethical (or political) studies. Rhetoric often masquerades as political science, and its professors as experts, sometimes through ignorance, sometimes through ostentation. As stated, rhetoric is a branch of dialectic. Neither is a scientific study of a separate subject; both are faculties for providing arguments.

Regarding proof: as dialectic has induction and syllogism, so does rhetoric. The example is a rhetorical induction; the enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism. Everyone uses either enthymemes or examples to prove a point. Since all proof rests on syllogism or induction (as shown in the Analytics), enthymemes must be syllogisms and examples inductions. The Topics explains the difference. Proving a proposition by similar cases is induction (dialectic) or example (rhetoric). Proving that a distinct proposition follows from certain truths is syllogism (dialectic) or enthymeme (rhetoric). Each type has advantages. Some styles rely on examples, others on enthymemes. Speeches with examples are persuasive, but those with enthymemes excite more applause. We will discuss their sources and uses later. Now let us define the processes.

A statement is persuasive because it is self-evident or appears proved by other statements. In either case, it persuades someone. No art theorizes about individual cases. Medicine treats classes of patients, not just Socrates. Similarly, rhetoric deals with what seems probable to men of a given type, not just to an individual. Dialectic constructs syllogisms from materials calling for discussion; rhetoric draws from regular subjects of debate. Rhetoric deals with matters we deliberate on without systems, addressing listeners who cannot follow long chains of reasoning. We deliberate only on alternative possibilities. Nobody deliberates on the unchangeable.

We can form syllogisms from previous conclusions or from unproved but doubtful premises. The former are too long for untrained thinkers; the latter fail because their premises are not accepted.

Enthymemes and examples deal mainly with the contingent. The enthymeme consists of few propositions, fewer than a normal syllogism. If a proposition is familiar, omit it; the hearer supplies it. To show Dorieus won a contest with a crown as prize, simply say, "He won the Olympic games." Everyone knows the Olympic prize is a crown.

Few rhetorical syllogisms rely on necessary facts. We deliberate on our actions, which are contingent, not necessary. Conclusions about the usual or possible must come from similar premises. Thus, most enthymeme propositions are usually, not necessarily, true. Enthymemes use Probabilities and Signs. A Probability is a thing that usually happens—a contingent universal. Signs relate to the statement as particular to universal or universal to particular. The infallible sign is a "complete proof" (tekmerion); the fallible sign has no specific name. Infallible signs form syllogisms. If a sign is irrefutable, it is a complete proof. For instance, "He has a fever" is an infallible sign that he is ill. A fallible sign, like "He breathes fast" as a sign of fever, is refutable, for one may breathe fast without fever.

We have defined Probability, Sign, and complete proof. The Analytics explains why some form syllogisms and others do not.

The ‘example’ is a kind of induction. It relates part to part, or like to like. When a familiar statement supports a similar one, it is an example. For instance, to show Dionysius seeks a bodyguard to become a despot, we cite Peisistratus and Theagenes, who did the same. These instances support the general principle: a man asking for a bodyguard schemes to become a despot.

One distinction in enthymemes (and dialectical syllogisms) is often overlooked. Some belong to rhetoric or dialectic; others belong to specific arts. Missing this, people fail to see that handling a subject correctly leads them away from pure rhetoric. Dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms use universal Lines of Argument (topoi) applicable to many subjects (e.g., "the more or less"). Special Lines of Argument apply only to specific classes (e.g., ethics or physics). General Lines of Argument increase understanding of no particular class. Special Lines of Argument, however, approach a distinct science. Most enthymemes use special Lines of Argument. We must distinguish the special from the general. Special Lines of Argument are propositions peculiar to a class; general are common to all. We begin with the special. First, let us classify rhetoric.

Part 3

Rhetoric has three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners. The listener determines the speech’s object. He is either a judge of things past or future, or an observer. A member of the assembly decides future events; a juryman, past events; an observer decides on the orator’s skill. Thus, there are three divisions of oratory: political, forensic, and ceremonial.

