Reports/Judgments

Either Grant Or Deny Relief; Avoid Passing Adverse Orders Against Litigants On Issues Beyond Pleadings : Supreme Court To High Courts

Cause Title: P. Radhakrishnan & Anr. v. Cochin Devaswom Board & Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 970

The Supreme Court set aside certain directions issued by the Kerala High Court that had ordered the Cochin Devaswom Board to re-fix license fees and initiate a vigilance inquiry against Chinmaya Mission Educational & Cultural Trust.

A Bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice KV Viswanathan held that the High Court’s additional directions went beyond the scope of the writ petition filed by the appellants and were passed without affording them an opportunity of hearing, thus violating the principles of natural justice.

The Court was hearing an appeal filed by P. Radhakrishnan and another, trustees of the Chinmaya Mission Educational & Cultural Trust, challenging portions of a Kerala High Court judgment dated August 9, 2023, in W.P.(C) No. 29089/2020.

Tender Condition Requiring Past Supply Within One State Irrational, Violates Article 19(1)(g): Supreme Court

Cause Title: Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 971

The Supreme Court (October 6) struck down a Chhattisgarh Government tender condition that mandated bidders to show prior supply experience of at least ₹6 crores to state government agencies in the past three years, as a prerequisite for participating in bids to supply sports kits to government schools in the state.

The Court observed that to confine eligibility for participation in a tender to entities operating within a single State is not only irrational but also disproportionate to the stated goal of ensuring the efficient and effective delivery of sports kits.

A Bench of Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Alok Aradhe rejected the State’s contention that prior experience with the government was necessary since the supply of sports kits was to be made in Maoist-affected areas. The Court held that such a tender condition imposed an unreasonable restriction on trade and violated the doctrine of a level playing field, as it created an artificial barrier that excluded bidders lacking prior government supply experience

Supreme Court Grants Relief To Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd; Directs Essar Power To Reimburse Fixed Charges For Electricity Diverted

Cause Title: Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Essar Power Limited and Another

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 972

The Supreme Court has granted relief to Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited (GUVNL) by setting aside the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity’s (APTEL) March 2025 judgment and restoring the 2009 order of the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (GERC) in its long-pending dispute with Essar Power Limited (EPL) over diversion of electricity in breach of a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA).

The Court held that EPL was bound by the PPA to maintain the stipulated proportion of supply, 58% to GUVNL and 42% to Essar Steel Limited (ESL),and that the company’s failure to do so amounted to a breach entitling GUVNL to restitution and compensation.

A bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and Alok Aradhe partly allowed the GUVNL’s appeal, holding that “the finding of GERC and the APTEL that GUVNL is not entitled to reimbursement of fixed charges is, therefore, unsustainable.” It said that “once GUVNL did not receive the electricity for which such fixed charges had been computed and paid on a monthly basis, it was entitled to reimbursement thereof, not as compensation, but on the principle of restitution as such payment was not at all due from it.”

For Valid Oral Gift (Hiba) Under Mohammedan Law, Public Possession Must Be Proved; Absence Of Mutation Raises Doubt: Supreme Court

Cause Title: Dharmrao Sharanappa Shabadi and Others v. Syeda Arifa Parveen

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 973

The Supreme Court observed that an oral gift (hiba) under the Muslim law cannot be projected as a “surprise instrument” to stake claims over a property. To constitute a valid hiba, the Court said, all its necessary ingredients- declaration by donor, acceptance by donee and taking possession of land - are done publicly rather than secretly.

Although oral gift (hiba) is permissible in Mohammedan law, the evidence of acting under the gift - such as collecting rent, holding title, or effecting mutation- is essential to substantiate the claim of possession. Lack of effecting mutation in revenue records can be a crucial factor invalidating such a claim of gift, in the absence of other evidence of possession, the Court said.

It stressed that those claiming rights under a hiba must assert their ownership openly and without delay by mutating land records to reflect possession, an essential requirement for the validity of such a gift.

Order XLI Rule 5 CPC | Deposit Not Mandatory For Stay Of Money Decree, Unconditional Stay Can Be Granted In Exceptional Cases : Supreme Court

Cause Title: Lifestyle Equities C.V. & Anr. v. Amazon Technologies Inc.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 974

The Supreme Court (October 7) resolved the long-standing debate on whether deposit or security is an absolute precondition for staying a money decree. It clarified that it is not mandatory for the Appellate Court to impose a condition for deposit of the amount in dispute for grant of stay of execution under Order XLI Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”).

