It was a meeting that shocked the world. On 28 February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with US President Donald Trump in the Oval Office. Trump’s aim was “getting some of the rare earth” as payment for US weapons after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Negotiations broke down at the meeting, but later, on 30 April, Trump landed his deal. And he has been seeking other deals since, including signing a joint agreement with Australia on 21 October to secure critical-mineral and rare-earth supply chains.

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Access to minerals has long been an undercurrent of international relations, but rarely has it been so openly espoused, or so at odds with what the public thought those minerals were for. Once promoted as the minerals of the energy transition and digital transformations, Trump openly justifies critical minerals as the minerals of war. “We’re going to be… taking it, using it for all the things we do,” Trump said in February, “including … weapons and the military” (see go.nature.com/47by3cn).

Although minerals are at the centre of contemporary discussions on war, renewable energy and technology, they are also of immense relevance to human development, notably ending poverty in all its forms — the first priority of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Here we trace the national-security origins of the term critical minerals and what this implies for global inequality. We then draw lessons from how other natural resources have been reframed to show why a human-centred approach is essential to meet humanity’s needs for these minerals.

**Geopolitical origins **

Critical minerals have long been a focus of military planning. As early as the First World War, the War Industries Board compiled a list of strategic and critical minerals that were crucial to US industry and in short supply1. In 1921, the US Army General Staff adopted its first official list distinguishing between minerals that were ‘strategic’ for defence and industry; those that were ‘critical’ owing to shortages; and those that were ‘essential’ even if they didn’t meet either criteria. In 1944, the US Army and Navy Munitions Board developed a combined definition of ‘strategic and critical minerals’ as “those materials required for essential uses in a war emergency…the procurement of which [is] sufficiently uncertain for any reason to require prior provision for the supply thereof”1.

Frequent changes to the lists, terminology and policy followed in the United States, but it was the 2010 ‘rare-earth crisis’ that triggered the contemporary interest by a wider array of countries.

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On 7 September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with two Japanese Coast Guard vessels off the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. The arrest of the fishing-boat captain caused a diplomatic incident between the two nations. At around the same time, China halted exports of rare-earth elements (REEs), of which Japan was a major importer. This caused prices to skyrocket, revealing the economic vulnerability of countries when mineral supply chains are narrow.

Japan’s response, which was to invest in diversification, stockpiling, recycling and alternatives, became a blueprint for wider efforts. It spurred the development of critical-minerals strategies and lists by the European Union (2011), the United States (2018), Australia (2019), Canada (2021), the United Kingdom (2022), India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea (2023), and South Africa and New Zealand (2025).

In 2022, many of these countries came together under the Minerals Security Partnership to coordinate efforts to improve supply security. These strategies and lists build on the US definition, refined over the past century: a critical mineral is a material that is essential to the economy or national security, has a supply chain vulnerable to disruption and is crucial for manufacturing a product.

**Critical-mineral confusion **

After the rare-earth crisis, and the 2015 Paris agreement, addressing climate change became a more urgent policy priority for various governments and international institutions, many of which began using the term critical minerals as though it meant the minerals of renewable energy. In truth, however, most critical minerals are not energy-transition minerals, and most energy-transition minerals are not critical minerals.

For instance, roughly 60% of the critical minerals on the EU, US and Australian lists have no energy-transition use case2. Indeed, the EU includes coking coal on its list. Conversely, critical minerals make up less than 2% of energy-transition mineral demand (by volume). Mineral ingredients of concrete, such as sand and cement, which are crucial for renewable energy infrastructure, constitute 70% of demand2.

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Even when volume is set aside, many minerals needed for the energy transition do not feature on critical mineral lists2. Copper, for example, is essential to renewable energy but is not typically considered critical, given its diverse supply and limited vulnerability to disruption. There are exceptions, however, including South Korea, which includes it on its list.

In other words, critical minerals are defined not as minerals that are important, but as those that are in a state that is vulnerable to disruption — critical as in ‘the critical care unit of a hospital’, not critical as in ‘society can’t live without them’.

And although supply disruption is relevant, any attempt to plan for the energy transition should be concerned with all the minerals that are necessary, not just those with narrow supply chains. The mineral ingredients of concrete are important, yet they are absent from the discussion, or indeed any planning, even though they face huge affordability, sustainability and environmental issues3.

Critical to whom?

The realization that the term critical mineral is not a synonym for energy-transition mineral has led some institutions to seek alternatives.

The United Nations Environment Programme and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative both use the term ‘transition mineral’. Chemists will immediately pick up the awkwardness of using this term because ‘transition metals’ are already known as a group of twelve elements in the d-block of the periodic table.

Similarly, the UN Secretary-General’s Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals used the term ‘critical energy transition minerals’ in its 2024 report4. Its remit was confined to those minerals necessary for constructing, producing, distributing and storing renewable energy and associated infrastructure.

The African Union, too, avoided the term critical minerals in its Green Minerals Strategy, partly because of a desire to focus only on energy-transition minerals, but also because the term begs the question, critical to whom?

Across African countries, it is common to hear the phrase, ‘critical minerals are not critical to us’. And they have a point. Most nations that have critical-mineral lists are industrialized and looking to shore up mineral imports. There are exceptions, including Australia, Canada and South Africa, who are mineral exporters. Their lists include minerals deemed critical not for themselves, but for import by their trading partners.

The top exporters of raw critical minerals also have something in common: they lack a large industrial base. In the context of a mainly one-way flow of minerals from low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) to high-income nations, it is understandable that exporters might think that the global critical-minerals agenda is not focused on their own needs. Although they might — or might not — be able to secure a part of the processing value chain or revenue and employment from mineral extraction, ultimately the minerals are used elsewhere.