Political speaking urges action or inaction. Private counsellors and public speakers always take one of these courses. Forensic speaking attacks or defends; litigants always do one or the other. Ceremonial oratory praises or censures. These three kinds refer to three different times. The political orator concerns himself with the future: he advises for or against things to be done. The litigant concerns himself with the past: he accuses or defends regarding things done. The ceremonial orator concerns himself properly with the present: he praises or blames existing conditions, though he may recall the past or guess at the future.

Each kind of rhetoric has a distinct end. The political orator aims at expediency or harmfulness; he urges acceptance because it does good, or rejection because it does harm. All other points—justice, honor—are subsidiary. Litigants aim at justice or injustice; they treat other points as subsidiary. Those who praise or attack aim at honor or disgrace, treating other considerations as subsidiary.

Speakers prove these are the ends by sometimes ignoring everything else. A litigant may admit the fact or the harm, but never the injustice; otherwise, there would be no trial. Political orators often concede anything except that their course is inexpedient. They may not care if enslaving innocent neighbors is unjust. Similarly, those who praise often make a man’s neglect of his own interest a ground for praise. They praise Achilles for championing Patroclus at the cost of his life; to die was noble, though to live was expedient.

Evidently, the orator must command propositions on these three subjects. The propositions of Rhetoric are Complete Proofs, Probabilities, and Signs. Every syllogism is composed of propositions; the enthymeme is a syllogism composed of these specific propositions.

Only possible actions can occur in the past or present. Things that have not occurred or will not occur cannot be done. Therefore, all speakers must have propositions about the possible and the impossible, and about whether a thing has happened or will happen. Further, all men attempt to prove that good or harm, honor or disgrace, justice or injustice, is great or small. Thus, we must command propositions about greatness and smallness, both universal and particular. We must be able to say which is the greater good or the greater injustice.

These are the subjects for which we must master relevant propositions. We must now discuss each class in turn: political, ceremonial, and legal oratory.

Part 4

We must first ascertain what subjects the political orator counsels on. He deals only with things that may or may not take place. No counsel is given on inevitable or impossible things. Nor do we deliberate on all possible things, such as natural or accidental events. We deliberate only on matters within our power—matters we can set going.

We will not attempt to classify these subjects accurately here. That belongs to political science, not rhetoric. Rhetoric combines logic and ethics; it resembles dialectic and sophistry. Treating rhetoric or dialectic as sciences of definite subjects destroys their nature. They are practical faculties. However, we will mention points of practical importance.

Political speakers deliberate primarily on five matters: ways and means, war and peace, national defence, imports and exports, and legislation.

Regarding Ways and Means, the speaker must know the country’s revenue sources to add overlooked ones or increase defective ones. He must know all expenditures to abolish the superfluous and reduce the excessive. Men become richer by reducing expenditure as well as by increasing wealth. Experience in home affairs is insufficient; one must study the methods of other lands.

Regarding Peace and War, he must know his country’s actual and potential military strength, and its history of wars. He must know the same about neighboring and likely hostile countries. This allows him to maintain peace with the stronger and make war on the weaker. He must compare military powers. He should study the wars of other countries, for similar causes produce similar results.

Regarding National Defence, he must know the defensive forces and the positions of forts. He must know the lie of the country. This allows him to increase or reduce garrisons and guard strategic points.

Regarding Food Supply, he must know the country’s needs and its home production. He must know what to export and import to negotiate treaties. He must ensure his country offends neither stronger states nor useful trading partners.

Above all, he must understand legislation, for a country’s welfare depends on its laws. He must know the different constitutions, their conditions for prosperity, and their causes of destruction. Constitutions are destroyed by being pushed too far or not far enough. Democracy turns into oligarchy if pushed to excess, just as an aquiline nose becomes deformed if too aquiline. The speaker should study his country’s history and the constitutions of other nations. Books of travel help with laws and customs; historical researches help with politics. These, however, belong to political science.

These are the most important kinds of information for the political speaker. We will now state the premises for arguing for or against measures regarding these matters.

Part 5

Every man aims at a certain end: happiness and its constituents. This aim determines his choices. Advice concerns happiness—what creates it or destroys it. We ought to do what creates happiness and avoid what destroys it.

We may define happiness as prosperity combined with virtue, as independence, as the secure enjoyment of pleasure, or as a good condition of property and body with the power to guard and use them. Nearly everyone agrees happiness is one or more of these.

