Memory Corruption in WebAssembly: Native Exploits in Your Browser 🧠

Introduction: When Native Code Meets the Web

WebAssembly (WASM) has revolutionized web development by enabling near-native performance in browsers. Developers can now compile C, C++, Rust, and other languages into a portable binary format that executes at remarkable speeds. However, this technological leap forward has inadvertently opened a Pandora’s box of security challenges—bringing decades-old memory corruption vulnerabilities from native platforms directly into the browser environment.

Memory Corruption in WebAssembly: Native Exploits in Your Browser 🧠

Introduction: When Native Code Meets the Web

The promise of WebAssembly is compelling: performance-critical applications running seamlessly in web browsers without the need for plugins or native installations. Yet beneath this innovation lies a sobering reality: traditional memory safety vulnerabilities like buffer overflows and use-after-free bugs are alive and well in WebAssembly modules, creating a new frontier for browser exploitation.

Understanding WebAssembly’s Memory Model

Linear Memory: A Double-Edged Sword

WebAssembly’s linear memory model uses a single contiguous address space to organize memory, allowing the processing unit to access memory locations directly and sequentially. While this design provides exceptional performance, it also introduces significant security risks when modules access memory outside their allocated ranges.

Unlike JavaScript’s managed memory environment, WebAssembly gives developers low-level control over memory allocation and manipulation. Variables in C/C++ can be lowered to two different primitives in WebAssembly: local variables with fixed scope stored in index space, and local variables with unclear static scope stored in a separate user-addressable stack in linear memory. This architectural decision creates opportunities for classic memory corruption vulnerabilities to manifest.

The Compiler Gap: Missing Security Protections

Recent research has revealed a critical security gap in WebAssembly compilation. When C programs are compiled to WASM, they may lack anti-exploit defenses that programmers take for granted on native architectures, as security protections available in compilers like Clang for x86 builds don’t show up when WASM output is produced.

Researchers compiled 4,469 C programs with known buffer overflow vulnerabilities to both x86 code and WebAssembly, finding that execution outcomes differed for 1,088 programs due to the lack of security measures such as stack canaries in generated WebAssembly—while x86 code crashed upon stack-based buffer overflow, the corresponding WebAssembly continued execution.

This finding fundamentally challenges the security assumptions developers hold about WebAssembly. Without stack-smashing protection, exploited WASM programs can continue running under an attacker’s control, whereas their x86 counterparts would exit for their own protection.

Buffer Overflows in WebAssembly: Old Threat, New Environment

How Buffer Overflows Manifest in WASM

While buffer overflows cannot affect local or global variables stored in index space (which are fixed-size and addressed by index), data stored in linear memory can overwrite adjacent objects, since bounds checking is performed at linear memory region granularity and is not context-sensitive.

Under certain circumstances, unsafe functions such as strcpy can allow an attacker to overwrite local variables when they are stored contiguously in memory. This classic buffer overflow scenario translates directly into the WebAssembly environment, enabling attackers to corrupt adjacent memory regions.

Stack-Based Corruption Attacks

WebAssembly binaries continue execution after buffer overflow and memory corruption most of the time, attributed to the absence of Stack Smashing Protection (SSP) in WebAssembly binaries, allowing attackers to exploit buffer overflows in a stealthier fashion. This makes WebAssembly binaries more vulnerable to memory corruption than their native counterparts.

Stack canaries, which serve as tripwires to detect buffer overflow attempts in native applications, are conspicuously absent from most WASM binaries. This architectural decision was made under the assumption that WebAssembly’s sandboxing would provide sufficient protection—an assumption that research has shown to be problematic.

Heap Metadata Corruption

Research has demonstrated sophisticated heap exploitation techniques in WebAssembly. In heap metadata corruption attacks using the emmalloc allocator, an overflow in one allocation can write to directly adjacent metadata of another allocation, manipulating the used bit and creating a fake structure that tricks the allocator during subsequent free operations.

These attacks mirror classic heap exploitation techniques from native platforms, demonstrating that WebAssembly’s sandboxing does not eliminate the fundamental risks of memory corruption—it merely relocates them within the browser environment.

Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities in WASM Modules

The Persistent Danger of Dangling Pointers

Use-after-free (UAF) vulnerabilities occur when a program continues to use a memory location after it has been freed. Memory-unsafe C code remains unsafe when compiled to Wasm, and attackers can exploit buffer overflows and use-after-frees in Wasm almost as easily as they can on native platforms.

Recent vulnerabilities in WebAssembly tools have included use-after-free issues, such as CVE findings affecting the wabt toolkit’s GetFuncOffset function. These vulnerabilities demonstrate that dangling pointer bugs persist through the compilation process from C/C++ to WebAssembly.

Exploitation Challenges and Opportunities

While use-after-free vulnerabilities exist in WebAssembly, exploiting them presents unique challenges and opportunities. The absence of traditional memory corruption mitigations means that once an attacker achieves a UAF condition, the exploitation path may be more straightforward than in hardened native environments.

However, WebAssembly’s sandboxed execution model and control-flow integrity features do impose constraints on exploitation techniques. Attackers cannot directly inject code or use traditional return-oriented programming (ROP) gadgets as they would in native environments.

Control-Flow Hijacking: The Indirect Call Vulnerability

Exploiting Function Pointers

Restricted control-flow hijacking is possible by abusing the call_indirect instruction of WebAssembly, which allows the language to support function pointers required when the compiler cannot statically determine the exact function to call, such as callback functions or dynamic methods in object-oriented programming. This mechanism weakens WebAssembly’s implicitly enforced control-flow integrity.

When function pointers are compiled into variables stored in linear memory, attackers with arbitrary write capabilities through buffer overflows can modify these pointers to redirect program execution. While WebAssembly’s control-flow integrity ensures that call targets must be valid functions declared at load time, this still provides attackers with a meaningful subset of potential targets for control-flow hijacking.

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Amplification

Buffer overflows in WebAssembly can lead to cross-site scripting vulnerabilities when corrupted data is later used in DOM manipulation. This demonstrates how traditional memory corruption bugs can have web-specific consequences, bridging the gap between low-level exploitation and high-level web application attacks.

Attackers exploiting memory corruption in WASM modules can leverage these vulnerabilities to inject malicious scripts, bypass security policies, or exfiltrate sensitive data—all while operating within the supposed safety of the browser sandbox.

Real-World Vulnerabilities and Attack Scenarios

Recent CVE Discoveries

The WebAssembly ecosystem has seen numerous security vulnerabilities documented in recent years. In 2025, Google patched CVE-2025-5419 (CVSS score: 8.8), an out-of-bounds read and write vulnerability in the V8 JavaScript and WebAssembly engine that allowed remote attackers to potentially exploit heap corruption via crafted HTML pages.

In 2023, the CosmWasm vulnerability CVE-2023-33242 allowed malicious contracts to cause stack overflows by exploiting recursive calls, with attackers deploying contracts that repeatedly invoked functions across the contract-runtime boundary, crashing blockchain nodes and interrupting operations.

Wasm Bombs and Denial-of-Service

The vulnerability CWA-2023-004 in late 2023 and early 2024 allowed attackers to upload specifically crafted WebAssembly contracts that appeared benign in size but expanded massively in memory when loaded, with contracts consisting of only hundreds of kilobytes expanding to hundreds of megabytes in memory, causing node crashes and threatening chain availability.

These “Wasm bombs” demonstrate how WebAssembly’s compilation and runtime behavior can be exploited for denial-of-service attacks, even without breaking the sandbox security model directly.

Sandbox Escape Attempts

CVE-2023-51661, a flaw in the Wasmer runtime, enabled contracts to bypass sandbox security restrictions, gaining unauthorized access to node file systems. This represents one of the most severe categories of WebAssembly vulnerabilities—those that break through the fundamental isolation guarantees that make WASM viable in multi-tenant environments.

The V8 Sandbox: Google’s Response to WASM Threats

A New Defense Layer

In response to growing concerns about memory corruption in WebAssembly, Google announced support for the V8 Sandbox in Chrome to address memory corruption issues, with the sandbox designed to prevent memory corruption in V8 from spreading within the host process. This lightweight, in-process sandbox specifically targets common V8 and WebAssembly vulnerabilities.

