Greetings from Tel Aviv and a happy new year,
Just weeks after Iran’s designated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) led a “counterterrorism” drill with China, Russia, and other Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members, the same force is being deployed at home against Iranians it considers “terrorists.”
As the death toll mounts, likely in the thousands, and US President Donald Trump considers military action against Iran, Tehran’s ambassador in Beijing, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli عبدالرضا رحمانی فضلی, [told](https://news.q…
Greetings from Tel Aviv and a happy new year,
Just weeks after Iran’s designated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) led a “counterterrorism” drill with China, Russia, and other Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members, the same force is being deployed at home against Iranians it considers “terrorists.”
As the death toll mounts, likely in the thousands, and US President Donald Trump considers military action against Iran, Tehran’s ambassador in Beijing, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli عبدالرضا رحمانی فضلی, told reporters on Wednesday that Iran would safeguard Chinese businesses and nationals, and hopes to receive help from China and other “friendly countries,” per state-owned Phoenix TV.
The response translated below shows how such appeals have landed in one corner of China’s nationalist discourse. **Zhanhao **占豪, one of China’s most widely read WeChat public accounts, written by multiple authors under the pen name of Hu Zhanhao 胡占豪 (a government adviser in Hubei), offers a scathing, crude rebuttal: China will not “take the bullet” for Iran, and Iran should stop expecting it to save its hide.
While it should be noted that Zhanhao is a for-profit outfit, for which veracity and conviction appear secondary to selling snake oil and cheap liquor, but due to its reach and proximity to officially tolerated nationalist discourse that it remains worth paying attention to.
The piece provides insight into an unusually sharper tone from Chinese analysts toward a bona fide “Global South” partner and an “anti-hegemonic” bastion in the Middle East, which has become more pronounced since the 12-day Israel-Iran war in June. It confirms what some Iran-China watchers have warned for years: Tehran and Beijing do not see the relationship in the same way, and they certainly differ from the CRINKers in the West, who describe it as an “axis.”
The article’s jingoistic machismo keeps it from addressing China’s deeply transactional and risk-averse approach to Iran, including its fear of secondary sanctions. Beijing has helped prop up Iran’s economy by absorbing the overwhelming majority of its oil exports. However, as Iran’s near-sole buyer, it has done so at steep discounts, while flooding the Iranian market with Chinese technology and manufactured goods in ways that have further hollowed out Iran’s domestic industrial base.
Seen from this angle, Zhanhao’s contempt is an unvarnished articulation of a broader worldview, one that prizes strength, punishes weakness, and measures partnership almost entirely in terms of cost, risk, and immediate utility. One could argue that under such a realist calculus, Israel, too, was temporarily downgraded after the unprecedented display of vulnerability on October 7, 2023.
And perhaps this is my Israeli wishful thinking, but it may be that, deep, deep down, China is far less oblivious than it lets on to the disastrous consequences of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, its attempts to eradicate the Jewish state, and its long record of exporting Islamist revolutionary violence, not only across the Middle East and beyond, but uncomfortably close to China’s own backyard.
As for what Beijing makes of Iran’s mass killing of protesters and internet blackout, you can use your imagination.
Thank you for reading,
Tuvia
by Zhan Hao 占豪
Hu Zhanhao delivering a speech on August 25, 2021, at the Hubei Provincial Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a United Front body of the Chinese Communist Party (source).
Iran is too opportunistic, with a mindset that is very “Indian” 思维很“印度”. The result is that it talks big in peace times, but the moment intensity rises, it falls apart. Iran used to have a bunch of junior partners in the Middle East, including Assad’s government in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, Iraq, and so on. And what happened? Faced with the strength of the United States and Israel, Iran has collapsed. Its support for its junior partners has been insufficient, so Israel has been systematically eliminating and destabilizing them. Iran could not even protect its own president [a reference to Ebrahim Raisi’s death in a helicopter crash in 2024], and eventually replaced him with an opportunistic “pro-American” president, then fell into a state of timid paralysis. The final result was that Iran got hit by the US and Israel, and got hit for nothing.
Iran believes that if it acts more softly, it will be able to sleep soundly. But what happened? Israel won’t give it a break, and neither will the US. Recently, large-scale protests erupted inside Iran, prompting Israel and the US to issue new military threats. Iran has no other choice in this situation. Is there an alternative to confronting the problem head-on? It appears not. Nonetheless, in this context, Iran continues to expect China to take the bullet for it 替他挡枪子. That’s pure fantasy!