The parts of happiness are good birth, many and good friends, wealth, many and good children, a happy old age, and bodily excellences like health, beauty, strength, stature, and athletic skill. Also fame, honor, good luck, and virtue. A man with these internal (soul/body) and external (birth, friends, money, honor) goods is completely independent. He also needs resources and luck for security. Let us define these parts.

Good birth in a state means indigenous or ancient members, distinguished early leaders, and many admirable descendants.

Good birth in an individual means free citizenship on both sides, notable ancestors (for virtue or wealth), and many distinguished relatives.

"Many and good children" means, for a community, numerous young men of good body (stature, beauty, strength) and soul (temperance, courage). For an individual, it means numerous children with these qualities. This includes both male and female children. Women should have bodily beauty and stature, and soul-self-command and industry. Communities, like Sparta, where women are in a bad state, spoil half of human life.

Wealth consists of plenty of money, land, estates, implements, livestock, and slaves. These must be secure, gentlemanly, and useful. Productive property is useful; enjoyable property is gentlemanly. Security means the power to use it; ownership means the power to dispose of it (give or sell). Wealth lies in use, not ownership.

Fame is respect from everybody, or from the good or wise.

Honour is the token of a reputation for doing good. It is paid chiefly to benefactors, past or future. Doing good means preserving life, wealth, or other goods. Honour includes sacrifices, eulogies, privileges, land grants, front seats, state burial, statues, and public maintenance. Presents are also honours; they satisfy both the money-lover (as property) and the honour-lover (as a token).

Health is a condition allowing the use of the body while keeping free from disease. A "healthy" man like Herodicus, who abstains from everything to stay alive, is not truly healthy. Beauty varies with age. A young man’s beauty is fitness for running and strength contests—pleasant to look at. An all-round athlete is most beautiful. A man in his prime is fit for war—pleasant yet formidable. An old man is strong enough for necessary exertion and free from deformity. Strength is the power to move others at will—by pulling, pushing, lifting, pinning, or gripping. Excellence in size means surpassing the average without losing speed. Athletic excellence combines size, strength, and swiftness. A runner moves legs fast and far; a wrestler grips; a boxer strikes. A pancratiast does both; an all-round athlete does all.

A happy old age comes slowly and painlessly. It requires bodily excellence and good luck. Even a strong man suffers if diseased or unlucky. Long life is independent of health or strength, but we will not discuss that here.

A friend tries to do what is good for you for your sake. He who has many such friends has "many friends"; if they are worthy, he has "good friends".

Good luck is the acquisition of good things due to luck. Some are artificial, some natural (like beauty and stature). Things that excite envy usually come from luck. Luck also causes unexpected good results: you are handsome when your brothers are ugly, or you find a treasure others missed, or a missile misses you.

We will define virtue when we discuss Eulogy.

Part 6

We now understand our aims in urging or deprecating proposals. The political orator aims at utility—what is useful to do. Utility is a good thing. Therefore, we must understand Goodness and Utility.

A good thing is chosen for its own sake, or for the sake of something else. It is sought by all rational beings, or prescribed by reason. It brings satisfaction and self-sufficiency. It produces or maintains these states, or prevents their opposites. One thing entails another simultaneously (as health entails life) or subsequently (as learning entails knowledge). Production occurs in three ways: as being healthy produces health, as food produces it, or as exercise usually does. Both acquiring good and removing bad are good. Acquiring a greater good for a lesser, or a lesser evil for a greater, is good. Virtues are good because they put us in good condition and produce good actions. Pleasure is good because all animals aim at it. Consequently, pleasant and beautiful things are good.

Here is a detailed list of good things. Happiness: desirable in itself and sufficient. Justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence: excellences of the soul. Health, beauty, and the like: bodily excellences productive of pleasure and life. Wealth: the excellence of possession. Friends and friendship: desirable and productive. Honour and reputation: pleasant and productive. The faculty of speech and action. Good parts, strong memory, quick intuition. All sciences and arts. Life itself. Justice, as the cause of good to the community.

These are admittedly good. For disputed goods, argue thus: That is good of which the contrary is bad. That is good of which the contrary helps our enemies; if cowardice helps them, courage helps us. Generally, the contrary of what our enemies desire is valuable. ("Surely would Priam exult.") However, sometimes our interest coincides with our enemies’, as when a common evil unites us.

