- 08 Nov, 2025 *
Government cites successful public operators to justify creating new bureaucracy, as implementation extends into 2027
Transport Secretary Heidi Alexander has a problem. To justify Great British Railways, she cites London North Eastern Railway and Southeastern as proof that public ownership works - both rank among the top five operators nationally for reliability. But if taking railways into public ownership already delivers results, why spend years creating an entirely new organisation merging 17 separate bodies?
The question cuts to the heart of Britain’s latest railway reorganisation. The existing publicly owned operators outperform their private counterparts within the current fragmented system. They prove that simply running services publicly works. Yet the…
- 08 Nov, 2025 *
Government cites successful public operators to justify creating new bureaucracy, as implementation extends into 2027
Transport Secretary Heidi Alexander has a problem. To justify Great British Railways, she cites London North Eastern Railway and Southeastern as proof that public ownership works - both rank among the top five operators nationally for reliability. But if taking railways into public ownership already delivers results, why spend years creating an entirely new organisation merging 17 separate bodies?
The question cuts to the heart of Britain’s latest railway reorganisation. The existing publicly owned operators outperform their private counterparts within the current fragmented system. They prove that simply running services publicly works. Yet the government is embarking on what the Department for Transport’s permanent secretary calls “one of the most significant transformations being undertaken” - a restructuring that won’t finish until 2027 at the earliest.
The Railways Bill creates Great British Railways as a single state-owned company responsible for both infrastructure and passenger services. Ministers promise simpler ticketing, better reliability, and an end to three decades of fragmentation. Passengers currently navigate 14 different operators and a fare system so complex it offers 55 million different ticket combinations. Nobody clearly holds responsibility when things go wrong.
Yet the government’s own performance data suggests Britain’s problem isn’t structure - it’s that too few services run under public ownership.
Public operators already deliver what reform promises
Greater Anglia: 93.9% punctuality. Southeastern and LNER: lowest cancellation rates nationally. South Western Railway: tripled new train deployment within four months of public ownership. TransPennine Express: 34% cut in cancellations under state control.
These operators function within the supposedly broken fragmented system - dealing with the same complex regulations, contractor relationships, and infrastructure constraints that GBR promises to sweep away. They succeed not because of elaborate reorganisation, but because they’re publicly owned.
The government’s logic becomes circular. Taking franchises into public ownership when contracts expire improves performance. So the solution is... to create new bureaucracy reorganising the operators that already work? Tony Lodge, a rail expert at the Centre for Policy Studies, calls Great British Railways “a solution looking for a problem - prioritising the nationalisation of the railways over their effective and efficient operation.”
Transport Committee Chair Ruth Cadbury identified the gap between promise and proof: “What difference will passengers notice? How can we feel confident that these plans, that sound good on paper, will translate into more reliable train journeys and fares that are value for money?”
Why successful railways never needed reorganisation
Switzerland ranks first among 26 European railway systems. Denmark, Finland, Germany, Austria, Sweden and France follow. Britain sits in the second tier. The gap isn’t marginal - Switzerland achieves 99% electrification, the highest per capita rail usage in Europe, and transparent subsidy structures prioritising infrastructure investment.
None of these high-performing systems privatised their railways. None fragmented infrastructure from operations. None created the contractual labyrinth Britain now tries to simplify through reorganisation. They maintained integrated public ownership and invested in service rather than restructuring institutions.
Britain chose the opposite path. Major’s government privatised British Rail in the 1990s, splitting track from train. Railtrack collapsed after the 2000 Hatfield crash. The East Coast Main Line failed three times under private franchise - 2006, 2009, 2018. After each failure, politicians promised the next reorganisation would finally work.
A 2011 report found UK railway costs ran 30% higher than comparable European systems. Much of this premium stemmed from fragmentation itself - the administrative burden of managing relationships between track owner, train operators, rolling stock companies, maintenance contractors, and multiple regulators. Privatisation didn’t cut costs. It added expensive complexity.
The irony: much of Britain’s “privatised” system ended up run by other countries’ state railways. Deutsche Bahn, SNCF and Dutch Railways operated British franchises whilst their governments maintained integrated public systems. Britain exported its experiment. Nobody imported it.
Creating a new railway whilst running the old one
Transport Secretary Louise Haigh told MPs that establishing GBR represents an “enormous programme of change” requiring the government to “massively reduce and simplify the mass of regulation built up over 30 years of privatisation.” Creating GBR means merging organisations with distinct cultures, systems, and practices whilst maintaining daily train services.
