Executive Summary:

Russia is exporting an illiberal governance model to the Western Balkans, using extremist movements, Orthodox religious networks, and sympathetic political elites to weave Kremlin-aligned narratives into elections, legislation, and public discourse.

Transnational far-right networks connected to Moscow offer ideological, organizational, and moral support to regional actors, helping normalize authoritarian practices and strengthen resistance to EU norms in countries with weak institutions and unresolved political fragmentation.

By fusing religion and ultranationalism with influence operations, Russia has turned its soft power into a tangible, durable force in the Balkans, shaping political trajectories and making democratic consolidation across the region far more difficult.

In mid-January 2026, analysts reported a surge of Russian-linked far-right propaganda circulating on Telegram in Serbia (Radio Slobodna Evropa, January 13). Scores of interconnected channels amplify messages from the International Sovereigntist League and other extremist networks, reaching hundreds of thousands of followers. These channels are not isolated echo chambers. Ultranationalist groups in Serbia repost coordinated content on immigration, traditionalism, and opposition to liberal norms, embedding Moscow-aligned narratives deeply into online discourse. The expansion of these networks highlights how digital platforms have become central vectors for foreign influence in the Western Balkans, shaping public opinion and political dynamics rather than merely reflecting them.

Online networks are only one layer of a broader ecosystem. Across the Western Balkans, far-right militias march in the streets, Orthodox priests frame geopolitical loyalty as a moral duty, and sympathetic politicians invoke Moscow’s blessing to resist Western norms, creating a coordinated strategy that fuses digital, religious, and political levers of influence.

The stakes are clear for the Balkans and the West. Russian influence is no longer abstract—it exploits historical grievances, social conservatism, and weak institutions to embed an illiberal model of governance. Through extremist organizations, religious networks, and sympathetic political elites, Moscow is exporting the very blueprint of its authoritarian system—centralized authority, constrained pluralism, and the fusion of cultural and political power—to a region still struggling with democratic consolidation. Understanding this dynamic is essential for safeguarding democratic norms and the EU integration process in a region under active ideological contestation.

In the Western Balkans today, Russia’s influence is not a distant abstraction. It is a tangible force shaping elections, polarizing societies, and embedding itself within extremist movements that claim cultural affinity and political purpose (see EDM, May 13, October 22, 2024, May 13, June 3, August 1, 2025). From Belgrade to Banja Luka and Skopje, Moscow’s strategy has evolved into a multi-layered campaign that fuses cultural identity, Orthodox affiliation, extremist networks, and influence operations. It is a blueprint for exporting a governance model rooted in centralized authority and resistance to liberal democratic norms.

The contours of this influence were dramatically visible in September 2025, when neo-Nazi and far-right groups from across Europe gathered in St. Petersburg under the auspices of the Russian Orthodox Church to launch the International Sovereigntist League (BBC Monitoring, September 25, 2025). Italy’s Forza Nuova, Greece’s Golden Dawn, and Serbian ultranationalist groups such as People’s Patrols and Serbian Action attended alongside oligarch-ideologue Konstantin Malofeev and Russian nationalist thinker Aleksandr Dugin (Telegram/@kvmalofeev, September 23, 2025). The League’s mission—to “defend white Christian values” against Western decadence—illustrated how Kremlin-linked networks provide platforms for extremist ideologies while cloaking them in religious legitimacy. As United24 Media noted, “Far-right groups were given moral sanction by the Church, effectively transforming radical political agendas into a form of spiritual duty” (United 24 Media, December 18, 2025)

Far from operating in isolation, these networks benefit from allies and enablers within the European Union, who provide legitimacy and space for their ideas to circulate. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has played a particularly facilitative role in this ecosystem. He hosts gatherings such as the 2023 Demographic Forum in Budapest that draw regional far-right actors, ultranationalist politicians, and ideologues sympathetic to a socially conservative worldview (Hungarian Government, September 14, 2023). By offering high-profile platforms and soft diplomatic cover, Orbán has strengthened links between Western Balkans extremists and their European counterparts, effectively normalizing a model of socially conservative, authoritarian governance that mirrors Russia’s.

This development has broader implications. The rise of far-right movements across Europe that openly admire or emulate Russia’s political model signals to the region that illiberalism is a viable and electorally successful template. It emboldens local actors to reject EU norms on pluralism, civil liberties, and minority rights, making the Kremlin’s influence operations far easier to operationalize in states already struggling with weak institutions and political fragmentation.

These dynamics are not merely symbolic. Across the Western Balkans, extremist and pro-Russian currents have translated ideological affinity into concrete political influence, shaping local elections and national policy debates.