Further, moderation is good; excess is bad. That on which much labor or money is spent is good; it is an end reached through means. ("And for Priam... should they leave behind them a boast.") Also, the proverb about breaking the pitcher at the door applies.

What most people seek is good. "Most people" implies "everybody." What is praised is good. Even what enemies praise is good; if they admit it, it must be evident. (Corinthians felt insulted by Simonides: "Against the Corinthians hath Ilium no complaint.")

What discerning people favor is good—as Athena favored Odysseus. Generally, what men deliberately choose is good. This includes things bad for enemies or good for friends, provided they are practicable. "Practicable" means possible and easy. "Easy" means done quickly or without pain. Also good are things men wish for: either no evil or a balance of good. Things possessed exclusively, or appropriate to birth and capacity, are good. Things easily effected are good because they are practicable. Things that gratify friends or annoy enemies are good. Things chosen by those we admire, or for which we are fitted, are good. Things no worthless man can achieve bring greater praise. Finally, what we desire we consider pleasant and better. A man pursues what corresponds to his disposition: the victory-lover seeks victory; the money-lover, money. These are the sources of persuasion about Good and Utility.

Part 7

Since people often agree two things are useful but disagree on which is more so, we must discuss relative goodness and utility.

A thing that surpasses another contains it plus something more. "Greater" implies comparison with "less"; "great" and "small" imply comparison with the normal. The great surpasses the normal; the small is surpassed by it.

We define "good" as desirable for its own sake, sought by all, or chosen by the wise. It produces or preserves goods. The end is the good for the sake of which else is done. Therefore, a greater number of goods is better than a smaller number, if the smaller is included. The larger contains the smaller.

If the largest member of one class surpasses the largest of another, the first class surpasses the second. If the tallest man is taller than the tallest woman, men are generally taller than women. Superiority of classes corresponds to the superiority of their largest members.

If one good always accompanies another, but not vice versa, the former is greater; it implies the use of the latter. Accompaniment is simultaneous (life with health), subsequent (knowledge with learning), or potential (cheating with sacrilege).

If two things surpass a third, the one surpassing it more is greater. What produces a greater good is itself greater. What is produced by a greater good is also greater. Health is better than pleasure because it is more wholesome.

What is desirable in itself (like bodily strength) is better than what is merely wholesome, which is not pursued for its own sake. An end is better than a means. What needs less is more self-sufficing and therefore better. What cannot exist without a second, while the second can exist without it, is inferior to the second.

A beginning or cause is a greater good than what is not. Without a cause, nothing exists. Where two causes produce consequences, the cause with more important consequences is more important. Conversely, the cause of more important consequences is itself more important. Thus, one can argue a thing is important because it is a beginning, or because it is an end. Leodamas accused Callistratus of being more guilty for prompting the deed, but Chabrias for doing it.

What is rare is better than what is plentiful. Gold is better than iron, though less useful, because it is harder to get. Conversely, the plentiful is better because we can use it more often. "The best of things is water." Generally, the hard is better than the easy because it is rarer; yet the easy is better because it is as we wish.

That is the greater good whose contrary is the greater evil, or whose loss affects us more. Positive goodness is better than the mere absence of badness. Good things have noble functions; bad things have base ones. Superiority in desirable qualities is better: keen sight is better than keen smell. Unusually great love of friends is nobler than unusually great love of money.

If it is nobler to desire a thing, that thing is nobler. The importance of the object corresponds to the importance of the instinct. If a science is valuable, so is its object.

What the wise or the majority judge good must be so. Good is what understanding chooses; therefore, what understanding declares better is better. What better men choose is better. Courage is better than strength. Suffering wrong is better than doing wrong, for the just man chooses it.

The pleasanter thing is better, for all pursue pleasure. A pleasure unmixed with pain, or more lasting, is greater. The nobler thing is better. What we desire earnestly for ourselves or friends is a greater good; what we least desire is a greater evil. Lasting and secure things are better.

Co-ordinate terms follow the same rule. If "brave" is better than "temperate," then "bravery" is better than "temperance." What all choose is better than what some choose. What competitors or enemies consider better is better; their judgment is impartial.