On January 7, Iran’s ambassador to China, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli [before his posting in May, Fazli was Minister of Interior in Hassan Rouhani’s government and the president of the Supreme Audit Court from 2008 to 2013], held a briefing in Beijing to introduce the domestic and international situation Iran currently faces. Fazli affirmed the progress of China-Iran relations and thanked China for its consistent condemnation of the US during major events and its support for Iran. At the same time, he condemned US actions in Venezuela, claiming that the invasion and subsequent kidnapping of President Maduro shocked the world and represented an attack on the global order. He claimed that the United States has abandoned its formerly loud slogans of democracy and human rights in favor of forcefully promoting power politics and imperialism.
Fazli stated that the most important question for Global South countries right now is what stance and actions powerful countries on the international stage will take in response to this US trend. He offered three options:
The first is to observe without taking any action, which means the US will continue carrying out its power politics and imperialist schemes 帝国主义的计划. 1.
The second is to simply yield and accept the reality of a US unipolar world and unilateralism. 1.
The third option is to unite with all countries to form economic, political, and military deterrence.
As Iran’s representative, the ambassador hopes that China, as a powerful Global South country, can play a more active role in addressing the world’s problems, including in political, economic, and legal arenas, and, if necessary, do more on defense and military affairs. He said that countries threatened by the US strongly want to place themselves under the “protective umbrella” of a powerful country like China.
In reality, what it means is that Iran is very afraid, and other small Global South countries are also afraid, so they want China to provide military protection. They hope China can lead Global South countries to jointly resist US hegemony on political, economic, and legal fronts.
However, Iran’s position in international strategic cooperation appears to be conceptually ambiguous. In any mature strategic partnership, a clear division of roles and shared responsibility is the foundation of an alliance’s resilience. Generally, the party that is relatively weaker or more directly exposed to risk must take on more frontline tactical response and execution, demonstrating its value and commitment as a dependable partner. The major power in the rear plays a critical role in providing strategic resources, diplomatic support, and overall deterrence, rather than taking the place of its allies in bearing the primary, direct blows.
If one side is unwilling or unable to demonstrate the required capacity under pressure and frontline responsibility within its core interest area, its true strategic value to the collaborative system is difficult to demonstrate. In that case, how can it reasonably expect the leading partner to allocate significant resources and provide comprehensive protection? A balance of responsibility and proof of value is required for long-term strategic trust and deep cooperation. In this kind of world, big brother won’t charge into battle for his younger brother. This is the law of the land, and Iran got it all sideways.
In an international cooperation system, every country’s strategic resources are limited and valuable, and their investment necessarily follows cautious cost-benefit and strategic value assessments. Therefore, if a country wants sustained and strong external support, it must first have a clear understanding of its position in the international structure, its capabilities, boundaries, and the core values it can offer. Only by fulfilling corresponding responsibilities and playing a matching role based on a clear positioning can it build solid and reliable cooperative ties. The reality of international relations often shows that passivity cannot guarantee security and development. Proactive action and demonstrating irreplaceable value are the keys to protecting one’s interests and winning strategic space in complex competition.
China has already fully proved its value as a partner. For example, while China has been resisting the US trade war, technology war, and geopolitical competition, Iran hasn’t been able to reciprocate and provide China any kind of help. On the other hand, Iran would not have been able to endure US pressure and blockade for very long if China had not purchased Iranian oil and engaged in some economic cooperation initiatives.
However, due to persistent strategic imbalance and wavering, Iran’s long-managed regional “resistance front” has become increasingly worn down. What’s tragic is that Iran still does not appear to have learned fundamental lessons from these setbacks, which is undoubtedly a contributing factor to its strategic passivity. Given this reality, it is clear that Iran is not one of China’s core interests, so how can China bear direct conflict risks and costs for it? Iran must first demonstrate its own value. In the first place, Iran’s most valuable asset was its “Axis of Resistance,” which it eventually abandoned.
China has not remained idle in response to Washington’s global strategic moves. In fact, China has long taken an active and pragmatic role in international frameworks. Who has consistently fostered unity among developing nations and executed successful political and diplomatic balancing acts in multilateral forums like the UN? And who has promoted the idea of common development on a worldwide level, engaging in mutually beneficial cooperation with all nations - including those under US pressure - thereby providing an alternative to hegemonic logic? One obvious fact is that if China had not withstood pressure and maintained normal trade and economic ties with Iran, particularly in the oil trade, the Iranian regime’s survival would have been in a different spot right now.