Affirming the Delhi High Court’s division bench decision, the Court held that the provisions of Order XLI Rule 1(3) and Rule 5(5) of CPC, which require an appellant to deposit the decretal amount or furnish security, are directory, not mandatory. While non-compliance may normally lead to rejection of a stay application, appellate courts retain discretion to grant stay in “exceptional cases” even without such a deposit. Importantly, the Court stressed that failure to deposit cannot result in dismissal of the appeal itself.

“Although, Order XLI Rule 5 of the CPC, uses the word “shall”, yet a combined reading of the sum and substance of Rule(s) 1(3) and 5(5) would reveal, that for the grant of stay of execution, it is not mandatory for the appellate court to impose a condition for deposit of the amount in dispute. The aforesaid provisions make it abundantly clear that the appellate court, for the grant of stay of execution, has a discretion to impose a condition of deposit of the amount depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.”, the court said.

Supreme Court Upholds Tax On Ink & Chemicals Used To Print Lottery Ticket; Says Their ‘Deemed Sale’ Occurs With Lottery Sale

Cause Title: M/S. Aristo Printers Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, Lucknow, U.P.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 975

The Supreme Court (October 7) held that the ink and chemicals used in printing the lottery tickets is a taxable item under the Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Act, 1948 (“Act”).

A bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and KV Viswanathan dismissed the appeal filed by an assessee, who is engaged in the business of printing lottery tickets and had been taxed on the value of ink and chemicals used in the printing process. While the Appellate Authority and Tribunal set aside the levy holding these materials were consumed rather than a transferrable good, the High Court restored the tax leading to an appeal before the Supreme Court.

The appellant’s primary argument before the Supreme Court was that the ink and chemicals were consumed in the printing process. Since they ceased to exist in their original form and were not delivered to the customer as separate items, there was no “transfer of property,” and thus, no tax could be levied. Rejecting this argument, the judgment authored by Justice Pardiwala noted that the moment the lottery ticket is transferred to the consumer, the ink and chemicals used in printing of the lottery ticket also gets transferred, making it taxable not as a consumer goods but as a transferred goods classifying it as a ‘deemed sale’ under Article 366(29-A) (b) of the Constitution incorporated via 46th Constitutional Amendment.

Supreme Court Issues Directions To Enforce Helmet Use, Curb Wrong-Lane Driving & Use Of Dazzling Headlights

Case Details: S.Rajaseekaran v. Union of India and Ors. and Ors. | W.P.(C) No. 295/2012

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 976

The Supreme Court (October 7) issued a slew of significant directions aimed at strengthening road safety measures across the country. In a writ petition filed in 2012 by Dr. S. Rajaseekaran, a leading orthopaedic surgeon, the Court directed strict enforcement of helmet use, and measures to curb wrong-lane driving, unsafe overtaking, use of dazzling LED lights, and the unauthorised sale and misuse of red–blue strobe lights and hooters.

The Court further ordered that the complete ban on unauthorised red–blue flashing lights and illegal hooters must be implemented through seizures, market crackdowns, and imposition of penalties.

These directions have been issued by a bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice KV Viswanathan, considering the recent official figures of the Government of India, which show that more than 35,000 pedestrians were killed in road accidents in 2023, and more than 54,000 riders/passengers of two-wheelers died due to non-wearing of helmets.

Supreme Court Flags Lack Of Pedestrian Crossing Near Delhi High Court; Orders Nationwide Survey To Identify Road Crossing Needs

Case Details: S.Rajaseekaran v. Union of India and Ors. and Ors. | W.P.(C) No. 295/2012

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 976

The Supreme Court (October 7) expressed concern over the absence of a pedestrian crossing near the Delhi High Court and the National Zoological Garden on Mathura Road, Delhi, terming it a serious safety lapse that endangers thousands of people who cross the busy stretch every day without traffic signals, foot overbridges, or other safety measures.

A Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan directed the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) and other road-owning agencies to prepare an action plan and conduct a phase-wise survey across major Indian cities to identify locations where additional pedestrian crossings are required.