Sometimes we argue that what all share is better (it is a dishonour not to share); other times, what few share is better (it is rare). Praiseworthy things are better. Things with heavy penalties for absence are better.

Dividing things into parts makes them seem better; they seem to surpass more things. Homer lists the horrors of a captured city to rouse Meleager. Piling up facts produces a similar effect.

Since hard or rare things are better, superiority due to season, age, or place is valuable. Accomplishing something beyond one’s natural power or years is noble. What is natural is better than what is acquired.

The best part of a good thing is particularly good. Pericles called the loss of young men "the spring taken out of the year." Things useful in pressing need (old age, sickness) are better. What leads directly to the end is better. What is possible is better than what is impossible. What is at the end of life is better.

Reality is better than appearance. We define appearance as what a man would not choose if it remained unknown. Thus, receiving benefits is better than conferring them, for one would choose to receive even secretly. Being is better than seeming. Men say justice is of small value because it is better to seem just than to be just; not so with health.

What serves many purposes (life, pleasure, noble conduct) is better. Hence wealth and health are highly valued. What brings pleasure with less pain is better. What makes a better whole when added to a third thing is better. Visible possessions are better because they seem real. What is dearly prized is better; blinding a one-eyed man is worse than half-blinding a two-eyed man.

We have now set forth the grounds for arguing for or against a proposal.

Part 8

To persuade audiences on public affairs, one must understand the forms of government—their customs, institutions, and interests. Men are persuaded by their interests, which lie in maintaining the established order. The supreme authority gives decisions; this authority varies with the government. There are four forms: democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy. The supreme right to judge rests with the governing power of each.

In a democracy, citizens distribute offices by lot. In an oligarchy, they require a property qualification. In an aristocracy, they require education—specifically, education laid down by law. Those loyal to national institutions hold office; they are considered "the best men," hence the name "aristocracy." Monarchy is rule by one man. Kingship is limited by conditions; tyranny is unlimited.

We must notice the ends of each government, for people choose actions that lead to their ends. The end of democracy is freedom; of oligarchy, wealth; of aristocracy, the maintenance of education and institutions; of tyranny, the protection of the tyrant. We must distinguish the customs and interests that realize these ideals. Rhetorical persuasion relies on ethical as well as demonstrative argument; a speaker convinces us if we believe he possesses goodness or goodwill. Similarly, we must know the moral qualities characteristic of each government, for the character of the government provides our most effective means of persuasion. We learn these qualities from their deliberate acts of choice, which are determined by their ends.

We have considered the objects of political persuasion and the grounds for arguing utility. We have also briefly considered how to learn the moral qualities and institutions of the various governments. The Politics gives a detailed account.

Part 9

We must now consider Virtue and Vice, the Noble and the Base, the objects of praise and blame. This will also help us make our own characters appear credible—our second method of persuasion. We make others trust our goodness in the same way we make them trust others’. Praise may be serious or frivolous, addressing humans, gods, inanimate things, or animals.

The Noble is both desirable for its own sake and praiseworthy, or both good and pleasant because good. If this is true, virtue is noble, being good and praiseworthy. Virtue is a faculty of providing and preserving good, or of conferring great benefits on all occasions. Its forms are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, and wisdom. The highest virtues are those most useful to others, like justice and courage. Liberality is useful because liberal men spend rather than fight for money. Justice lets men enjoy their own property legally; injustice does the opposite. Courage disposes men to noble deeds in danger; cowardice does the opposite. Temperance disposes men to obey the law regarding physical pleasures; incontinence does the opposite. Liberality spends for others; illiberality does not. Magnanimity does good on a large scale; [its opposite is meanness]. Magnificence produces greatness in spending; its opposites are smallness of spirit and meanness. Prudence is the understanding that decides wisely about happiness and goods.

This suffices for virtue and vice. Things productive of virtue are noble, as are the effects and signs of virtue. Deeds of courage are noble, as are just actions (though receiving justice is not always noble; being punished justly is shameful). Actions rewarded by honor, or done for others, or done for one’s country, are noble. Actions good in themselves, not just for the individual, are noble. Noble actions include those enjoyed after death, those done for others, benefits to others, services to benefactors, and good deeds generally.