However, when considering Iran’s actions in recent years, China’s reasonable expectations of a strategic partner have not been met or effectively consistent with Iran’s performance in at least four key areas:
Iran’s sincerity in cooperating with China is insufficient - Even though China and Iran formed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016, there have been obstacles in their bilateral relations during the last ten years, when tangible progress was required. In an effort to provide institutional protections for cooperation, China has consistently pushed for closer ties. For instance, it has supported Iran’s admission to organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) [and BRICS+, which conducted a maritime drill in South Africa this week]. However, this high-level political stance has not yet been matched by the depth and scope of economic cooperation between the two nations.
The main issue is that without deeply integrated economic interests acting as a “ballast stone,” a strategic partnership is difficult to progress to a higher level. China does not lack willingness or action. The crux is more about implementation capacity and openness. Although the two sides signed a large-scale 25-year comprehensive cooperation plan [in March 2021], specific projects, such as development and operations on Qeshm Island in the Persian Gulf, have long been delayed, with no substantive breakthrough in many years.
Iran’s internal strategic hesitancy and lack of transparency are the causes of this paradox of “lively when [agreements are] signed, frigid when [they are] implemented 协议热、落地冷.” Tehran’s external economic policy lacks coherence and decisiveness as a result of its long-standing oscillation between “looking east” and pursuing détente with the West. Some agreements appear to have been signed primarily as bargaining chips in games with the West rather than as a commitment to creating a stable partnership with the East. In actuality, this strategic half-measure hinders the growth and strengthening of common China-Iranian interests while also slowing Iran’s own development. 1.
**Iran’s strategic trust in China is still insufficient, and it has failed to seize the historical opportunity to deepen cooperation. **This lack of trust is evident on multiple levels. Although China has clearly elevated the bilateral relationship to a higher strategic level and expressed willingness to strengthen defense and security cooperation, substantive and systematic military-security cooperation between the two countries remains slow, with significant gaps compared to both sides’ political consensus.
A comparable example is how neighboring countries, such as Pakistan, have significantly improved their defense capabilities and strategic security by establishing long-term, stable, trust-based comprehensive cooperation with China. Such outcomes do not occur overnight, but are the result of decades of close collaboration and shared investment under conditions of high strategic trust. In fact, China has provided Iran with valuable opportunities and frameworks to deepen overall cooperation, including in the security sector. However, whether due to internal calculations or a shaky external strategy, Iran has failed to respond and connect with the same strategic resolve, failing to transform cooperation directions on paper into firm bonds of mutual interests and capabilities. This reflects a fundamental lack of trust, which is essential for any strategic partnership. 1.
Some actions by Iran have seriously harmed the interests and security of Chinese companies, thereby eroding the commercial foundation of China-Iran mutual trust. Consider the US’s tech war against China. When a company like Huawei became a primary target, the US obtained and abused information and evidence regarding its Iran operations, resulting in the unjust detention of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou. This suggests that, in the face of Washington’s maximum-pressure campaign, Iran failed to fully comply with its obligation to protect its partners’ commercial secrets and security. There is even reason to believe that it sacrificed the interests of Chinese companies to relieve pressure on itself
[It’s worth dwelling on this for a moment. The author is implying that, under pressure, Iran may have handed Huawei-related information to the US - information that was then used in the chain of events leading to Meng Wanzhou’s detention in Canada on an extradition request. I can’t recall seeing this specific allegation before, and it should be treated with more than a pinch of salt. When Chinese nationalists (and officials) get “angry” at a country, they tend to assemble an “airing of grievances” going back 18 generations, some with little connection to reality.]
This pattern of behavior raises a fundamental question: if Iran is unable to maintain its position on major interests involving core partners, how can Chinese high-tech companies feel confident in long-term, deep cooperation in its market? Furthermore, if Iran could engage in unrestricted deep cooperation with Chinese firms in key information infrastructure, such as large-scale adoption of Huawei equipment combined with strict security cooperation mechanisms, its own cyber and information security defenses would be stronger, rather than as vulnerable to external forces as they are now. This incident demonstrates that a lack of strategic trust is not only political but can also concretely undermine the foundations of economic and technological cooperation.