The V8 Sandbox represents a significant architectural investment in containing the damage from memory corruption vulnerabilities. Rather than attempting to eliminate all memory safety bugs—an arguably impossible task given the nature of C/C++ code—Google’s approach focuses on limiting the blast radius when exploitation does occur.

Limitations and Ongoing Challenges

While the V8 Sandbox provides meaningful protection against certain classes of attacks, it cannot address all WebAssembly security concerns. Memory corruption within a WebAssembly module can still compromise the application’s logic, steal data, or enable cross-site scripting attacks—all without escaping the sandbox.

Furthermore, the sandbox introduces performance overhead and implementation complexity. Balancing security with WebAssembly’s core value proposition of near-native performance remains an ongoing challenge for browser vendors and the WebAssembly community.

Detection and Analysis Challenges

Static Analysis Limitations

Traditional security tools and techniques are not always effective at detecting vulnerabilities in WebAssembly code due to its unique structure and execution model. The binary nature of WASM, combined with its stack-based virtual machine architecture, creates blind spots for conventional security scanners.

Static analysis tools designed for native code often struggle with WebAssembly’s different representation of memory operations, control flow, and function calls. Similarly, tools designed for JavaScript may not understand the low-level semantics of WASM modules or how they interact with the JavaScript environment.

The Need for Specialized Tools

One approach to detecting vulnerabilities in WebAssembly code is to use static analysis tools that can analyze the code for potential security issues, with developers able to implement checks for common memory corruption errors. However, developing effective WASM-specific security tools remains an active area of research.

Recent academic work has focused on creating specialized analyzers, symbolic execution engines, and fuzzing frameworks tailored to WebAssembly’s unique characteristics. These tools represent important steps toward better security visibility in WASM applications.

Mitigation Strategies and Best Practices

Memory Safety Through Language Choice

The most effective mitigation against memory corruption vulnerabilities is using memory-safe languages. WebAssembly contracts can benefit from the safer language constructs of languages such as Rust, which enforce memory safety at compile time. By compiling from Rust rather than C/C++, developers can leverage the language’s ownership system and borrow checker to prevent entire classes of memory safety bugs.

Other memory-safe languages like Go (with caveats regarding its WASM implementation), Swift, and modern C++ with strict coding standards can also reduce vulnerability surface area significantly.

Secure Coding Practices for C/C++

When working with C/C++ and WebAssembly, developers should use bounds checking to ensure modules only access memory within their allocated range, avoid unsafe functions to prevent memory corruption vulnerabilities, and implement memory protection mechanisms such as address space layout randomization (ASLR) and data execution prevention (DEP).

Developers should treat C language security issues just as seriously in WASM as in native environments, avoid emscripten_run_script (as dynamic JavaScript execution from WASM is dangerous), use Clang’s Control Flow Integrity flag (-fsanitize=cfi), and enable optimization to remove some of Emscripten’s built-in functions that can be used for exploits.

Input Validation and Sanitization

Developers should validate input data, sanitize user inputs, and avoid unsafe memory operations to reduce the likelihood of security vulnerabilities. This fundamental security principle applies equally to WebAssembly applications as to any other software.

Special attention should be paid to data crossing the JavaScript-WASM boundary. Attackers may attempt to exploit type confusion vulnerabilities or trigger buffer overflows by supplying maliciously crafted input through the JavaScript API.

Sandboxing and Isolation

Implementing a robust sandboxing mechanism that restricts the capabilities of WebAssembly modules and prevents them from accessing sensitive data or system resources is crucial, with developers enforcing strict isolation between WebAssembly code and the rest of the application to reduce the risk of sandbox escapes.

This defense-in-depth approach assumes that some vulnerabilities will exist and focuses on limiting their impact. By compartmentalizing WebAssembly modules and restricting their access to system resources, developers can contain potential breaches.

The Future of WebAssembly Security

Memory-Safe WebAssembly Proposals

Memory-Safe WebAssembly (MSWasm) proposes to extend Wasm with language-level memory-safety abstractions to address memory corruption problems, with well-typed MSWasm programs designed to be robustly memory safe by construction. This represents a potential long-term solution to the fundamental memory safety challenges facing WebAssembly.