The opposites of shameful things are noble. Men are ashamed of saying or doing shameful things. As Sappho told Alcaeus: "If your wish were noble, shame would not weigh on your eyelids."

Things men strive for without fear are noble; they lead to fame. Qualities of naturally finer beings are noble (a man’s vs. a woman’s). Qualities giving pleasure to others are noble (justice). Avenging oneself is noble, for requital is just. Not surrendering is noble (courage). Victory and honor are noble, proving superiority. Memorable things are noble, especially if they last after death, are always honored, or are exceptional. Possessions bringing no profit are noble, fitting a gentleman. Distinctive customs, like long hair in Sparta, are noble. Not practicing a sordid craft is noble for a free man.

To praise or blame, identify a man’s actual qualities with closely allied virtues or vices. Call the cautious man cold-blooded, the stupid man honest. Idealize the passionate man as "outspoken," the arrogant as "impressive." Call rashness courage, and extravagance generosity. This appeals to the audience and allows misleading inferences from motive: if a man risks danger needlessly, he will surely do so in a noble cause.

Consider the audience. As Socrates said, praising Athenians to Athenians is easy. If the audience esteems a quality, attribute it to your hero. Represent everything esteemed as noble.

Appropriate actions are noble—those worthy of ancestors or past career. Adding to existing honor is noble. Even inappropriate actions are noble if they surpass expectation—if an average man becomes a hero in adversity, or a successful man becomes easier to get on with. Compare Iphicrates: "Think what I was and what I am."

Since we praise intentional actions, prove the hero’s deeds were intentional. Assert that coincidences were intended. Show a pattern of good actions to prove intent and character.

Praise expresses the eminence of good qualities. Encomium refers to actual deeds. Accessories like birth and education help credibility. We bestow encomiums for deeds. Yet deeds evidence character; we praise a man if we believe he would do the deed. Calling a man blest or happy includes praise and encomium, as goodness is part of happiness.

Praise is akin to urging action. Suggestions for action become encomiums when rephrased. "A man should be proud of what he owes to himself" becomes "He is proud of what he owes to himself." To praise, think what you would urge; to urge, think what you would praise.

To heighten praise, point out uniqueness, primacy, or superiority. Mention the season and occasion. If he achieved success often, emphasize it to credit him, not luck. Mention if he inspired new observances (like Hippolochus or Harmodius). Censure bad men for the opposite.

If you lack material, compare him with others, especially famous men. Surpassing the great is noble. If not famous men, compare him with ordinary people; superiority reveals excellence. Heightening effect suits declamations (epideictic); examples suit deliberative; enthymemes suit forensic speeches.

These are the lines for speeches of praise or blame. We know the materials for encomiums and censures. Censure simply reverses the grounds of praise.

Part 10

We must now discuss Accusation and Defence, and the ingredients of their syllogisms. We must ascertain three things: the incentives to wrongdoing, the state of mind of wrongdoers, and the kind of persons wronged. We will deal with these in order, after defining ‘wrongdoing’.

‘Wrongdoing’ is injury voluntarily inflicted contrary to law. Law is either special (written law of a community) or general (universal unwritten principles). Voluntary acts are done consciously and without constraint. All deliberate acts are conscious. The causes of deliberate, illegal harm are vice and lack of self-control. A man’s wrongs correspond to his bad qualities. The mean man wrongs others for money; the profligate, for pleasure; the effeminate, for comfort; the coward, from terror. The ambitious man seeks honor; the quick-tempered, anger; the victory-lover, victory; the embittered, revenge; the stupid, from misguided notions; the shameless, from indifference.

We have partly discussed this under virtues and will discuss it further under emotions. Now let us consider motives and victims.

First, what do people try to get or avoid when wronging others? The prosecutor must consider which inducements affect his adversary; the defendant, which do not. Every action is due either to the person himself or not. Actions not due to himself are due to chance, necessity (compulsion), or nature. Actions due to himself are due to habit or craving (rational or irrational). Rational craving is a wish for good. Irrational craving is anger or appetite.

Thus, every action springs from one of seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite. Distinctions based on age or condition are superfluous. Young men act from anger or appetite, not youth. Poor men crave money from appetite, not poverty. Just and unjust men act from reasoning or emotion. However, certain actions and people usually go together. Accessory qualities like wealth or luck are important.

