In 2010, a fishing boat collision near the Senkaku Islands triggered a geopolitical shock. When Japan detained the Chinese captain, Beijing quietly responded—not with missiles, but by cutting off exports of rare earth materials. Within days, shipments to Japan froze while exports to the U.S. and Europe continued normally.
At the time, Japan relied on China for 90% of its rare earth imports. Prices for critical materials surged as much as 400%, and Japan quickly released the detained captain. The message was unmistakable: 🇨🇳 China could weaponize its control of these minerals whenever it chose.
The episode forced Washington and Tokyo to rethink their supply chains. The...
In 2010, a fishing boat collision near the Senkaku Islands triggered a geopolitical shock. When Japan detained the Chinese captain, Beijing quietly responded—not with missiles, but by cutting off exports of rare earth materials. Within days, shipments to Japan froze while exports to the U.S. and Europe continued normally.
At the time, Japan relied on China for 90% of its rare earth imports. Prices for critical materials surged as much as 400%, and Japan quickly released the detained captain. The message was unmistakable: 🇨🇳 China could weaponize its control of these minerals whenever it chose.
The episode forced Washington and Tokyo to rethink their supply chains. The U.S. Defense Department began assessing its exposure, while Japan accelerated investment in Lynas Corporation (LYSDY), which built the first major rare earth refinery outside China in half a century.
Fifteen years later, China still controls roughly 70% of global supply and 90% of refining capacity—a reminder that the leverage revealed in 2010 never really went away.
Takeaway: The 2010 rare earth crisis wasn’t a one-off. It was the blueprint for how China can use rare earth materials as silent weapons of policy.
And if it just happened again, it doesn’t make sense to think that we’ll need to wait another fifteen years before this situation rears its head again.
Have a nice day.