When an Australian patrol aircraft met a Chinese jet over the South China Sea last month, the encounter quickly moved beyond airspace to digital space. Beijing’s subsequent coordinated online campaign shows that information operations are now an extension of military power, so Australia must be ready to defend itself by defending its stories.

We have documented an influence campaign between 20 and 24 October that used social media to shape the information space and paint Australia as a territorial intruder. While the campaign’s reach may not be significant, it was likely a coordinated effort to amplify Beijing’s preferred narrative through state media, social accounts and a farm news network. This makes it an important learning opportunity for Australia.

On 19 October, a Royal Australian Air Force P-8A Poseidon was intercepted by a Chinese air force Su-35 jetfighter in a manner that Canberra described as ‘unsafe and unprofessional’. In response, China’s Ministry of National Defense issued a statement saying Australia had ‘infringed upon and provoked’ China.

Beijing amplified this narrative through state media outlets. The Global Times and broadcaster CGTN accused Australia of ‘illegal intrusion’ into Chinese airspace. These outlets then shared the framing on their social media channels. On X, the Global Times post was reposted by 19 accounts, while CGTN’s English version had 10 reposts. Together, they gained more than 16,000 views on X. Many reposting accounts appeared to be solely dedicated to disseminating pro-China content. Usernames that appeared to be randomised or automatically generated were common among these accounts, suggesting automated or pseudonymous activity.

Source: authors

The narrative was further peddled through pseudo-media network known as ‘Falsos Amigos’. As reported by social network analysis company Graphika, this network consists of a constellation of websites ‘almost certainly’ using AI-generated content to masquerade as independent news outlets in various languages, including English, French, Spanish and Vietnamese. These sites, listed in the table below, regurgitated the Chinese narrative, using these tactics to obscure origins and mimic news outlets. Not only does this content laundering tactic allow actors to seed propaganda through seemingly neutral news channels, but it also raises concerns around the use of generative AI models in influence operations.

To analyse the campaign, we applied the Disinformation Analysis and Risk Management framework. Commonly known as Disarm, this is an open-source analysis tool endorsed by the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, and is the European Union’s method of examining foreign interference, manipulation and interference.

We identified three main objectives of this information operation: to smear or discredit Australia’s patrols and its reputation for respecting sovereignty; to divide or exploit polarised opinions on sovereignty issues in the South China Sea; and to facilitate state propaganda by amplifying official narratives. These objectives align with Beijing’s broader strategy to assert its control over contested maritime territories in the South China Sea, given the interception occurred above the waters surrounding the Paracel Islands, which are also claimed by Taiwan and Vietnam.

The timing of the campaign was telling. It peaked before a meeting between Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Chinese Premier Li Qiang on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summit in Kuala Lumpur on 27 October, where the two committed to work together to build a more mature, stable and productive strategic partnership. By the time Albanese had met with Chinese President Xi Jinping on 29 October at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Gyeongju, South Korea, the issue had been ironed out enough that discussions on economic cooperation proceeded relatively smoothly. This sequence of events reflects China’s two-faced approach: blaming Australia online through its information-operations network while remaining conciliatory offline through diplomatic engagement. This enables Beijing to pressure its adversaries while maintaining the appearance of diplomatic reasonableness.

Canberra has done the right thing by issuing a formal statement through the Department of Defence, reaffirming that all Australian Defence Force activities follow international law despite China’s Ministry of Defence claiming otherwise. But more still can be done. For Australia, its international partnerships should serve as platforms for building its reputation, including through information-sharing with regional networks.

The battle for truth is as vital as the battle for territory. Recognising this, Canberra should be aware of narrative-shaping that is taking place in the grey zone and prepare for hybrid threats. This includes in the information space, where strategic messaging is thrown around to rewrite reality and challenge the legitimacy of Canberra’s actions. To this end, investment in information-resilience is important. This should include greater support for credible journalism and fact-checking networks; increased pressure on online platforms to make their data accessible for monitoring; enhanced public awareness of foreign influence; and collaboration with partners to expose and address information campaigns.