arXiv

Manipulation, Insider Information, and Regulation in Leveraged Event-Linked Markets (opens in new tab)

The introduction of leverage on prediction-market event contracts raises three structurally distinct questions that have not been addressed jointly: how leverage changes manipulation incentives, how it interacts with informed-trading rents, and how regulatory frameworks should respond. This paper develops a theoretical framework for the first two and a synthesis of the existing regulatory landscape for the third. The principal analytical move is...

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