How we implemented RFC 6962 Merkle Trees, Ed25519 signatures, and hash chain validation for MT4/MT5 trading platforms—and why no one had done it before

---

TL;DR

We just launched the world’s first cryptographic audit trail implementation for MetaTrader 4/5 with ABLENET, Japan’s leading MT4/MT5 VPS provider. This article covers:

• Why MT4/MT5’s plain-text logs are a security nightmare
• The cryptographic architecture: Ed25519 + SHA-256 + Merkle Trees
• How we achieved MQL4/MQL5 integration without modifying the platform
• The "sidecar" pattern for non-intrusive deployment
• Performance benchmarks and optimization strategies
• Lessons learned from production validation

GitHub: github.com/veritaschain IETF Draft: draft-kamimura-scitt-vcp Evidence Report: VCP World’s First Claim Verification

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The Problem: MetaTrader’s Plain-Text Audit Trail

Let’s start with a harsh truth that every MT4/MT5 developer knows but rarely discusses publicly.

What MetaQuotes Actually Stores

Open any MT4/MT5 terminal and check your logs directory. You’ll find files named YYYYMMDD.LOG containing entries like:

0   12:34:56.789    Trade   order #12345678 buy 1.00 EURUSD at 1.08765 done
0   12:34:57.123    Trade   order #12345678 sl 1.08500 tp 1.09200 done

That’s it. Plain text. No signatures. No hashes. No verification mechanism.

The Official Documentation Confirms It

From MetaQuotes’ own MQL5 Reference:

"Logs are not physically removed from the computer, they are still available in log files... stored in YYYYMMDD.LOG format."

And perhaps more tellingly:

"Cryptography is rarely used in MQL programs. There are not so many opportunities in everyday trading to use cryptography."

Why This Matters

Anyone with server access can:

# Edit trade history
sed -i 's/buy 1.00/buy 0.10/g' 20251225.LOG

# Change execution prices
sed -i 's/1.08765/1.08500/g' 20251225.LOG

# Delete inconvenient records
grep -v "order #12345678" 20251225.LOG > temp && mv temp 20251225.LOG

No cryptographic trail. No tamper detection. No way for traders to prove their records are authentic.

This isn’t a theoretical vulnerability—it’s actively exploited by fraudulent brokers running fake MT4/MT5 servers.

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Why Hasn’t Anyone Solved This Before?

Before building VCP, we conducted extensive competitive analysis. The results were surprising.

The Research

• 85+ search queries across Google, Bing, academic databases
• 28+ RegTech companies analyzed
• 22+ patents reviewed
• Multi-language searches in English, Japanese, Russian

What We Found: Nothing

Zero cryptographic audit trail solutions for MT4/MT5.

Why the Gap Exists

1. MQL4/MQL5 is a Closed Ecosystem

// MQL5 is C++-like but proprietary
// No external library imports
// Limited cryptographic primitives
// MetaQuotes controls everything

#include <Trade\Trade.mqh>  // Only MetaQuotes libraries
// #include <openssl/sha.h>  // NOT POSSIBLE

2. Major RegTech Targets Institutional Markets

Companies like NICE Actimize, Nasdaq SMARTS, and Eventus Systems build for:

• Institutional trading desks (FIX Protocol)
• Exchanges (proprietary APIs)
• Prime brokers (SWIFT integration)

The 9.6 million retail traders on MT4/MT5? Not their target market. The monthly broker license of $10,000-$20,000 is too small for enterprise sales teams.

3. Blockchain Analytics ≠ Audit Trail Creation

Chainalysis, Elliptic, and TRM Labs analyze existing blockchain transactions. They:

• Cannot create audit trails where none exist
• Cannot work with off-chain forex trades
• Have zero integration with MQL environments

The Scope of "World’s First"

To be clear about our claim: general cryptographic audit mechanisms have existed since blockchain (2009) and Certificate Transparency (2013).