The MSWasm proposal aims to preserve high-level semantic information about memory operations during compilation, enabling runtime systems to enforce memory safety without requiring source code changes. However, adoption of such extensions requires coordination across the WebAssembly ecosystem and may introduce performance trade-offs.

Compiler and Toolchain Improvements

Nearly 80% of all collected binaries are compiled with the LLVM toolchain, meaning implementing security mechanisms like Stack Smashing Protection in LLVM would introduce increased protection in most WebAssembly programs without additional engineering efforts. This represents a practical path forward for improving WASM security at scale.

Compiler developers are actively working on bringing traditional security features like stack canaries, control-flow guard, and address sanitizers to WebAssembly toolchains. As these protections mature, the security gap between native and WASM binaries should narrow.

Runtime Defenses and Monitoring

Browser vendors continue to innovate in runtime defenses against WebAssembly exploitation. Beyond Google’s V8 Sandbox, other approaches include:

Fine-grained memory compartmentalization
Hardware-assisted memory tagging
Runtime monitoring of suspicious WASM behavior
Just-in-time compiler hardening
Enhanced control-flow integrity enforcement

These multi-layered defenses recognize that no single mitigation can eliminate all risks, requiring instead a comprehensive security approach.

Security Testing for WebAssembly Applications

Fuzzing and Symbolic Execution

Automated testing techniques like fuzzing and symbolic execution have proven effective at discovering vulnerabilities in WebAssembly modules. These approaches can systematically explore program states and input spaces to identify memory corruption bugs before attackers do.

Specialized tools like WAFL (WebAssembly Fuzzing with Fast Snapshots) and SeeWasm (symbolic execution for WebAssembly) provide WASM-specific capabilities that improve vulnerability detection compared to generic testing frameworks.

Security Code Review

Given WebAssembly’s ability to inherit vulnerabilities from source code, thorough security review of C/C++ code before compilation is essential. Research on WebAssembly compiled from C/C++ programs confirms that in some cases, the WebAssembly can inherit vulnerabilities hidden within the source code that can become exploitable.

Code review should focus on: - Memory allocation and deallocation patterns - Buffer handling and bounds checking - Pointer arithmetic and dereferencing - Integer overflow potential - Use of unsafe C library functions

Continuous Security Monitoring

Organizations deploying WebAssembly applications should implement continuous security monitoring to detect exploitation attempts. This includes:

Anomaly detection for unusual WASM module behavior
Memory access pattern analysis
Performance monitoring for Wasm bomb indicators
Integration with web application firewalls
Regular security scanning of WASM modules

Conclusion: Navigating the WebAssembly Security Landscape

WebAssembly represents a transformative technology that brings unprecedented performance to web applications. However, this performance comes at a security cost—the reintroduction of classic memory corruption vulnerabilities that plagued native applications for decades.

The security challenges facing WebAssembly are neither insurmountable nor unexpected. They reflect the fundamental trade-offs between performance, compatibility with existing codebases, and security. As the WebAssembly ecosystem matures, we’re seeing important progress in detection tools, runtime defenses, and secure development practices.

For developers, the path forward requires vigilance and layered security thinking. Choosing memory-safe languages when possible, applying secure coding practices when using C/C++, leveraging available compiler protections, implementing robust sandboxing, and conducting thorough security testing all contribute to more secure WebAssembly applications.

For the broader WebAssembly community, continued research into memory-safe extensions, improved toolchain security features, and better runtime defenses will be essential to realizing WASM’s full potential without compromising user security.

The era of native exploits in browsers is here—but so too are the tools, knowledge, and community commitment needed to address them effectively. By understanding these risks and implementing comprehensive security measures, we can harness WebAssembly’s power while keeping users safe from memory corruption attacks.

Keywords: WebAssembly security, WASM vulnerabilities, buffer overflow, use-after-free, memory corruption, browser exploitation, WebAssembly exploits, native code security, heap corruption, stack overflow, control-flow hijacking, V8 sandbox, memory safety, WebAssembly mitigation, secure coding practices