“One can give the example of the road crossing at the Delhi High Court and the National Zoological Garden on Mathura Road where every day thousands of employees, litigants, lawyers, children, and families cross the road, without any red light or foot overbridge or any traffic calming measure, putting their lives at risk,” the Court observed.

Supreme Court Issues Directions To Enforce Helmet Use, Curb Wrong-Lane Driving & Use Of Dazzling Headlights

Case Details: S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India and Ors. and Ors. | W.P.(C) No. 295/2012

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 976

The Supreme Court (October 7) issued a slew of significant directions aimed at strengthening road safety measures across the country. In a writ petition filed in 2012 by Dr. S. Rajaseekaran, a leading orthopaedic surgeon, the Court directed strict enforcement of helmet use, and measures to curb wrong-lane driving, unsafe overtaking, use of dazzling LED lights, and the unauthorized sale and misuse of red–blue strobe lights and hooters.

The Court further ordered that the complete ban on unauthorised red–blue flashing lights and illegal hooters must be implemented through seizures, market crackdowns, and imposition of penalties.

These directions have been issued by a bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice KV Viswanathan, considering the recent official figures of the Government of India, which show that more than 35,000 pedestrians were killed in road accidents in 2023, and more than 54,000 riders/passengers of two-wheelers died due to non-wearing of helmets.

Supreme Court Refuses To Quash Money Laundering Case Against JSW Steel Over Dealings With Obulapuram Mining Company

Case Title – Jsw Steel Limited v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 977

The Supreme Court refused to quash PMLA proceedings against JSW Steel Limited in relation to alleged illegal mining by mining companies owned by former Karnataka minister G. Janardhana Reddy.

A bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Augustine George Masih noted that JSW steel is no more an accused in the predicate offence investigated by the CBI, and the ECIR also doesn’t name JSW Steel as an accused. The Court noted that ED’s money laundering complaint was based only on alleged withdrawals of attached amount of ₹33.80 crore and not on any broader charge of criminal liability.

Since JSW’s appeal against the attachment orders was already pending before the Appellate Tribunal, the Court declined to intervene at this stage.

Supreme Court Refuses To Quash Money Laundering Case Against JSW Steel Over Dealings With Obulapuram Mining Company

Case Title – JSW Steel Limited v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 977

The Supreme Court refused to quash PMLA proceedings against JSW Steel Limited in relation to alleged illegal mining by mining companies owned by former Karnataka minister G. Janardhana Reddy.

A bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Augustine George Masih noted that JSW steel is no more an accused in the predicate offence investigated by the CBI, and the ECIR also doesn’t name JSW Steel as an accused. The Court noted that ED’s money laundering complaint was based only on alleged withdrawals of attached amount of ₹33.80 crore and not on any broader charge of criminal liability.

Since JSW’s appeal against the attachment orders was already pending before the Appellate Tribunal, the Court declined to intervene at this stage.

Nagpur’s Futala Lake Not Wetland : Supreme Court Allows Constructions Near It

Cause Title: Swacch Association, Nagpur v. State of Maharashtra and Ors

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 978

The Supreme Court (October 7) upheld the Bombay High Court’s decision declining to classify Nagpur’s Futala Lake as a ‘wetland’ under the Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2017, thereby permitting the State authorities to proceed with temporary constructions such as a floating restaurant, banquet hall, musical fountain, and viewing gallery around the lake.

“In view of this Court, the Futala Lake is a man-made waterbody and it does not fall within the meaning of the statutory definition and is not a ‘wetland’ as defined in Rule 2(1)(g) of the 2017 Rules. The definition excludes human-made waterbodies and those constructed inter alia for irrigation purposes. The High Court was justified in recording finding in the interim order dated 05.07.2023 and confirming the same while passing the impugned final judgment and order.”, the court said.

A bench of Chief Justice BR Gavai and Justices K Vinod Chandran and NV Anjaria dismissed the petition filed by Nagpur based NGO-Swachh Association, who filed a Public Interest Litigation (“PIL”) before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court raising concerns about the breach of environmental safeguards under the Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2017, and argued that the raising temporary structures risked ecological damage.

S.149 IPC | Supreme Court Explains Tests To Determine If Bystander Was Member Of Unlawful Assembly With Common Object

Cause Title: Zainul v. State of Bihar

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 979

The Supreme Court (October 7) observed that mere presence at the crime scene would not ipso facto render a person a member of the unlawful assembly to book him under Section 149 IPC. The Court clarified that the liability would shift to the bystander only when he shared the common object with the unlawful assembly.

A bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan acquitted 10 individuals who were convicted for the 1988 violent community clash in Bihar’s Katihar District, after finding that the prosecution failed to prove that they shared a common object with the unlawful assembly. An FIR under Sections 148, 149, 307, and 302 of the IPC was lodged against them.

“At the same time, mere presence at the scene does not ipso facto render a person a member of the unlawful assembly, unless it is established that such an accused also shared its common object. A mere bystander, to whom no specific role is attributed, would not fall within the ambit of Section 149 of the IPC. The prosecution has to establish, through reasonably direct or indirect circumstances, that the accused persons shared a common object of the unlawful assembly. The test to determine whether a person is a passive onlooker or an innocent bystander is the same as that applied to ascertain the existence of a common object.”, the court said.

S. 27 Evidence Act | Only Disclosure Leading To Recovery Of Weapon Admissible; Statement About Its Use Not Admissible : Supreme Court

Cause Title: Rajendra Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal Etc.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 980

The Supreme Court (October 7) acquitted three individuals for the offence of murder (Section 302 IPC) after noting that the prosecution had relied on their disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act (“Act”), where they confessed that the weapon recovered was the weapon of crime.

A bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Prasanna B. Varale held that only that part of the disclosure statements under Section 27 would be admissible which supports the recovery of an object, and not that part which supports the maker’s statement about the use of the object in the crime, as it would amount to a confession being inadmissible under the Act.

“We are afraid that the submission of the State counsel, that as the appellants themselves stated that they took the police to the place where they hid the weapons, by which they committed the offence indicates that the appellants admitted to have committed the offence with the above weapons, cannot be accepted. The statement of the appellants that the weapons recovered were the weapons of crime cannot be read against them in view of Sections 25 and 26 read with Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Only that part of the statement which leads the police to the recovery of the weapons is admissible, and not the part which alleges that the weapons recovered were actually the weapons of crime.”, the court said.

Right To Seek Arbitration Not Lost Just Because Arbitration Clause Became Inoperable Due To Statutory Amendment: Supreme Court

Cause Title: Offshore Infrastructures Limited v. M/S Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 982

The Supreme Court held that the invalidity or inoperability of an arbitration clause, such as one naming an ineligible arbitrator under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, does not nullify the underlying arbitration agreement between the parties. The Court clarified that in such cases, the Court is empowered to step in and appoint a neutral arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act to preserve the efficacy of the arbitration mechanism.

The Court emphasised that the statutory disqualification of a named arbitrator under Section 12(5), read with the Seventh Schedule, does not render the arbitration clause itself void or non-existent. Rather, the clause remains enforceable, and the power to appoint an independent arbitrator shifts to the Court.

In this case, the arbitration clause specified that the Managing Director of the respondent-company will act as the arbitrator. However, as per Section 12(5) of the Act, post the 2015 amendment, the Managing Director was disqualified from being an arbitrator.

Supreme Court Acquits Chennai Man Dashwanth, Who Was Sentenced To Death For Rape-Murder Of 7-Year-Old Girl

Case Title: Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu, Crl.A. No. 3633-3634/2024

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 983

The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and death sentence of one Dashwanth, who was accused of the rape and murder of a 7-year old minor girl at Mugalivakkam, Chennai in 2017.

Acquitting Dashwanth, the Court ordered his immediate release, if he is not wanted in any other case. The Court held that the prosecution has “miserably faield to prove the vital circumstances.”

Allowing the appeal filed by Daswhant against his conviction and sentence, the Court pronounced:

Supreme Court Acquits Chennai Man Dashwanth, Who Was Sentenced To Death For Rape-Murder Of 7-Year-Old Girl

Case Title: Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu, Crl.A. No. 3633-3634/2024

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 983

The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and death sentence of one Dashwanth, who was accused of the rape and murder of a 7-year old minor girl at Mugalivakkam, Chennai in 2017.

Acquitting Dashwanth, the Court ordered his immediate release, if he is not wanted in any other case. The Court held that the prosecution has “miserably faield to prove the vital circumstances.”