The human turn

A mineral-security agenda that is defined solely by the national-security priorities of industrialized nations is prone to geopolitical competition and neglect of the broader needs of humanity.

The world has been here before — the concept of energy security was popularized as a national-security response to the 1970s oil crisis. Similarly, the concept of food security prioritized national availability. Only after the Nobel-prizewinning work of economist Amartya Sen in the early 1980s and 1990s identified that it is not broader disruptions to supply that cause famine, but the inaccessibility of food for those individuals who need it5, were these concepts reframed from a human-centred perspective.

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Sen would go on to help publish the first UN Human Development report with Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq in 1990, and they and others would define the phrase human security, in the 1994 version of the report6. Human security is ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. It puts people at the centre of analysis — it imagines that the security of all people is much more than their physical safety, and it is intended to complement, not replace national security.

The human-centred versions of food security, energy security and water security, which emphasize accessibility to all people, are now central ideas in the SDGs. Yet, that’s not the case for minerals.

It is hard to believe it, but the 15,000-word SDG agenda Transforming Our World makes no reference to minerals — the only natural resource that is missing. Not only do minerals lack a relevant goal, but the resource, occupations, sector and activities do not appear in the agenda7. The omission of minerals from the SDGs has led overseas development assistance to the mineral sector to plummet to just under US$600 million of the $239 billion spent by 2021, representing 0.2%, among the lowest by sector.

It is true that the extraction of minerals can and too often does harm people and the environment, and no matter the purpose, minerals should be mined only if it can be done responsibly. But the same is true for the extraction of all natural resources, which can both enable and disrupt sustainable development. By only ever framing minerals as a problem for sustainable development, little room was left for the drafters of the SDGs to recognize their transformative potential to meet basic human needs and reduce poverty.

Mineral security for all

After the release of the SDGs, one of us (D.M.F.) joined the UN Development Programme motivated to change this. From this emerged the concept of mineral security: “when all people have sufficient and affordable access to the minerals necessary for human development, including for shelter, mobility, communication, energy and sustenance”7.

A human-security approach to mineral security complements the national-security approach that is exemplified by critical minerals (see ‘Mineral security shift’). It gives us a different perspective, one that is universal and relevant to all people; is human-centred; needs-based; focused on accessibility, affordability and sufficiency; and promotes multilateralism and international cooperation.

Mineral security shift

How focusing on human security, not just national security, shapes mineral policies.

Aspect	National security	Human security
Terms	Critical minerals or critical raw materials	Mineral security or mineral poverty
Definition	Essential to economy and at risk of supply disruption	Sufficient and affordable access by all people to the minerals necessary for human development
Subject	Industrialized importing states	All people — universal
Perspective	State-centred	Human-centred
Objective	National economic development, defence, energy, digital technology	Human development and human needs (sustenance, shelter, energy, mobility, communication)
Focus	Manufacturing	Mineral-enabled utilities and mineral-based products
Policy themes	Geopolitics: on-shoring and friend-shoring, value addition, supply diversification	Poverty reduction, universal access, affordability

Although this definition of mineral security applies to everyone, our actions should prioritize those who don’t have it. That is, we should be guided by those experiencing deprivation of the mineral-enabled utilities that are important for a decent life.

If we were to ask, for example, what are the mineral needs of people living in poverty, we would probably come up with a radically different group of mineral commodities than those on critical-mineral lists: clay bricks for houses and glass-wool insulation to keep them warm; cement to build wells and chlorine to purify the water; fertilizers to grow crops, iron and zinc to fortify grain, and salt to preserve food and provide direct nutrition; fluoride to protect teeth and limestone for the toothpaste to keep them clean; gypsum chalk for school tuition; and so on.

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Where there might be overlap is precisely for the minerals of renewable energy: silicon to capture the energy of the Sun, concrete dams to harness the power of water, and cobalt, lithium, nickel and copper to transport and store it.

African countries produce 30 million tonnes of mineral fertilizer annually but export most of it, accounting for just 3–4% of global consumption. Ninety per cent of sub-Saharan Africa’s fertilizer consumption is met by high-priced imports. In Brazil, the Rochagem movement of subsistence farmers has taken matters into their own hands and pioneered the use of local crushed rocks such as basalts and nepheline syenites to remineralize soils, improve crop nutrients and cut costs.

Similarly, African nations consume only 5% of global cement, despite accounting for almost 19% of the world’s population, with the high cost of imported clinker and limited availability of low-carbon cements impeding development and slowing disaster recovery.

Affordable access to globally integrated, mineral-based products such as solar panels and batteries is also a concern. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, produces 72% of the world’s cobalt, a key component of lithium-ion batteries. But Africa is projected to account for just 0.1% of the global battery market by 2030. The same is true for Latin America, which exported nearly 2 million tonnes of lithium between 2002 and 2022, yet only 13,000 tonnes (less than 1%) returned to the region in finished goods.

From concept to action

A national-security lens will stretch only so far. The world’s real concern should be universal access and affordability to the minerals that matter to human development — the minerals that put a roof over our heads, filter our water, preserve our food, nourish our bodies and connect us to each other. Achieving this will require a huge shift in mindset, with human need as the starting point.

LMICs should re-strategize their approach to minerals, look beyond exports and trade and reorient geological surveys, policies and industrial strategies to also prioritize the mineral needs of their citizens.

Industrialized countries that import minerals should pursue mutual partnerships for mineral security — you help my mineral security, I’ll help yours — supporting LMICs to not only supply global markets but also access affordable mineral-based products for their own development.

And finally, the research community and international-development agencies should establish mineral security as a new field of development studies, integrating minerals into strategies for poverty reduction.