This happens whilst rail needs unprecedented support. The industry receives £12.5 billion annual subsidy despite providing just 2% of journeys nationally - a £9 billion increase from pre-pandemic levels. The government expects GBR to reduce this through operational efficiencies, but analysis identifies persistent challenges: boom-and-bust investment cycles, fragmented rolling stock specifications preventing economies of scale, and mounting infrastructure maintenance costs.
The Regulatory Policy Committee’s assessment of the Railways Bill noted that “due to limited analysis of all identified impacts,” the estimated net present value ranges from -£203 million to -£409 million, though “the Department expects the non-monetised benefits will outweigh this.” This cautious language reflects genuine uncertainty about whether reorganisation delivers promised efficiencies.
GBR also retains significant fragmentation. Trains remain privately owned by rolling stock leasing companies - the government cites high nationalisation costs. Some services will still be contracted to private operators. The regulatory framework still involves the Office of Rail and Road as an appeals body. This isn’t full integration. It’s reorganisation that keeps key elements of the fragmented model.
Years of transition for uncertain improvements
The timeline reveals the gap between promise and delivery. The Railways Bill needs Royal Assent - typically several months to over a year for major legislation. Then GBR becomes operational “approximately 12 months” later. That places launch in late 2026 at the earliest, likely 2027.
Meanwhile, franchise transfers continue separately. South Western Railway transferred in May 2025, c2c in July, Greater Anglia in October. West Midlands Trains moves in February 2026, Govia Thameslink Railway in May 2026. All transfers complete by October 2027.
Passengers face years of transition. Some travel on rebranded public operators. Others remain with private franchises awaiting transfer. The promised single GBR ticketing app won’t launch until the organisation exists. Simpler fares require coordinated implementation across the network. Infrastructure improvements depend on GBR planning and executing projects more effectively than the current system.
During this extended transition, existing problems persist. Trains still get cancelled. Fares remain Europe’s highest. The £9 billion subsidy gap continues. Infrastructure backlogs don’t pause for reorganisation.
Lodge warns that “without a customer-first focus, the network will remain heavily dependent on public subsidy.” His concern: whether GBR can deliver promised efficiencies or simply creates different bureaucracy with similar problems. “Great British Railways will merely resurrect the ghost of British Rail, with all the poor performance, taxpayer subsidy, and passenger dissatisfaction that came with it,” he argues, unless operations fundamentally change.
Disability rights advocates expressed disappointment that the consultation gave insufficient attention to competing access needs. Freight operators worry whether GBR will prioritise their requirements alongside passengers. Logistics UK noted: “Success will hinge on how effectively it enables freight to grow.” With GBR controlling both infrastructure and passenger timetabling, freight risks being squeezed when capacity conflicts arise.
Reorganising structure without addressing fundamentals
British railways don’t need institutional restructuring. They need what European railways demonstrate works: consistent long-term investment in stable integrated public systems. Switzerland, Denmark and Germany didn’t reorganise their way to success. They maintained integration and invested steadily.
Britain has spent three decades reorganising. Privatisation promised efficiency through competition. When Railtrack failed, Network Rail replaced it. When franchises collapsed, emergency agreements provided stopgaps. Now GBR promises integration will finally work.
Yet the evidence sits in plain sight. Greater Anglia, LNER and Southeastern succeed within the existing framework because they’re publicly owned. They demonstrate that ownership matters more than organisational charts. Which returns to the question: if letting franchises expire naturally and operating them publicly delivers results, why the elaborate transformation?
The answer appears political. Creating Great British Railways provides visible action - a new organisation with a familiar brand replacing the confusing array of private operators. It’s more attractive than “just run the services publicly as contracts expire.”
But Britain’s track record suggests caution. Institutional restructuring consumes political capital and management attention without addressing underlying problems. The time, complexity and risk involved in creating GBR could go towards simply operating existing public services well and investing in infrastructure passengers actually notice.
The government’s Railways Bill may eventually deliver promised improvements. GBR might prove more efficient than the current system. Unified track and train management could eliminate coordination failures plaguing infrastructure projects. But passengers face years of uncertainty whilst the transformation unfolds.
The successful public operators government cites as proof demonstrate that Britain doesn’t need elaborate reorganisation to improve rail service. It needs adequate funding, consistent investment, and operational stability. The question isn’t whether public ownership works - current evidence shows it does. The question is whether creating Great British Railways addresses actual problems or adds another chapter to Britain’s long history of railway reorganisation whilst Europe’s integrated public systems continue proving simpler approaches work better.