Iran’s **tendency to blame China for the Syrian crisis leads to significant strategic miscalculations - **President Assad’s visit to China [in September 2023] and the signing of several agreements for economic cooperation, [including Syria’s accession to the Belt and Road Initiative], were made possible by China to aid Syria’s postwar reconstruction. This was a step in the right direction toward Syria’s recovery and achieving win-win outcomes. However, follow-up implementation was hindered, in part because Iran and other regional powers were worried about changes in the interest structure and did not offer adequate support. Iran appealed to China to take on security responsibilities beyond China’s regional interests when Syria’s situation deteriorated once more due to multilateral pressure, hoping that China would directly face strategic pressure from the US, Turkey, and Israel.
Iran’s move is based on an incorrect logical permutation: it had viewed its presence in Syria as a form of “strategic cover” for China, and had claimed that if Syria collapses, the US would shift all pressure to the Taiwan Strait, implying that China, in turn, had an “obligation” to save Syria for Iran. This significantly misinterprets China’s interest boundaries and operating principles. China’s primary interests are its sovereignty and development. Its actions in the Middle East are guided by a cooperation logic based on common development, rather than traditional spheres of influence or security obligations. The facts show that China did not directly intervene in the security conflict, as Iran had hoped. China’s subsequent display of strategic resolve and capability improvements, such as the recent claim that it test-flew two sixth-generation aircraft in formation at the same time and stunned the world, serves its own path of defense modernization rather than diplomatic bargaining chips tied to specific Middle Eastern events.
This case demonstrates that Iran does not understand China’s strategic culture of “not forming alliances and not needlessly carrying burdens for others 不结盟、不无谓替人扛事.” Iran’s hopes of tying China to its frontline conflicts are bound to fail. After the “Axis of Resistance” collapsed, Iran was quickly subjected to direct strikes [by Israel and the US in the 12-day war in June], demonstrating that relying on another country’s willingness to bear core risks is unsustainable. If China-Iran cooperation is not founded on clear, equal, and delineated interests, as well as shared understandings of each other’s responsibilities, strategic expectation mismatches will continue to undermine mutual trust and cooperation efficiency.
Therefore, Iran’s recent demand for China to provide direct military protection and to substitute for Iran in bearing its core security responsibilities is unrealistic. This is both because shared interests between China and Iran have not reached such tightly bound strategic levels, and because the two sides lack the special historical ties and trust foundation sufficient to support such high-risk commitments.
Does this imply that China will not support Iran in any way? Of course not. The key issue is that Iran must increase its irreplaceable value in the face of great-power competition through independent action and strategic decisions. Only when its own ability to withstand pressure, its regional influence, and the credibility and execution capacity of its cooperation with China have grown sufficiently, will the strategic support and deep cooperation it seeks come naturally.
The essence of international relations is a mutual exchange of genuine interests, not one-sided protection or philanthropy. Any meaningful support assumes that the other party has already demonstrated its value and dependability. As history demonstrates, how could vital industrial support have been supplied later on without the tenacity and skill shown on the battlefield? This profoundly clarifies an eternal truth: in a system made up of sovereign states, true security and status stem primarily from one’s own struggle and construction, rather than being bestowed by others.
Iran is currently in turmoil. This demonstrates that if Iran strikes out as forcefully as it has in the past, its domestic contradictions would be relatively easier to absorb, as it would obtain support from the great powers. In contrast, when you retreat into your shell and lose courage, you naturally lose value. Small countries that are overly protective of their image 爱惜羽毛 and lack strategic vision will fail to gain value recognition. Some things must be carried on your own shoulders. In contrast, as long as you dare to charge out and fight your way to proving your worth, what you deserve will naturally follow.
**Iran has no way out! All of the junior partners have completed their tasks, and it is now time for Iran to step up! Furthermore, China does not fear the dispute over Taiwan. On the contrary, China is locked and loaded. Whoever dares to speak out on the Taiwan Strait will have their head cut off 斩掉他的头! Like “pipsqueak Japan 小日本,” what follows shall be relentless blows from China’s iron fist. If the US dares to come, China will cut off its head too! **
Iran should therefore not assume that China is afraid of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. China has never been afraid of a challenge or provocation. China does not engage in reckless militarism. Instead of waiting for a major power to defend it militarily, Iran should do what it needs to do and then get what it deserves.
Link: https://archive.is/1j4fR
Zhao Shengye, a nationalist influencer and co-founder of the Honker Union of China hacker group, claims that Trump’s threats against Iran are an extension of Venezuela’s playbook, specifically an attempt to strangle China’s energy supply chain.
