When the CEO of ARM, Rene Haas, speaks publicly about Intel’s opportunities in the semiconductor market, it is worth listening, not only because ARM is deeply rooted in the industry as a design house, but also because the statements are usually more than mere competitive rhetoric. In a conversation as part of the “All In” podcast, Haas painted an unsparing picture: Intel had been “punished in several key areas”, especially for strategic failures that were now taking full revenge.

Haas was particularly hard on Intel’s decisions over the last two decades. The biggest mistake? Missing out on the mobile market, a sector that is now considered the basis for many modern architectures, not only economically but also technologically. Although Intel had a low-power SoC design in its portfolio with “Atom”, it turned down a deal with Apple for the first iPhone. A decision that even the CEO at the time, Paul Otellini, later described as a major mistake. ARM, on the other hand, became the basic platform for the entire mobile revolution. But that was just the beginning. Haas also pointed the finger at another, deeper problem: Intel’s late entry into EUV production. Extreme Ultraviolet Lithography is now the gold standard in the production of ultra-fine chip structures and TSMC invested billions in this technology early on. Intel, on the other hand, hesitated, initially leaving the field to ASML’s European customers and thus losing valuable development cycles. The result is obvious today: while TSMC is producing on the 3nm track with Apple, NVIDIA and AMD, Intel is still struggling with yield problems and a still patchy foundry business model.

“If you miss a few cycles, you can hardly catch up,” says Haas, hitting a sore point. Because in the semiconductor industry, time multiplies its own effect: those who lag behind today will be twice as far behind tomorrow because customers, tools and design infrastructures are increasingly tailored to the leading process node. The barrier to entry becomes higher with every missed development step. But Haas’ analysis goes beyond technical errors. He also criticizes a structural, almost cultural deficit in the West: manufacturing is not seen as prestigious work, skilled workers for semiconductor production are rare, and the will for industrial transformation is lacking. In Taiwan, a job at TSMC is more of a “blue collar job” than a career in the USA. It is a cultural difference that is reflected in education, politics and infrastructure and ultimately determines how seriously a country takes its technological sovereignty.

Of course, Haas is not neutral either. As head of ARM, he benefits from the fact that design dominates and manufacturing is concentrated on a few strong partners. But his diagnosis hits many sore points, not just at Intel, but in an entire industry that is currently trying with all its might to make up for lost decades. What remains is a sober realization: money alone is not enough. No matter how many billions Intel pumps into foundries, those who are too late will not only be punished by the market, but also by physics, the supply chain and customer confidence. And while TSMC continues to cement its lead, Intel remains, at best, the driven one. At worst: the admonisher on its own behalf.

Source: Youtube