Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi (cc) Japan’s Cabinet Secretariat, via Wikimedia Commons.

Japan’s new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made her first diplomatic debut last week, including hosting a closely watched visit from the U.S. President Donald Trump on Oct. 27. Elected just a week prior, Takaichi is Japan’s fourth prime minister in the last five years. Her tenure begins amid deep uncertainty for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Takaichi now leads a minority government after a string of election defeats forced Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba to step down in September.

Takaichi’s arrival has rekindled debates over Japan’s foreign policy. Scholars have traditionally characterized Japanese foreign policy as reactive and risk-averse, anchored by the stability of the country’s “one-party democracy.” But as Japan’s consensus politics erode, this type of caution may prove hard to sustain. Takaichi’s biggest test may lie in squaring her hard-right politics at home with the complex choices she faces abroad – keeping Washington close, Seoul steady, and Taipei secure.

Who is Sanae Takaichi and what does she stand for?

Takaichi has long been an icon for Japan’s nationalist right. She rose from a modest and non-dynastic background, a rarity in Japanese politics where roughly a third of lawmakers come from political families. She is also the first woman to take the country’s top job, and one of only 73 women in Japan’s 465-member House of Representatives.

Ideologically, Takaichi mirrors her mentor Shinzo Abe, blending hard-edged nationalism with economic populism. She supports revising Japan’s pacifist constitution to strengthen the Self-Defense Forces and expand Japan’s role in regional security. Economically, she remains loyal to “Abenomics” – large-scale public spending and government intervention to spur growth – and protecting Japanese industries. Besides the policy continuity, her personal affinity with Abe has earned her the title “Abe 2.0.”

**Can Takaichi keep Washington close – and keep Japan independent? **

Takaichi’s first foreign policy priority is stabilizing relations with the United States. Trump has repeatedly called the U.S.-Japan security treaty “one-sided,” urging Japan to spend up to 5% of its GDP on defense. In July 2025, the Trump and Ishiba administrations struck a deal that would keep U.S. tariffs on Japanese goods at 15%, down from the 25% rate Trump had threatened earlier this year. In exchange, Japan promised to buy more American goods – including defense equipment, liquefied natural gas, automobiles, and soybeans – and pledged to invest $550 billion in projects in the United States.

Like Abe, Takaichi appears to be anchoring her foreign policy on the U.S. alliance – but how far she will go to accommodate Trump remains uncertain. During her campaign, she criticized the July trade deal as “unequal” and hinted at reopening negotiations. Yet at her first summit she refrained from proposing specific changes, emphasizing instead “continuity and fairness” in future talks. Meanwhile, her pledge to increase defense spending to 2% of GDP by the year’s end pleased Washington. But with the cost of living already squeezing households, she risks losing public trust by prioritizing defense spending instead of focusing on the Japanese economy.

Can Takaichi work with South Korea?

Takaichi faces an equally delicate balancing act in South Korea. Her ultranationalist reputation, shaped by past visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine and whitewashing of the Japanese imperial record, continues to fuel distrust in Seoul. As recently as September 2025, she reaffirmed Japan’s territorial claims over the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima islands, calling them “Japanese territory.” She has shown some restraint since taking office – notably, abstaining from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine and expressing a desire to improve relations with South Korea, which she called an “important neighbor.” During their Oct. 30 summit in Kyeongju, Takaichi and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung spoke of “forward-looking” relations, promising continued shuttle diplomacy.

Still, domestic politics could constrain her outreach. Political scientist Jennifer Lind has shown how conciliatory gestures toward South Korea can trigger nationalist backlash in Japan, and exacerbate bilateral tensions over historical grievances. As younger voters – among LDP’s growing constituents – continue to drift rightward, Takaichi also faces domestic pressure to project toughness. Her appointment of several cabinet members from the ultranationalist lobby Nippon Kaigi – to which she herself belongs – only deepens skepticism over whether Takaichi’s moderation will endure.

How far will the new prime minister go in supporting Taiwan?

A well-known pro-Taiwan figure, Takaichi aims to strengthen Japan-Taiwan cooperation. During a visit to Taipei in April, she even proposed a “quasi-security alliance” along with Australia and several European countries to combat authoritarian aggression, an implicit reference to China. Her support for Taiwan aligns with a broad domestic consensus, with 82% in Japan holding a favorable opinion of Taiwan, the highest response of any foreign country.

That said, geopolitical and economic realities will impede Takaichi’s ability to formalize support for Taiwan. China is Japan’s largest trading partner – accounting for roughly one-fifth of all Japanese trade. Any rash, overt commitment to Taiwan could risk her agenda for Japan’s economic recovery. Despite growing statements of solidarity – for instance, as when Abe said in 2021 that a “Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency” – the government’s official position on Taiwan remains ambiguous. Direct military involvement in a cross-strait conflict would trigger complex legal questions surrounding Japan’s “peace constitution” and challenge underlying norms of pacifism that have long underpinned Tokyo’s postwar foreign policy. Indeed, though sympathetic to Taiwan’s security challenges, the Japanese public is not ready to fight for Taiwan.

Abe 2.0?

Takaichi’s brand of “Abe 2.0” politics may inspire confidence among her conservative supporters. The challenge is that this approach risks alienating moderates at home as well as partners abroad. On her first overseas tour, she promised that every trade deal and defense pact would make Japan wealthier and stronger. Yet, between Washington’s demands, Seoul’s suspicions, and Beijing’s shadow, Takaichi’s path forward will be defined as much by constraint as ambition. How she handles this balancing act will influence whether she becomes another temporary caretaker in Japan’s revolving-door politics – or the politician who finally restores stability to LDP leadership.

*Kaito Elston is a research assistant and an undergraduate junior at William & Mary. He studies international security and diplomacy with a focus on East Asia. *

Eun A Jo* is an assistant professor of government at William & Mary, and a 2025-2026 Good Authority fellow. She studies historical memory and nationalism with a focus on East Asia.*