The US vice-president, J. D. Vance, has identified himself as being “of the post-liberal right”. Vance is generally thought of as more influential than many previous US vice-presidents and the odds are narrowing on him running for president in 2028. So it’s useful to know what this “post-liberal” section of the Republican party stands for.

In many ways, post-liberalism isn’t new. As I argue in my forthcoming book, post-liberals hold very traditional, conservative views on social issues that have been present in the Republican party going back decades.

They don’t believe in abortion rights, same-sex marriage, or gender self-identification. They also oppose access to pornography, and condemn blasphemy, while urging governments to strengthen support for families, rebuild communities, support churches, unions, and local groups, and bring society back to its Christian roots.

But post-liberalism is different from past conservatism in three big ways.

Economic policy

Since the 1980s, conservatives across the west have mostly supported neo-liberal economics. That means things like free trade, privatisation, less government spending, globalisation and letting markets run with little interference. In short: the market decides, not the state.

Post-liberals strongly disagree. They argue that neo-liberalism has helped big corporations make unprecedented profits while hurting working people, destroying local communities, and damaging the environment. They say free trade hasn’t raised living standards for everyone – especially the working class.

Instead, they want governments to break up powerful monopolies, rebuild manufacturing bases, ensure that wages can support families, protect workers (including gig workers) and support unions and trades. This is closer to former president Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal in the 1930s, where an emboldened state counterbalances capital to protect communities and the working-classes, than it is Ronald Reagan’s free marketeering philosophy of the 1980s.

Freedom and the common good

Post-liberals also argue that neo-liberal economics isn’t truly conservative at all – it’s just another form of liberalism because it focuses on individual freedom and choice. Liberalism is about giving people as much freedom as possible. Post-liberals say this has gone too far. In their view, freedom is not the most important thing – it’s more important to be making the right choices.

They believe in something they call the “common good”: the idea that there is one true way to live a good life, and that politics should guide people towards it. Individuals, according to this view, can be wrong about what’s best for them. It’s the moral purpose of the state to step in and point them in the right direction.

The role of the state

Religion – especially Catholicism – plays a big role in this. Many post-liberal thinkers are Catholic (as is Vance). Some believe that the state should act under the authority of the Catholic church to pursue our spiritual ends – very likely restricting certain civil and political rights of unbelievers (or believers of the wrong religion) in doing so. Not all post-liberals agree with that extreme version. But all agree that religion needs to play a more central role in politics.


True believer: days before he died, Pope Francis gave an audience to the US vice-president. Vatican Media via AP, HO

Traditional conservatives often tried to change culture first, hoping politics would follow. Post-liberals think this has failed. What is needed instead, they believe, is the opposite: political power needs to be seized and then used to make society more conservative.

Like populists, they argue that “the people” (especially the working classes) are being undermined by a liberal elite. But while populists want to hand politics to the people, post-liberals think elites are inevitable. The question is whether the right elites – those committed to the common good – wield power.

Strategies differ among post-liberals as to how this will be achieved. One model is democratic – take over a political party (as Trump did with the Republicans) and then reshape society along post-liberal lines. Another model is significantly less democratic: place loyal officials inside the administration to quietly change the system from within, even if voters do not support post-liberalism.

Which strategy post-liberals choose depends on how much they think ordinary people understand their best interests. If they believe “the people” still know what is good for them – that is, post-liberalism – then all that’s needed is a political party to run on a post-liberal platform and win support through elections.

But in reality, there isn’t much evidence that large numbers of people are already waiting to support post-liberal ideas.

That makes the second strategy – quietly reshaping government from the inside – seem more likely. In this view, if people don’t know what’s truly good for them, democracy can’t be trusted. Instead, leaders must guide – or even compel – citizens towards the “right” beliefs and choices, teaching them what their real interests are.

Where conservatives have distrusted large governments, championed markets, and celebrated individualism, post-liberals embrace “big-state conservatism”. They treat a strong and activist government as essential to counter vested economic interests. Further it’s the government’s moral purpose to guide the people towards living what they believe to be the universal view of what represents a good life.

Post-liberals want to use government power to reshape society. They want to guide people towards one view of the good life, heavily influenced by religion. But many people do not share this vision. Critics say that forcing it through – “legislating morality” – risks backlash and deeper division.

Liberal suspicion of state-enforced morality is rooted not only in principle but because of centuries of religious strife, intolerance and persecution. Post-liberalism promises unity and moral renewal, but it could end up producing division and authoritarian rule.