Some observers have described the fall of Pokrovsk as “sudden.” That may be true if one followed the wrong analysts. In reality, the defense deterioration was apparent as early as 2024 and became unmistakable by 2025, as the underlying dynamics made the outcome nearly inevitable:
https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1954601747844112634
**
2/ That the city continued to hold out until November is, in itself, an achievement. Still, the rapid loss of positions in summer/fall 2024, which left logistics vulnerable and exposed the flanks, combined with manpower shortages, largely dictated the outcome now unfolding **
3/ Launching a counteroffensive capable of retaking the city and securing its flanks, or even holding f…
Some observers have described the fall of Pokrovsk as “sudden.” That may be true if one followed the wrong analysts. In reality, the defense deterioration was apparent as early as 2024 and became unmistakable by 2025, as the underlying dynamics made the outcome nearly inevitable:
https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1954601747844112634
**
2/ That the city continued to hold out until November is, in itself, an achievement. Still, the rapid loss of positions in summer/fall 2024, which left logistics vulnerable and exposed the flanks, combined with manpower shortages, largely dictated the outcome now unfolding **
3/ Launching a counteroffensive capable of retaking the city and securing its flanks, or even holding for another year, would have required diverting significant resources from other sectors of the front, a tradeoff that would result in disastrous situation elsewhere. **
4/ The broader battlefield dynamics remains unchanged. Russian forces advance despite sustaining higher casualty ratios in KIA and WIA. Persistent issues within Ukrainian units, including manpower shortages and command and control difficulties, are still in place. **
5/ The key task after withdrawal will be to prevent a repeat of the 2024 situation, when Russian forces achieved rapid gains in both the Ocheretyne and Pokrovsk sectors in a short period of time. Ukraine’s readiness behind Pokrovsk appears stronger than it was behind Avdiivka **
6/ Overall, the defense of Pokrovsk in 2025, given the circumstances, is a notable accomplishment. Yet the ultimate result of the defense will depend on whether the AFU command will decide to reinforce the city or conduct an organized withdrawal to better positions **
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More from @Tatarigami_UA
Oct 29
North Korea and Russia are rapidly building their first road bridge to enhance logistics and expand military and economic ties. Frontelligence Insight has analyzed satellite imagery and project documents to estimate its completion and potential impact. 🧵Thread:
2/ Today, Russia and North Korea have no direct road connection. The only land crossing is the 1950s-era Korea - Russia Friendship Railroad Bridge. Air and maritime routes, via Pyongyang Airport and ports like Rajin, exist, but their capacity and costs are often suboptimal.
3/ In the summer of 2024, Russia confirmed plans to build a road bridge over the Tumen River, with construction led by Russia’s TunnelYuzhStroy. The project is budgeted at 9 billion rubles ($110M), spanning 4.7 km in total, with the bridge itself about 1 km long
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Oct 21
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Oct 14
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Oct 13
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Oct 12
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https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1976997555822358538
2/ Question (Q): Do we know what production vs. overhaul and modernization numbers look like?
A: Yes, at least for 2027–2029:
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3/ Q: Do we know which tanks are being modernized, and into what models?
Yes. According to the documents:
T-90A, T-72B/B1, and T-72B3/B3M are upgraded to T-90M2. T-90A also modernized to T-90M. T-72A, BK, B1, B1K, and BA are converted to T-72B3M.
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