Allowing the appeal filed by Daswhant against his conviction and sentence, the Court pronounced:

Criminal Court Cannot Review Or Recall Its Judgment Except To Correct Clerical Errors : Supreme Court

Case: State of Rajasthan v. Parmeshwar Ramlal Joshi and Others

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 984

The Supreme Court reiterated that a High Court exercising criminal jurisdiction cannot recall or review its own judicial order under the guise of inherent powers, except to correct a purely clerical or accidental error. Setting aside the Rajasthan High Court’s direction transferring investigation to the CBI in a mining-related dispute, the Court held that the recall of an earlier order by invoking Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS) was beyond jurisdiction.

“Law is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that a criminal Court has no power to recall or review its own judgment. The only permissible action is to correct or rectify clerical errors by virtue of Section 403 BNSS [Section 362 CrPC],” the Court observed.

Background

Supreme Court Acquits Man Convicted For Murdering Mother, Says Suicide Can’t Be Ruled Out

Cause Title: Nilesh Baburao Gitte v. State of Maharashtra

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 985

The Supreme Court (October 8) acquitted a man who was convicted for a murder of his mother (matricide), after noting that the entire case rests upon the circumstantial evidence and the prosecution failed to prove the guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

A bench of Justices KV Viswanathan and K Vinod Chandran found that the appellant-accused was falsely implicated as the prosecution failed to prove that the death of the deceased was at all homicidal in nature, as the medical evidence showed that the deceased was suffering from schizophrenia and may have died by suicide, a fact not disproved by the prosecution.

The case related to an incident in Maharashtra (Taloni Village, Ambajogai) in 2010. The police received an anonymous tip about a “doubtful death.” Upon arriving, they found a crowd attempting to hurriedly cremate the body of deceased. When police announced it was a murder, the crowd dispersed. The investigation that followed led to the conviction of Sunanda’s son, Nilesh-Appellant.

Railway Accident Claims Not Criminal Trial For Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; Avoid Hypertechnical Approach : Supreme Court

Case: Rajni and Another v. Union of India and Another

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 986

The Supreme Court cautioned against adopting a hypertechnical approach in claims under Section 124A of the Railways Act seeking compensation for deaths or injuries - “untoward incidents”- during train journeys.

The Court said that once foundational facts - (i) the possession or issuance of a valid ticket, and (ii) the occurrence of an accidental fall from train - are established through credible material, it must be statutorily presumed that the victim was a bona fide passenger.

Reaffirming that proceedings under Section 124A of the Railways Act are not “criminal trials demanding proof beyond reasonable doubt, but welfare statues are governed by the principles of preponderance and probabilities”, the Court asked the Railways not to reject genuine claims citing technicalities.

Railway Accident Claims Not Criminal Trial For Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; Avoid Hypertechnical Approach : Supreme Court

Case: Rajni and Another v. Union of India and Another

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 986

The Supreme Court cautioned against adopting a hypertechnical approach in claims under Section 124A of the Railways Act seeking compensation for deaths or injuries - “untoward incidents”- during train journeys.

The Court said that once foundational facts - (i) the possession or issuance of a valid ticket, and (ii) the occurrence of an accidental fall from train - are established through credible material, it must be statutorily presumed that the victim was a bona fide passenger.

Reaffirming that proceedings under Section 124A of the Railways Act are not “criminal trials demanding proof beyond reasonable doubt, but welfare statues are governed by the principles of preponderance and probabilities”, the Court asked the Railways not to reject genuine claims citing technicalities.

Motor Accident Claims | Fake License By Driver Doesn’t Absolve Insurer Unless Vehicle Owner Knowingly Allowed Breach : Supreme Court

Cause Title: Hind Samachar Ltd. (Delhi Unit) v. National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 987

In a relief to a vehicle owner, the Supreme Court (October 8) observed that the insurance company cannot recover the compensation amount from the vehicle owner merely because the driver was found to be using a fake license.

A bench of Justices K Vinod Chandran and NV Anjaria said that a vehicle owner is not expected to verify the credentials of the driver’s license from the issuing authority whether it is fake or not. Only when the insurance company proves that there was an absence of due diligence in the employment of the driver or the entrustment of the vehicle, the liability would shift to the insured-vehicle owner.

“As has been rightly held by the precedents above noticed, the owner of a vehicle employing a driver can only look at the licence produced by the person seeking employment and is not expected to verify from the licence issuing authority whether the licence is fake or not.”, the court said.