What’s unprecedented is an open standard combining:

• Cryptographic verification (Ed25519, SHA-256, Merkle Trees)
• MetaTrader ecosystem integration (MQL4/MQL5)
• Production deployment capability
• Regulatory compliance mapping (EU AI Act, MiFID II, SEC 17a-4)

Full evidence documentation: VCP World’s First Evidence Report

---

The VCP Architecture

Design Principles

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    DESIGN PRINCIPLES                        │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 1. Non-intrusive: Zero modifications to MT4/MT5             │
│ 2. Cryptographically rigorous: RFC-compliant primitives     │
│ 3. Third-party verifiable: Anyone can validate              │
│ 4. Regulatory-aligned: EU AI Act, MiFID II, SEC 17a-4       │
│ 5. Performance-conscious: <1ms overhead per trade           │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Core Components

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                      VCP v1.0 ARCHITECTURE                       │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                  │
│  ┌─────────────┐    ┌─────────────┐    ┌─────────────┐          │
│  │  VCP-TRADE  │    │   VCP-GOV   │    │  VCP-RISK   │          │
│  │   Module    │    │   Module    │    │   Module    │          │
│  │             │    │             │    │             │          │
│  │ Order Entry │    │ Parameter   │    │ Risk Limit  │          │
│  │ Execution   │    │ Changes     │    │ Breaches    │          │
│  │ Modification│    │ Approvals   │    │ Adjustments │          │
│  └──────┬──────┘    └──────┬──────┘    └──────┬──────┘          │
│         │                  │                  │                  │
│         └────────────┬─────┴─────┬────────────┘                  │
│                      │           │                               │
│                      ▼           ▼                               │
│              ┌───────────────────────────┐                       │
│              │     HASH CHAIN ENGINE     │                       │
│              │                           │                       │
│              │  prev_hash ──► SHA-256    │                       │
│              │  payload   ──► ──────►    │                       │
│              │  timestamp ──► hash_n     │                       │
│              └─────────────┬─────────────┘                       │
│                            │                                     │
│                            ▼                                     │
│              ┌───────────────────────────┐                       │
│              │      MERKLE TREE          │                       │
│              │       (RFC 6962)          │                       │
│              │                           │                       │
│              │         [ROOT]            │                       │
│              │        /      \           │                       │
│              │     [H01]    [H23]        │                       │
│              │     /   \    /   \        │                       │
│              │   [H0] [H1][H2] [H3]      │                       │
│              └─────────────┬─────────────┘                       │
│                            │                                     │
│                            ▼                                     │
│              ┌───────────────────────────┐                       │
│              │    SIGNATURE ENGINE       │                       │
│              │      Ed25519              │                       │
│              │     (RFC 8032)            │                       │
│              └───────────────────────────┘                       │
│                                                                  │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

---

Cryptographic Primitives: The Technical Details

1. Digital Signatures: Ed25519 (RFC 8032)

Why Ed25519 over RSA or ECDSA?

# Performance comparison (signatures/second on modern hardware)
# RSA-2048:    ~1,000 sig/s
# ECDSA P-256: ~10,000 sig/s
# Ed25519:     ~30,000 sig/s  ← Winner

# Key size comparison
# RSA-2048:    256 bytes public key
# ECDSA P-256: 64 bytes public key
# Ed25519:     32 bytes public key  ← Winner

# Security level
# All provide ~128-bit security
# Ed25519 is immune to timing attacks by design

Implementation:

from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
import json

class VCPSigner:
def __init__(self):
self.private_key = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
self.public_key = self.private_key.public_key()

def sign_record(self, record: dict) -> bytes:
"""Sign a VCP record with Ed25519"""
# Canonical JSON serialization (RFC 8785)
canonical = json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'))
return self.private_key.sign(canonical.encode('utf-8'))

def verify_signature(self, record: dict, signature: bytes) -> bool:
"""Verify Ed25519 signature"""
canonical = json.dumps(record, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'))
try:
self.public_key.verify(signature, canonical.encode('utf-8'))
return True
except Exception:
return False

def export_public_key(self) -> str:
"""Export public key for third-party verification"""
return self.public_key.public_bytes(
encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo
).decode('utf-8')

