Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

The Sixth Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation (P-TEC) took place last week in Athens, with Washington and its European partners once again vowing to “displace Russian gas for good”.

This is a narrative that has dominated Western policymaking since 2022. The question is whether this is truly feasible, or merely a political slogan attached to a costly long-term energy gamble. One may recall that Europe once prided itself on “energy pragmatism,” particularly Germany, whose industrial model relied on competitively priced Russian pipeline gas.

Washington is now urging Europe to speed up the shift away from Russian gas and expand LNG imports. This has long been an American goal and I’ve been writing about this since 2021, at least. In any case, Brussels now aligns with this position, thereby accelerating Europe’s dependence on LNG supplies largely controlled by US-aligned producers. The P-TEC agenda is unmistakably centered on “securing” non-Russian supply while consolidating US influence over Europe’s energy architecture. This is less about “diversification” and more about re-orientation.

But, again, is it actually possible to “displace Russian gas for good”? In purely theoretical terms, yes. Europe could rely on LNG, renewables, limited domestic output, North African and Eastern Mediterranean resources, plus interconnectivity improvements. In practical, economic, and geopolitical terms, however, the challenges are formidable, to say the least.

First, replacing Russian pipeline gas requires enduring higher costs. LNG is more expensive to transport, regasify, and distribute. Last month, I wrote about Europe’s Nord Stream “headache” and the ongoing political infighting between Poland, Germany, and Ukraine. That episode illustrates how fragile Europe’s energy consensus is. Add to that the sabotage mystery that still lingers around Nord Stream; no wonder European industries today find their energy bills unbearable enough to undermine competitiveness.

Second, there is no easy alternative solution. Europe has turned to Norway and Azerbaijan to compensate for lost Russian pipeline gas, but even they can only do so much. Norway’s output is plateauing and expected to decline after 2026, while Azerbaijan’s Southern Gas Corridor supplies remain limited in scale. In North Africa, Algeria aspires to fill part of the gap, yet as I argued back in 2023, regional rivalries — particularly with Morocco over Western Sahara — undermine long-term reliability. That remains true. The grand “energy independence” slogan is far more complicated than Western officials admit.

Third, the underreported reality is that the rest of the world has not joined Europe’s embargo crusade. Turkey, India, and China continue to trade with Moscow. Even Western-aligned Asian states maintain strategic energy ties with Russia. Japan and South Korea remain stakeholders in the Sakhalin-2 LNG project — so much for the notion of a “united West” on energy sanctions. One may argue that this is not hypocrisy, but realpolitik. European elites, however, seem unwilling to adopt the same pragmatic approach.

Then, Greece is often presented as a key player in Europe’s post-Russian-gas era. It is true that Athens is actively positioning itself as a strategic LNG gateway for US cargoes. Its Energy Minister recently discussed the P-TEC summit agenda with his US counterpart. On paper, Greece’s role as a transit hub boosts its relevance, and infrastructure such as Alexandroupolis’ LNG terminal indeed enhances regional connectivity. Athens is also reviving offshore exploration, with ExxonMobil, Energean, and Hellenic Energy striking a historic drilling deal for deep-sea hydrocarbons.

Once again, the messaging is that Europe is entering a “new” energy chapter. No wonder Greece is being promoted as a critical piece of Europe’s energy puzzle.

However, a sober view reveals limitations. Offshore exploration takes years before production, with geopolitical hurdles like the “Turkish Question”, maritime disputes, environmental pushback, and cost overruns remain potent risks. LNG transshipment does not necessarily translate into affordable domestic energy or industrial revival.

Greece could end up as a transit zone benefiting others more than itself. The revival of the “3+1” diplomatic format involving Greece, Cyprus, Israel and the US shows geopolitical interest, but it also risks entangling Athens in regional rivalries without guaranteed economic payoff. Simply put, being a hub does not mean being a winner.

Meanwhile, Bulgaria is deepening energy cooperation with the US on strategic projects, indicating that Washington seeks a broader regional alignment. But whether this benefits ordinary Europeans is still unclear.

Europe’s refusal to sanction, say, Israel — while swiftly condemning Russia for a largely Western-made crisis — lays bare its glaring double standards and moral hypocrisy on international law and human rights.

Be as it may, Europe’s political establishment frames abandoning Russian gas as a kind of moral and strategic imperative — yet Hungary and Slovakia (using exemptions to keep Russian oil via Druzhba and gas via TurkStream), plus France, Belgium, Italy, and Austria, still import significant Russian gas, mainly LNG, despite 2027 phase-out pressure. These holdouts aside, Europe claims energy security and autonomy, while risking enhancing its dependence — this time on US LNG, Middle Eastern instability, and complex maritime supply chains.

Thus, critics argue that the goal is not “energy independence” but realignment under American guidance. Europe’s choice has its geopolitical logic: weaken Russia’s energy revenues, align with Washington, and integrate energy policy with NATO strategy. The price Europeans pay, however — deindustrialization, higher living costs, and strategic exposure — is rarely debated honestly.

To sum it up, Europe can theoretically phase out Russian gas “for good”. But doing so would require years of sustained high spending, political consensus, alternative supply diversification, and no major global disruptions. If anything, the rest of the world’s behavior shows that isolating one of the largest energy producers is, at best, a Western European fixation. It is blatantly obvious that most nations are pursuing pragmatic energy policies grounded in national interest — not ideological crusades. Now, whether Europe will eventually admit this remains to be seen.