Written Statement Filed In Commercial Suit During COVID Limitation Extension Period Cannot Be Rejected For Delay : Supreme Court

Cause Title: M/S Anvita Auto Tech Works Pvt. Ltd. v. M/S Aroush Motors & Anr.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 988

The Supreme Court (October 8) reiterated that the Written Statement filed belatedly in a commercial suit after the mandatory period of 120 days cannot be rejected when it was filed during COVID-19, as the delay fell entirely within the COVID-19 limitation extension ordered by the Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation.

A bench of Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice NV Anjaria set aside the Karnataka High Court’s decision, which affirmed the Commercial Court’s decision rejecting the Appellant’s application to file a Written Statement (filed on 07.01.2022) as the 120-day period ended on 14.11.2021. The High Court also justified that the Appellant lacked the right to cross-examine the witnesses, as its statutory right to file a written statement had been forfeited.

Aggrieved by the High Court’s decision, the Appellant moved to the Supreme Court.

District Judge Direct Appointment | 7 Year Practice Mandate Not Fulfilled If There’s Break In Practice : Supreme Court

Case Details: Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa [Civil Appeal No(S). 3947/2020]

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 989

The Supreme Court held that a break in practice cannot be ignored while considering the mandate of 7-year practice as an advocate, prescribed under Article 233(2) of the Constitution, for direct appointment as a District Judge.

The Court clarified that 7-year practice must be “continuous” as on the date of application.

The observation was made by a 5-judge bench of Chief Justice of India BR Gavai, Justices MM Sundresh, Aravind Kumar, SC Sharma and K Vinod Chandran.

Advocates Cannot Claim Exclusive Quota In District Judge Direct Recruitment : Supreme Court

Case Details: Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa [Civil Appeal No(S). 3947/2020]

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 989

The Supreme Court Constitution Bench held that the 25% quota set for direct recruitment for the post of district judges is not exclusively for the candidates from the bar.

The bench of Chief Justice of India BR Gavai, Justices MM Sundresh, Aravind Kumar, SC Sharma and K Vinod Chandran held that :

“We are also not inclined to accept the contention on behalf of the respondents that 25% quota of direct recruitment is reserved only for practising advocates. We are of the view that if the contention in this respect is accepted, it will amount to providing a “quota” for the advocates having seven years’ practice. A plain and literal reading of Article 233(2) does not contemplate such a situation. Therefore, the contention as canvassed in that regard does not hold water.”

Sex Education Should Be Included In School Curriculum From Younger Age, Not Limited To Classes IX To XII : Supreme Court

Cause Title: Juvenile X v. State of U.P.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 989

The Supreme Court (October 8) opined that Sex Education should be incorporated in the school curriculum from a younger age, and not be restricted to Classes IX to XII.

“we are of the opinion that sex education should be provided to the children from a younger age and not class IX onwards.”, the court said.

A bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and Alok Aradhe made this observation while hearing the bail plea filed by the juvenile, who committed offences under Sections 376 (Rape) and 506 (Criminal Intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 2012 (punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault).

Judicial Officers With 7 Years Combined Experience On Date Of Application Eligible For Direct Recruitment As District Judges : Supreme Court

Case: Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa [Civil Appeal No(S). 3947/2020]

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 989

In a significant judgment, the Supreme Court Constitution Bench held that a judicial officer, who has a combined experience of seven years as a judicial officer and an advocate, is eligible to apply for direct appointment as a District Judge. The eligibility will be seen as on the date of the application.

To ensure a level playing field, the Court held that the minimum age of the in-service candidates applying for District Judges’ direct recruitment must be 35 years.

The Court held that the state governments will have to frame rules providing eligibility for in-service candidates. The rules should provide that in-service candidates should be eligible if they have a combined experience of 7 years as a judicial officer and advocate.

Sex Education Should Be Included In School Curriculum From Younger Age, Not Limited To Classes IX To XII : Supreme Court

Cause Title: Juvenile X v. State of U.P.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 989

The Supreme Court (October 8) opined that Sex Education should be incorporated in the school curriculum from a younger age, and not be restricted to Classes IX to XII.

“we are of the opinion that sex education should be provided to the children from a younger age and not class IX onwards.”, the court said.

A bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and Alok Aradhe made this observation while hearing the bail plea filed by the juvenile, who committed offences under Sections 376 (Rape) and 506 (Criminal Intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 2012 (punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault).

Age Bar In Surrogacy Act Won’t Apply To Couples Who Froze Embryos Before Law Came Into Force: Supreme Court

Case Title – Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India and Connected Cases

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 990

The Supreme Court held that couples who had begun the surrogacy process before the enactment of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 law can proceed with surrogacy despite being over the statutory age limit under section 4(iii)(c)(I). The law mandates that the woman must be between 23 and 50 years of age and the man between 26 and 55 years.

A bench of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice KV Viswanathan said that the right to surrogacy of such couples crystallised when they had their empbryos frozen under the law prevailing at the time (before commencement of the Surrogacy Act when there was no age limit) as a part of reproductive autonomy and parenthood, and the age restriction under the Act cannot apply retrospectively to such couples.

“In the result, we hold that section 4(iii)(c)(I) does not have retrospective operation, and therefore will not apply to the petitioners and applicants who are intending couples”, the Court held.

Surrogacy Act Does Not Affect Rights Vested In Couples Who Froze Embryos Before Law Took Effect : Justice Viswanathan’s Concurring Judgment

Case Title – Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India and Connected Cases

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 990

The Supreme Court held that couples who had frozen embryos for surrogacy before the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 came into effect on January 25, 2022, had acquired vested rights to surrogacy which the Act could not retrospectively take away.

Justice KV Viswanathan, in his concurring opinion, said that by completing the fertilisation process before the statutory cut-off date, the couples had already crossed a legally recognised threshold, and the later introduction of age limits under Section 4(iii)(c)(I) of the Act could not invalidate their position.

“by the fertilization of the embryo prior to 25.01.2022, certain rights inhered in the intending couple and the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 (for short ‘the Act’) does not divest them of those rights”, he said.

Age Bar In Surrogacy Act Won’t Apply To Couples Who Froze Embryos Before Law Came Into Force: Supreme Court

Case Title – Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India and Connected Cases

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 990

The Supreme Court held that couples who had begun the surrogacy process before the enactment of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 law can proceed with surrogacy despite being over the statutory age limit under section 4(iii)(c)(I). The law mandates that the woman must be between 23 and 50 years of age and the man between 26 and 55 years.

A bench of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice KV Viswanathan said that the right to surrogacy of such couples crystallised when they had their empbryos frozen under the law prevailing at the time (before commencement of the Surrogacy Act when there was no age limit) as a part of reproductive autonomy and parenthood, and the age restriction under the Act cannot apply retrospectively to such couples.

“In the result, we hold that section 4(iii)(c)(I) does not have retrospective operation, and therefore will not apply to the petitioners and applicants who are intending couples”, the Court held.

S.138 NI Act | Cheque Dishonour Complaint Maintainable Against Trustee Without Arraying Trust As Accused : Supreme Court

Cause Title: Sankar Padam Thapa v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 991

The Supreme Court (October 9) observed that a cheque dishonor complaint would be maintainable against a trustee, who has signed a cheque on the Trust’s behalf, without arraying the Trust as an accused. The Court reasoned that since a Trust is not a juristic person, and neither sues nor is sued, therefore, trustees responsible for day to day affairs of the Trust would be held liable, particularly the one who signed the cheque.

“When a cause of action arises due to an alleged dishonour of cheque and a complaint is initiated under the NI Act, the same is maintainable against the Trustee who has signed the cheque, without the requirement to array the Trust also as an accused.”, the court held.

A bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Prashant Kumar Mishra heard the case that arose out of a ₹5 crore cheque issued by Orion Education Trust, signed by its Chairman, Respondent, in favour of the Appellant for liaisoning services. The cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. The appellant filed a complaint under Sections 138/142 NI Act against the Respondent personally.

Stamp Act | Stamp Duty Determined By Instruments’ Legal Character, Not Its Nomenclature: Supreme Court

Cause Title: M/S Godwin Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, Meerut Division & Anr.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 992

The Supreme Court held that while determining the chargeability of the Stamp Duty, the decisive factor is to ascertain the true legal character of the instrument, not the nomenclature assigned to the instrument.

A bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Prashant Kumar Mishra dismissed an appeal filed by a company that attempted to color a mortgage deed like a security bond to attract lesser stamp duty, affirming the higher demand for stamp duty on the deed.

The appellant executed a “Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed” in favour of the Meerut Development Authority (MDA) to secure obligations for colony development, including payment of external development charges and provision of amenities. Under the deed, the appellant mortgaged specified properties to the MDA, empowering it to sell them in case of default to recover ₹1,00,44,000/-. An advance deposit of ₹15,00,000/- was also made, with the bond becoming void upon full compliance. A stamp duty of ₹100/- was paid under Article 57, Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act.

Juvenile Justice Act 2000 Applies Retrospectively : Supreme Court Orders Release Of Convict Who Was Juvenile When Crime Was Committed In 1981

Cause Title: Hansraj v. State of U.P.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 993

The Supreme Court (October 9) ordered the release of the murder convict under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, after finding he was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the offence in 1981. The Court held that the JJ Act is retrospective in operation, and applies to offences pre-dated the enforcement of the JJ Act, 2000.

The Court rejected the State’s argument that since the offence was committed in 1981, the provision of the JJ Act, 2000 would not be applicable, and the law prevailing at the time of the offence would be applicable. Instead, a bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and A.G. Masih relying on the Constitution bench judgment of Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2005) 3 SCC 551 and two judge bench judgment of Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 5 SCC 344 observed that “all persons who were below the age of eighteen years on the date of commission of the offence even prior to 1st April, 2001 would be treated as juveniles even if the claim of juvenility is raised after they have attained the age of eighteen years on or before the date of commencement of the JJ Act, 2000 and were undergoing sentences upon being convicted.”

The Petitioner, who was twelve years old at the time of the commission of the offence (murder), moved the Supreme Court under Article 32 claiming that his detention exceeded the three-year limit under Section 15(1)(g) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, thereby violating his fundamental right to life and liberty.

Armed Forces Tribunal Empowered To Modify Court-Martial Convictions And Impose Lesser Penalties : Supreme Court

Cause Title: S.K. Jain v. Union of India & Anr.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 994

The Supreme Court (October 10) observed that the Armed Forces Tribunal (“AFT”) under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (“Act”) is empowered to substitute the findings of the Court Martial if its findings were excessive, illegal or unjust.

“Thus, under Section 15(6) (a) & (b) of the 2007 Act, the Tribunal is empowered to substitute the finding of Court Martial which includes the disciplinary proceedings under the Act and also to interfere with the sentence if the same is found to be excessive, illegal or unjust and to mitigate the punishment awarded.”, the court held.

A bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Alok Aradhe upheld the AFT’s decision to set aside the court-martial’s order of dismissal and replace it with compulsory retirement, granting the appellant pensionary benefits.

Supreme Court Notes Conflict Between Forest Rights Act & Forest Conservation Act On Allowing Houses For Tribes; Seeks Union’s Stance

Cause Title: Sugra Adiwasi & Ors. v. Pathranand & Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 995

The Supreme Court has directed the Union Government to file an affidavit within four weeks clarifying the scope, method, and manner of permitting construction of dwelling houses under the Forest Rights Act, 2006 (“FRA”), in a manner consistent with the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (“FCA”). While the FRA guarantees forest dwellers a ‘pucca house,’ the FCA imposes restrictions on such permanent constructions within forest areas.

Opining that the Forest Conservation Act should not prohibit the construction of a pucca house for forest dwellers, the Court asked the Ministry of Environment and Forest and Climate Change and the Ministry of Tribal Affairs to hold detailed consultations.

A bench of Justices PS Narasimha and Atul S Chandurkar heard an appeal where the issue for consideration was of great importance, as the court ought to balance two important legislation; where, to provide minimum basic housing even to those who are forest dwellers under FRA, and on the other side, an obligation of State and its citizenry to protect the national forest resource under FCA.

Supreme Court Notes Conflict Between Forest Rights Act & Forest Conservation Act On Allowing Houses For Tribes; Seeks Union’s Stance

Cause Title: Sugra Adiwasi & Ors. v. Pathranand & Ors.

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 995

The Supreme Court has directed the Union Government to file an affidavit within four weeks clarifying the scope, method, and manner of permitting construction of dwelling houses under the Forest Rights Act, 2006 (“FRA”), in a manner consistent with the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (“FCA”). While the