These transnational extremist currents have found fertile ground in regional politics. In North Macedonia’s 2025 local elections, parties such as United Macedonia campaigned against EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) integration, invoking sovereignty and cultural preservation while appealing to Moscow-aligned businessmen and ideological networks (Balkanweb, October 15, 2025; United Macedonia, accessed January 30). In Serbia, the government’s refusal to implement sanctions on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine has strengthened domestic political coalitions sympathetic to Kremlin narratives. Ultranationalist groups such as the Serbian Party Oathkeepers have gained parliamentary representation and now cooperate with the ruling Serbian Progressive Party, normalizing an anti-Western platform while advocating legislation restricting civil society (BBC na Srpskom, April 4, 2022; Serbian Party Oathkeepers, accessed January 30).

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska offers another stark example. Milorad Dodik, the former president of Republika Srpska, has repeatedly travelled to Moscow to reaffirm pro-Russian stances while obstructing state-level reforms and promoting secessionist rhetoric (Le Monde; President of Russia, April 1, 2025). In February 2025, Dodik’s government enacted a “foreign agents law” modeled directly on Russian legislation to limit independent media and non-governmental organizations, institutionalizing a tactic Moscow has used domestically to suppress dissent (Republika Srpska Ministry of Justice, January 2025; CPJ, March 4, 2025).

Beyond legislation, Russian influence in the Balkans thrives in civic and cultural life. Serbia witnessed some of the largest protests in decades in 2025, with hundreds of thousands demanding accountability for corruption and governance failures. Rather than address grievances, authorities labelled these protests “color revolutions” orchestrated by foreign powers, a narrative directly lifted from Russian information operations (EWB, February 20, 2025). Russian and state-linked Serbian media amplified this framing, portraying civic engagement as an existential threat manipulated by Brussels or Washington (EWB, September 17, 2025).

Religious institutions have emerged as among the most effective carriers of Kremlin-aligned narratives. The Serbian Orthodox Church, deeply embedded in political life, acts as a potent amplifier of pro-Russian sentiment, framing geopolitical choices as cultural battles and positioning Moscow as the guardian of Orthodox civilization (see EDM, May 16, 2022). As an article in the New Union Post explained, “Religious authority in the Balkans is not symbolic. It mobilizes voters, legitimizes political positions and amplifies narratives that dovetail with Russian strategic interests” (New Union Post, May 27, 2025). Extremist leaders leverage this religious platform to normalize ultranationalist and anti-Western rhetoric, presenting it as a defense of tradition rather than ideology.

Even outside Orthodox networks, Moscow’s strategy adapts to other sociopolitical contexts. Research shows that pro-Russian actors have occasionally engaged with Islamic organizations in the Balkans, promoting narratives of resistance to Western cultural imperialism. The adaptability of these networks underscores Moscow’s focus not merely on ideology but on building strategic alliances across a range of social milieus (NSF, April 10, 2024).

A clear governance model unites these interventions. Russia exports a combination of centralized authority, constrained pluralism, and cultural traditionalism, demonstrating how authoritarian power can be coupled with societal control framed as moral duty. Where institutions are weak, civil society is limited, and economic frustration is high, this model finds fertile ground. It normalizes the idea that deviation from Moscow-aligned norms threatens not only political order but cultural survival.

European policymakers have recognized these dynamics. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen condemned Russia’s “hybrid attacks aimed at destabilizing democracies in the Western Balkans,” stressing the importance of strengthening democratic institutions and independent media to resist external interference (AP, October 26, 2024). Regional leaders echo these concerns, warning that Moscow’s persistent influence could jeopardize peace, democratic progress, and the credibility of EU accession processes.

Russia’s influence in the Western Balkans reflects a deliberate and adaptive strategy that integrates extremist organizations, religious authority, and legislative tools into a coherent model of political influence. Rather than exporting ideology alone, Moscow promotes a system of governance characterized by centralized authority, constrained pluralism, and cultural traditionalism.

As these practices are institutionalized through elections, media regulation, and restrictions on civil society, they reshape political norms and expectations within the region. The result is not episodic interference but the gradual normalization of illiberal governance in societies already marked by institutional fragility and unresolved identity conflicts. This trajectory suggests that Russia’s role in the Balkans will remain a persistent factor in shaping the region’s political evolution.

**This article was originally published in **Eurasia Daily Monitor.

Dr. Blerim Vela served as Chief of Staff to the President of Kosovo (2021–2023) and as a member of Kosovo’s National Security Council. He holds a PhD in Contemporary European Studies and writes on governance, defense, and security in Southeast Europe.