China Power | Diplomacy | East Asia
Beijing weaponizes communication channels to compel compliance, signal grievance, assert status, and inflict punishment.

Credit: Depositphotos
In the wake of Czech President Petr Pavel’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in July 2025, China [severed all engagements](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202508…
China Power | Diplomacy | East Asia
Beijing weaponizes communication channels to compel compliance, signal grievance, assert status, and inflict punishment.

Credit: Depositphotos
In the wake of Czech President Petr Pavel’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in July 2025, China severed all engagements with the Czech head of state. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated in August that Pavel’s visit was a “malign provocation” and “undermined China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” In an age where communication channels are being weaponized to compel compliance, signal grievance, assert status, and inflict punishment, Beijing’s punitive silence warrants urgent attention.
Pavel paid a personal visit to the Dalai Lama in India on the occasion of the Tibetan Buddhist leader’s 90th birthday on July 27. The trip was reportedly conducted in a private capacity. Nevertheless it elicited vehement protest from the Chinese government, which culminated in the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s announcement of disengagement from Pavel.
There are three points to note. First, the ostracism was targeted only at the president. So far, it appears from various Chinese internet sources that other communication channels, including contact with the Czech prime minister, and economic interactions at all other levels, remain largely unaffected. Second, Beijing’s choice of punishment is telling, namely the severance of communication. Rather than imposing more substantive sanctions – like Beijing did to former U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and her family following her visit to Taiwan – it opted for cutting off all interactions with one individual. Third, the response from the Czech presidential office is equally revealing. On its official X account, the office posted: “At the presidential level between the Czech Republic and China there is currently no direct communication, so this is not a step that would change the status quo.” If there was no communication to begin with, then what exactly is being cut off?
A cursory examination of Chinese sources sheds light on how this official disengagement is being understood within the domestic discourse, which mirrors the strategic motive behind China’s move. First, the severance of communication channels functions as a communication in itself, one that signals anger over a perceived transgressor in a passive-aggressive manner. In other words, non-communication operates as an expression of fury or dissatisfaction: had no transgression occurred, normal diplomatic exchanges would have continued. Notably, according to publicly available information, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has not summoned the Czech ambassador over this meeting – a conventional diplomatic gesture used to directly express discontent or lodge a protest. This further highlights the passive-aggressiveness of Beijing’s chosen approach
Second, the termination of communication, or the deployment of silent treatment at the interstate level, constitutes a form of punishment. The frequent use of terms such as “blacklisting” and “cold treatment” across Chinese media illustrates how this action is domestically framed and imbued with meaning. It signals that Beijing’s decision to disengage from communication with the Czech president represents retaliation for the latter’s meeting with the Dalai Lama – a recurring trigger for China’s diplomatic disengagements. This is evidenced by Beijing’s earlier diplomatic ostracism of the Cameron government in the United Kingdom and of the Sarkozy government in France, both of which lasted for over a year. It also serves to compel the rest of the Czech government to respect China’s core concerns, and deters Czech and other European leaders from committing the same (perceived) transgression.
Moreover, the public nature of this move – that is, Beijing’s decision to broadcast its severance of ties with Pavel rather than to let estrangement unfold quietly – underlines the performative dimension. The announcement itself functions as a form of sanction, akin to a “naming and shaming” mechanism that publicly identifies and condemns the target’s behavior, thereby constructing a stigmatized image of the Czech leader and his actions. By deploying such a form of diplomatic “silent treatment” toward the head of state of a small country, Beijing seeks to consolidate its superior position within this dyadic relationship, signaling that it can afford not to engage with the Czech president at all, while keeping other channels of communication open.
Nevertheless, the Czech government maintained that no prior high-level contact had existed between the two sides. This framing re-casts Beijing’s move as largely symbolic: China declares “We are punishing you” while Prague replies, “We hardly lose anything.” Such rhetoric not only blunts the coercive edge of Beijing’s ostracism but may also serve to defuse tension by trivializing the punishment.
Third, this targeted (and relatively restrained) move, which stops short of imposing broader diplomatic or economic sanctions, forecloses the possibility of undue conflict escalation. After all, communication with other Czech state bodies and ongoing bilateral economic activities reportedly remain unaffected. Some observers have noted that by only restricting the measure on the president and, by extension, reassuring that the bilateral relations would not be affected, Beijing avoids antagonizing the rest of the Czech and European elites and pushing them further away from China. In fact, as reflected from the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s meeting with the EU’s High Representative Kaja Kallas in July 2025, it is in China’s interests to “not seek confrontation just because of divergences.” Doubling down on punitive actions against Czechia might invite retaliatory measures from Prague or even Brussels, which runs counter to Beijing’s broader strategic interests in the region. Meanwhile, this targeted approach affords Beijing greater latitude to escalate punishment if the perceived transgression persists.
The measured official response from Prague shows that it may also be seeking to contain the impact of this incident. Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky, again, highlighted the private nature of Pavel’s visit, in an effort to defuse the situation. Nonetheless, China’s punishment has seemingly provoked insubordinate reactions on X from some Czech Cabinet members – including Health Minister Vlastimil Valek and Science Minister Marek Zenisek – in a show of support for the president. This shows that such seemingly restrained communicative ostracism can still be viewed as rather aggressive, eliciting defiant or even “rally-around-the flag” reactions from the target.
The long-term impact of China’s non-engagement with the Czech president remains to be seen, but the use of the “cold treatment” in managing conflicts has become an increasingly common strategy for Beijing. We currently live in a world marked not only by economic interdependence but also communicative interdependence – one in which states, societies, and individuals rely on continuous communication, mutual recognition, and symbolic interaction to manage expectations, minimize misunderstanding, sustain relationships, and foster stability. The maintenance of dialogue and exchange of meaning has become as vital as trade, finance, or investment for the functioning of international relations.
Understanding China’s emerging yet overlooked use of punitive silence at the interstate level is significant for promoting sustainable conflict management and resolution, as well as for preserving peace and security.