Chance events have no determined cause, no purpose, and no regularity. Natural events have a fixed internal cause and occur uniformly. Compelled events happen contrary to desire, through the doer’s agency. Habitual acts are done from frequent repetition. Reasoned acts aim at a useful end (real or apparent). Anger causes acts of revenge. Punishment aims at the offender’s good; revenge, at the punisher’s satisfaction. Appetite causes all acts that appear pleasant. Habit also makes things pleasant.

To sum up: all voluntary actions either are or seem good or pleasant. I count escape from evil as a good, and escape from pain as a pleasure. We must therefore ascertain what is useful and what is pleasant. We have discussed the useful; now for the pleasant.

Part 11

Pleasure is a movement bringing the soul consciously into its normal state; pain is the opposite. Thus, what produces this condition is pleasant; what destroys it is painful. Moving toward a natural state is pleasant, especially when the process completes recovery. Habits are pleasant because the habitual becomes natural; the often is akin to the always.

What is unforced is pleasant. Force is unnatural and painful; "All that is done on compulsion is bitterness unto the soul." Acts of concentration and effort are painful unless habitual. Ease, relaxation, amusement, rest, and sleep are pleasant because they are uncompelled. Satisfied desires are pleasant. Irrational desires (thirst, hunger, sex) originate in the body. Rational desires arise from opinion; we desire what we are told is good.

Pleasure is conscious emotion. Imagination is feeble sensation; memory and expectation retain images. Thus, memory and expectation are accompanied by sensation and pleasure. We enjoy present things, remember past ones, and expect future ones. Remembering is pleasant, even of past pains, if the results were noble. "Sweet ’tis when rescued to remember pain." Being free from evil is pleasant.

Expecting delight or benefit is pleasant. Generally, what delights in the present delights in memory or expectation. Even anger is pleasant—"sweeter than honeycomb"—because we enjoy the prospect of vengeance. We do not get angry where vengeance is impossible.

Most appetites involve pleasure in memory or expectation. Fever patients enjoy remembering drinks. Lovers enjoy talking or writing about the beloved, recalling him to the imagination. Love begins when one feels pain at absence and pleasure in memory. Even mourning has pleasure; we grieve the loss but enjoy remembering the person. "He spake, and in each man’s heart he awakened the love of lament."

Revenge is pleasant. Failing to get it is painful; expecting it is pleasant. Victory is pleasant to everyone, not just bad losers; the winner sees himself as a champion. Thus, combative sports, games, and hunting are pleasant. Where there is competition, there is victory. Debating is pleasant to those with capacity for it.

Honour and good repute are highly pleasant. They make a man see himself as fine, especially when credited by good judges—neighbors, associates, contemporaries, the sensible. We value honour from those we esteem, not from children or animals.

Friends are pleasant. Loving is pleasant (like loving wine). Being loved is pleasant; it confirms one’s goodness. To be admired is pleasant for the honour. Flattery is pleasant because the flatterer seems to admire and like us.

Repetition is pleasant (habit). Change is also pleasant (nature). Invariable repetition causes excess. "Change is in all things sweet." Rare things are pleasant. Learning and wondering are pleasant; wondering implies a desire to learn. Imitation (painting, sculpture, poetry) is pleasant even if the object is unpleasant; we learn by inferring "That is so-and-so." Dramatic turns and escapes are pleasant because they are wonderful.

Kinship is pleasant. Like delights like ("jackdaw to jackdaw"). Since every man is akin to himself, self-love is natural. We love our own deeds, words, and children. Completing what is defective is pleasant; the result becomes our own work. Power and wisdom are pleasant. Disparaging neighbors is pleasant to the ambitious. Doing what one does best is pleasant. "To that he bends himself... wherein he is indeed the best part of himself." Amusement, relaxation, and laughter are pleasant; hence the ludicrous is pleasant. We discuss this in the Poetics.

So much for pleasant things. Their opposites are unpleasant.

Part 12

These are the motives for wrongdoing. We must next consider the wrongdoer’s state of mind and the persons he wrongs.