Some context: On Jan. 7, Reuters reported that after a US-Venezuela deal to export up to $2 billion in Venezuelan crude to the US and the January 1 halt of Asia-bound loadings, Chinese independents plan to replace Venezuelan barrels with Iranian and Russian heavy crude.
In 2025, Venezuela reliably supplied roughly 4.5% of China’s crude oil imports, while Iran’s share increased to 15%-20% after 2018. Though these sources are not completely irreplaceable, the numbers add app. Moreover, this oil *is *critical to China’s “teapot” refineries, which are hundreds of small, independent operators that process discounted, sanctioned crude.
This shadow trade saves the Chinese economy $10-15 billion per year and allows independent refiners to maintain margins that state-owned giants cannot match, all while supporting anti-Western bastions in South America and the Middle East. A true win-win.
Full quote from Zhao’s Weibo:
"The US may be about to launch military action against Iran, with Iranian oil facilities as the primary targets. ‘Supporting Israel’ is only a surface-level justification; in reality, this is about strangling our energy supply chain and is a continuation of the invasion of Venezuela.
"Imperialism has lost the trade war, tariff war, and chip war, abandoned the Taiwan card, and withdrew from Asia-Pacific.
"Consequently, Trump intends to launch a new oil battleground to contain our continued rise and halt the long-term trend of surpassing the US.
"We need to be more vigilant, improve our response capabilities, and get ready for military action in external conflict zones to stop violations of our international rights and interests."
Peking University assistant professor Mei Hualong argues that the Iranian protesters are violent, foreign-instigated extremists, and that China should side with Iran’s crackdown in the name of stability and anti-imperialism.
Full quote:
“People in Iran’s Kermanshah Province held a gathering to commemorate a three-year-old girl who violent terrorists killed. The crowd chanted anti-US slogans and condemned the brutality of the terrorists. By the way, Kermanshah is the city with the largest Kurdish population in Iran.
“I also saw videos of some Tehran residents, many of them ordinary young people, who were beaten badly by rioters and left with bruised and swollen faces. Many were rescued by other passersby or by soldiers and police.
“If Westerners do not know better, that is not our concern. But if Chinese people cheer for this kind of unrest, then I want to ask whether they also supported separatist forces and terrorist groups back then. What these people are doing looks very similar to what was described in the news more than a decade ago: attacking police, attacking innocent passersby regardless of ethnicity or gender, and destroying public facilities.
“This is a group of social scum who have been incited, or even are on drugs. Of course, only by addressing the problem at its root through economic solutions can the emergence of such people be avoided. However, we cannot simply repeat empty slogans like “just fix the economy.” Stability and economic development reinforce each other. Iran must now maintain stability and respond to the threat of US military strikes.
“As a regional power, Iran has limited resources at its disposal. Imperialist forces operate as a bloc. If one does not want to be picked off one by one, one must understand who one is and who shares the greatest common ground. In short, we should support Iran.
“If changes occur within Iran, that is nothing unusual and entirely normal. Any country experiences transitions of power, and Khamenei is already an old man. But no matter how things change, what we need is a stable and prosperous quasi-neighbor that is as independent as possible from the imperialist system in terms of oil.
“We should understand that the fundamental reason Iran has faced years of encirclement and containment is oil. Iranian oil, once controlled by the British Empire, is now controlled by Iran itself. This is precisely what imperialism finds most intolerable.
“On the Chinese internet, various claims are beginning to circulate about how corrupt Khamenei or other families supposedly are. We only need to say two things. First, this is exactly what they said about Assad back then. Second, when it comes to figures like Trump and Netanyahu, the word “corruption” hardly needs to be spelled out. If that is the standard, why not support the overthrow of US imperialism and the Zionist regime 锡安政权 as well?
“From Syria to the Iran-Israel war, and now, it is very clear: Iran has its own scum 渣滓, and we have ours as well. Iran has not fully dealt with its scum, while ours still enjoy substantial resources and influence.”
Right on time: ChinaTalk’s Lily Ottinger has just published a new article, in which she argues that China-Iran ties form a fragile marriage of convenience; Beijing offers discounted oil purchases, infrastructure, surveillance tech, and diplomatic cover in exchange for Iranian alignment on sensitive issues, while carefully avoiding costly commitments or coercive leverage despite growing Iranian public resentment. Read it here:
Tuvia Gering is an analyst at Planet Nine’s Digital Intelligence Team, a visiting fellow at the Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the author’s affiliated organizations.
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