Executive Summary:

Rumors have circulated throughout January that the strongman leader of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, is suffering from kidney failure, sparking speculation about his successor and the durability of personalized regional governance in Russia amid leadership transition.

Kadyrov has attempted to institutionalize a quasi-hereditary system by promoting family members into senior political and security roles. His sons, Akhmat and Adam, are being groomed for leadership, but their youth and lack of experience make their immediate succession unlikely.

Alternative successors include Adam Delimkhanov and Magomed Daudov, from Kadyrov’s inner circle, and Apti Alaudinov, a major general and commander of the Chechen Akhmat volunteer unit. Even if local elites or Kadyrov’s family members are positioned for leadership, Russian President Vladimir Putin will make the ultimate decision.

Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of the Russian republic of Chechnya for almost twenty years, is reportedly suffering from kidney failure (The Moscow Times, January 14). Reports about the idiosyncratic regional strongman’s declining health, which Kadyrov denies, have reignited discussions about who will succeed him (OC-Media, January 13). Succession planning in Chechnya is a political problem with implications for stability in the North Caucasus and for the Kremlin’s broader model of personalized regional governance.

Over the past several years, the Chechen leader has drawn attention through his eccentric public behavior and systematic promotion of family members—particularly his children—into senior political and security roles. As concerns about his health intensified, scrutiny shifted to his two eldest sons. In early 2026, Kadyrov appointed his 20-year-old son, Akhmat Kadyrov, as co-acting deputy prime minister of Chechnya (Telegram/@RKadyrov_95, January 5). Since 2022, when he was 18, Akhmat has served as an adviser to his father and has rotated through a series of senior positions, including leadership roles in youth organizations, deputy ministerial posts, as the minister of youth affairs and sports, and as the president of the Akhmat football club. Russian media frequently note his limited charisma and weak public-speaking abilities—traits that matter in a system built on personal authority—despite his many roles (Novaya Gazeta, January 21).

Akhmat’s younger brother, 18-year-old Adam Kadyrov, has attracted far more public attention. In 2023, Adam became notorious for violently assaulting Nikita Zhuravel, who had been arrested for burning a Qur’an (see EDM, November 2, 2023; Nastoyashee Vremya, October 3, 2024; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 19). After the beating, Adam received the title “Hero of the Chechen Republic” and was appointed head of his father’s personal security service at the age of 15. Chechen elites actively publicized a video of the assault on the prisoner—Kadyrov himself praised the beating and posted the video—framing it as a demonstration of masculinity and faith amid rumors surrounding Adam’s homosexuality (The Insider, June 17, 2024; Mi Ukraine, November 26, 2025). Since April 2025, Adam has served as secretary of the Chechen Security Council, and his lavish June 2025 wedding further reinforced his public profile (BBC-Russian Service, August 25, 2025).

Over two decades in power, Kadyrov has entrenched his rule by embedding both immediate family members and close relatives across Chechnya’s political, security, and economic institutions (Novaya Gazeta Europe, September 14, 2022). Political analyst Ruslan Aysin has described Chechnya as effectively a monarchy (TV Rain, January 7). This label may, however, apply only to the present. While Kadyrov inherited power after his father’s assassination and built a highly personalized system of rule—complete with an endorsement from Russian President Vladimir Putin—whether this system can survive him in hereditary form remains in question.

Beyond Kadyrov’s immediate family, two long-standing loyalists are often cited as potential successors. Magomed Daudov is the speaker of the Chechen parliament, and Adam Delimkhanov is a State Duma deputy from Chechnya (Novaya Gazeta Europe, April 25, 2024; Kavkaz Realii, July 17, 2025). Both have been central figures since the early years of Kadyrov’s rule. Despite their distinct formal spheres of influence, Delimkhanov appears to command significantly greater administrative, financial, and transregional resources (Novaya Gazeta Europe, April 25, 2024).