Wrongdoers must believe they can do the deed, either secretly or with impunity, or that the gain outweighs the punishment. We will discuss apparent possibility later. Men think they can wrong others with impunity if they possess eloquence, practical ability, legal experience, many friends, or money. They feel safest if they have these advantages personally; if not, they rely on friends or partners. They also feel safe if they are on good terms with their victims or the judges. Victims on good terms are off their guard and settle easily; judges favor friends and impose light sentences.

They avoid detection if their appearance contradicts the charge: a weakling is unlikely to be charged with assault, or an ugly man with adultery. Public and open injuries are easy because nobody expects them and therefore nobody guards against them. The same applies to terrible crimes; nobody guards against a disease nobody has ever had.

You feel safe if you have no enemies or many. If none, you are unwatched; if many, people think you would not risk it, and you can plead that you never would have. You may also trust to the way or place of the crime, or to means of disposal.

You may feel you can postpone a trial, corrupt judges, or avoid paying damages. You may have nothing to lose. You may see the gain as great, certain, and immediate, and the penalty as small, uncertain, or distant. Or the gain may outweigh any retribution, as with despotic power. You may profit solidly while suffering only bad names. Conversely, the crime may bring credit (avenging a parent) while the penalty is merely a fine.

People are led by either motive, but not by both; they affect opposite characters. You may be encouraged by past escapes or by past failures (refusing to give up). Weak-willed persons prefer immediate pleasure and later pain; sensible persons prefer immediate pain and later profit. You may make the crime appear due to chance, necessity, or habit—as if you failed to do right rather than did wrong. You may trust to equitable judgment, or be stimulated by want (of necessaries or luxuries). A good reputation saves you from suspicion; a bad one means nothing can make it worse.

Such are the wrongdoer’s states of mind. Now for the victims and the methods. People wrong those who have what they want. Victims may be near (quick profit) or far (slow vengeance). They may be trustful (easy to elude), easy-going (too lazy to prosecute), sensitive (avoiding money fights), or already wronged and silent (the "Mysian prey"). They may be those never wronged (unguarded) or often wronged (expecting no more).

They wrong those with attacked characters, who fear judges. They wrong those they can pretend treated them badly; wickedness needs only a pretext. They wrong enemies because it is pleasant, and friends because it is easy. They wrong the friendless and the ineloquent. They wrong foreigners and small farmers, who settle for a trifle. They wrong those who have wronged others; this feels like no wrong at all.

They wrong those who have done or intended wrong, for it seems fine to wrong them. They wrong those to gratify friends, masters, or admirers. They wrong those from whom they expect equitable treatment. They wrong those against whom they have a grievance (like Callippus to Dion). They wrong those about to be wronged by others, to forestall them (like Aenesidemus and Gelon). They wrong others to do many righteous acts, curing the harm easily (as Jason said).

They commit common wrongs, expecting forgiveness. They commit wrongs easily kept dark—involving consumables, changeables, or portables. They commit wrongs the victim is ashamed to speak of (outrages to women or self). They commit trifling wrongs that appear litigious to prosecute.

This covers the circumstances, nature, victims, and reasons of wrongdoing.

Part 13

We must classify just and unjust actions. They are defined by two kinds of law and two classes of persons. Law is particular or universal. Particular law is what a community lays down for itself, written or unwritten. Universal law is the law of Nature. There is a natural justice binding on all men, even without covenant. Sophocles’ Antigone appeals to this when she calls burying Polyneices just by nature: "Not of to-day or yesterday it is, But lives eternal..." Empedocles says killing no living creature is an all-embracing law.

Actions affect either the community or a member of it. Thus, we can do right or wrong toward a definite person or toward the community. Adultery and assault wrong a person; draft evasion wrongs the community.

Thus, unjust actions affect either the community or an individual. "Being wronged" implies intentional injury. To be wronged, a man must suffer actual harm against his will. The forms of harm correspond to goods and evils. Every accusation concerns an action affecting the community or an individual. The doer must either intend the action or not. Intentional acts spring from deliberate choice or passion.

Often a man admits the act but denies the label. He took a thing, but did not steal it; struck first, but committed no outrage. We must distinguish theft, outrage, and adultery from simple acts. Deliberate purpose constitutes criminal guil