1/6

Are Banks Having a Liquidity Problem?

tl:dr, Liquidity in the plumbing of the financial system is getting scarce. It is not a crisis now, but it has been moving in this direction for weeks, and it is now at a worrisome point.

When the financial plumbing gets stressed, it is when bad loans (aka “cockroaches”) get noticed.

(long thread, tried to write it so “normies” can follow.)

Wall Street is famous for diagnosing symptoms, not causes. I believe they are doing this again with the banking issues of the last few days., I do not think this is a “cockroach” problem (bad credit/loans) waiting to get disclosed publicly.

It is a liquidity problem that makes the “cockroaches” matter.

Banks (all 4,000+) hand out a trillion in loans. So, they will always have “cockroaches.” So, it is not an issue of whether cockroaches exist; they always do. Instead, it is the environment in which such disclosures are made. Does the market care or not?

Now it cares. Why?

---

@NickTimiraos said below:

How to define “temporary” and “modest.” Repo rates in the last two days have moved up to the top of the fed-funds range and around 10 bps above IORB, but it’s only been two days.

---

I would argue it has not “only” been two days; worsening liquidity in the funding market has been unfolding for weeks. It just got noticed in the last two days.

This chart shows Secured Overnight Financing Rate, or SOFR (orange), and Interest on Reserves, or IOR (blue). The bottom panel shows the spread between these two, along with some metrics (dashed line = average, shaded area = standard deviation range).

See the arrow; this spread (3-day average, so it is less noisy) has been tightening for weeks. This spread moved to positive territory in early September and has remained there for weeks. The last time it was positive for this long was in March 2020 (not shown).

2/6

A positive spread is typical around month- and quarter-end “window dressing,” when financial institutions need to report their positions and want to show conservative cash positions. Now it has been weeks, and it is in the middle of the month.

This chart shows that liquidity has been worsening for weeks. It was two days ago that it finally got noticed.

But note that Jay Powell noticed it, because in his speech to the NABE Conference three days ago:

Some signs have begun to emerge that liquidity conditions are gradually tightening, including a general firming of repo rates along with more noticeable but temporary pressures on selected dates.

SOFR replaced Libor (London InterBank Offer Rate) two years ago; it is the rate charged in the funding markets (that is, financial institutions that need cash and will borrow to get iInterbank Offer Rate) two years ago; it is the rate charged in the funding markets (that is, financial institutions that need cash and will borrow to get it) for overnight loans collateralized by Treasury Bills) on overnight loans collateralized by Treasury Bill (“Secured”). So these loans carry no credit risk. They are compared to the IOR rate, which is the interest rate the Federal Reserve pays banks on their reserve balances. This means that the spread between SOFR and IOR is purely driven by supply and demand. SOFR comprises three components.

* General Collateral repo Loans * Tri-party repo (biggest part) * Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (FICC) cleared bilateral repo

As the bottom panel shows, the SOFR market is now $3 trillion of overnight loans a day. It has doubled in the last two years.

The SOFR market has never been bigger (strong demand), and spreads are moving higher (insufficient supply).

3/6

In a normal SOFR market, when the balance between supply/demand is maintained, SOFR loans should trade at a slight discount to IOR rates (see the average and standard deviation range in the bottom panel of the spread chart in the first post). This is because IOR should act as a ceiling on money rates. Banks will not lend out below the IOR rate. Why should they when parking money (reserves) at the Fed offers a better rate?

In a normal market, non-bank (broker/dealers, money market funds, and Government-Sponsored Enterprises, or GSEs, etc.) with money to lend, who cannot park it at the Fed to get IOR rates, will offer it at slightly lower than the IOR rate to anyone that needs cash (to settle trades, needs to put up margin on derivatives, or money for other transactions). They will offer a better deal than IOR, so they do not have to compete with banks for interest on their cash.

Typically, eight basis points below IOR will do it (as the bottom panel shows in the first post), which is the same spread Dallas Fed President Lorie Logan noted in Timiroas’ tweet above. Note that before the Dallas Fed, Logan ran the NY Fed Open Market Desk.)

In other words, a negative spread indicates that funding markets are “liquid” and functioning normally. Conversely, an uptrend in the SOFR/IOR spread, which tips to a positive spread, indicates that the supply of cash (aka liquidity) is falling behind the demand for money. So the price (rate) is rising relative to the IOR benchmark.

Restated, liquidity in the plumbing of the financial system is getting scarce. It is not a crisis now, but it has been moving in this direction for weeks, and it is now at a worrisome point.

Remember, financial institutions are highly leveraged; these seemingly little moves can have a significant impact on the P&L and capital ratios.

Why Now?

Why is this happening now? And why should we believe the uptrend in SOFR/IOR will not stop its two-month uptrend?

The answer to the first question is Quantitative Tightening (QT). This is the Fed pulling out liquidity since 2022 by reducing its balance sheet.