Daudov is frequently portrayed as the Chechen regime’s brutal but effective enforcer. Kadyrov has relied on him to manage crises ranging from the COVID-19 pandemic to the organization of Chechen volunteer deployments to Ukraine (Novaya Gazeta Europe, April 25, 2024). Despite his loyalty, however, Daudov has never been fully incorporated into Kadyrov’s familial inner circle, nor has he developed an independent power base comparable to Delimkhanov’s (Novaya Gazeta Europe, April 25, 2024). Rumors circulated in May 2024 that Daudov sought a leadership role in neighboring Ingushetia but was blocked by Moscow (BBC-Russian Service, August 25, 2025).

Delimkhanov, by contrast, wields influence well beyond Chechnya. He maintains ties with Chechen diasporas across Russia, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Middle East—particularly in the United Arab Emirates, Türkiye, and Jordan (Novaya Gazeta Europe, April 25, 2024). His networks are also allegedly active in Europe and the United States, where they reportedly monitor and intimidate Chechen dissidents. Within Chechnya, the Delimkhanovs—together with their closest relatives, the Geremeyevs—are likely the republic’s second-most powerful elite grouping after the Kadyrovs (Novaya Gazeta Europe, April 25, 2024). The reported marriage between Adam Kadyrov and Delimkhanov’s granddaughter underscores the alliance between their families (BBC Russkaya Sluzhba, August 25, 2025).

Apti Alaudinov, a major general and commander of the Akhmat Chechen volunteer unit, emerged most recently as a potential successor. Alaudinov attracted attention at United Russia’s 21st party congress in December 2023 for a polished, confident speech delivered without notes or a noticeable accent—an unusual performance in Chechen elite politics (Novaya Gazeta Europe, April 22, 2024). Russian media portrayed the speech as a signal of his rapid political rise. In April 2024, Putin appointed Alaudinov as a deputy at the Main Directorate for Military and Political Work at the Defense Ministry (Novaya Gazeta Europe, April 22, 2024; see EDM, June 6, 2024).

Other names occasionally surface, including former Chechen Prime Minister Ruslan Edelgeriyev, Kadyrov relative Yakub (Ibrahim) Zakriyev, and longtime associate Abuzayd Vismuradov. These are, however, not widely regarded as serious contenders (Kavkaz Realii, July 17, 2025). Kadyrov’s daughter, Aishat, is sometimes mentioned, but the deeply patriarchal political culture of the North Caucasus limits her prospects (Kavkaz Realii, July 17, 2025).

Kadyrov’s young sons are unlikely to assume formal leadership in the near term. It is difficult to imagine Putin appointing 18- or 20-year-olds to lead Russia’s most volatile region despite Ramzan’s heavy investment in public relations and frequent photo opportunities with Putin. Beyond concerns over governance capacity, such a scenario would present serious legal obstacles. Under Russian law, heads of federal subjects must be at least 30 years old.

One frequently discussed scenario is “Collective Kadyrovism” (TV Rain, January 7). In this model, Kadyrov’s relatives and loyalists—already deeply embedded in the system—would continue to rule as a collective after his departure, preserving continuity without formal dynastic succession. Other observers are skeptical about the likelihood of any smooth transition. Aleksandr Cherkasov of the Memorial Human Rights Center warns that Ramzan Kadyrov’s departure could disrupt Chechnya’s fragile internal balance. The system rests not only on formal institutions but also on personal loyalties, informal agreements, and guarantees that Kadyrov personally enforces (TV Rain, January 7). Without him, dormant rivalries and contradictions may resurface.

Putin’s appointment of a new Kremlin-approved leader—possibly from Kadyrov’s inner circle—is the most probable outcome. This change of power could undermine or maintain the personality cult constructed around the Chechen leader over the past two decades. The question remains open, and will shape the republic’s future long after Kadyrov is gone.

**This article was originally published in **Eurasia Daily Monitor.

Rusif Huseynov is the co-founder and director of Topchubashov Center, a Baku-based think tank. He obtained a bachelor’s degree from Baku State University and master’s degree from the University of Tartu. He is a ReThink.CEE (2021) fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Local Focal Point within the EU4Dialogue project.