2. Hash Function: SHA-256 (FIPS 180-4)

The backbone of our hash chain:

import hashlib
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Optional
import time

@dataclass
class VCPRecord:
record_id: str          # UUID v7 (RFC 9562)
timestamp: float        # Unix timestamp with microseconds
event_type: str         # TRADE, GOV, RISK
payload: dict           # Event-specific data
prev_hash: str          # Previous record's hash
hash: Optional[str] = None
signature: Optional[bytes] = None

class HashChainEngine:
def __init__(self):
self.chain: list[VCPRecord] = []
self.genesis_hash = "0" * 64  # Genesis block

def compute_hash(self, record: VCPRecord) -> str:
"""Compute SHA-256 hash of record"""
# Canonical representation
data = f"{record.record_id}|{record.timestamp}|{record.event_type}|"
data += json.dumps(record.payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(',', ':'))
data += f"|{record.prev_hash}"

return hashlib.sha256(data.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest()

def add_record(self, event_type: str, payload: dict) -> VCPRecord:
"""Add new record to chain"""
prev_hash = self.chain[-1].hash if self.chain else self.genesis_hash

record = VCPRecord(
record_id=self._generate_uuid_v7(),
timestamp=time.time(),
event_type=event_type,
payload=payload,
prev_hash=prev_hash
)
record.hash = self.compute_hash(record)

self.chain.append(record)
return record

def validate_chain(self) -> tuple[bool, Optional[int]]:
"""
Validate entire hash chain
Returns (is_valid, first_invalid_index)

Time complexity: O(n) - any tampering is detectable
"""
prev_hash = self.genesis_hash

for i, record in enumerate(self.chain):
# Verify link to previous
if record.prev_hash != prev_hash:
return False, i

# Verify hash integrity
computed = self.compute_hash(record)
if computed != record.hash:
return False, i

prev_hash = record.hash

return True, None

def _generate_uuid_v7(self) -> str:
"""Generate time-ordered UUID v7 (RFC 9562)"""
import uuid
# UUID v7: timestamp-based, sortable
return str(uuid.uuid7()) if hasattr(uuid, 'uuid7') else str(uuid.uuid4())

3. Merkle Tree: RFC 6962 Compliance

The Merkle tree enables efficient third-party verification without revealing all records:

from typing import List, Tuple
import hashlib

class MerkleTree:
"""
RFC 6962-compliant Merkle Tree implementation
Used in Certificate Transparency, adapted for VCP
"""

def __init__(self, hash_func=hashlib.sha256):
self.hash_func = hash_func
self.leaves: List[bytes] = []
self.tree: List[List[bytes]] = []

def _hash(self, data: bytes) -> bytes:
return self.hash_func(data).digest()

def _leaf_hash(self, data: bytes) -> bytes:
"""RFC 6962: leaf hash = H(0x00 || data)"""
return self._hash(b'\x00' + data)

def _node_hash(self, left: bytes, right: bytes) -> bytes:
"""RFC 6962: node hash = H(0x01 || left || right)"""
return self._hash(b'\x01' + left + right)

def add_leaf(self, data: bytes) -> int:
"""Add leaf and return index"""
leaf_hash = self._leaf_hash(data)
self.leaves.append(leaf_hash)
return len(self.leaves) - 1

def build_tree(self) -> bytes:
"""Build tree and return root hash"""
if not self.leaves:
return self._hash(b'')

# Start with leaf hashes
current_level = self.leaves.copy()
self.tree = [current_level]

while len(current_level) > 1:
next_level = []

for i in range(0, len(current_level), 2):
left = current_level[i]
# RFC 6962: if odd number, duplicate last node
right = current_level[i + 1] if i + 1 < len(current_level) else left
next_level.append(self._node_hash(left, right))

self.tree.append(next_level)
current_level = next_level

return current_level[0]  # Root hash

def get_proof(self, leaf_index: int) -> List[Tuple[bytes, str]]:
"""
Generate inclusion proof for leaf at index
Returns list of (hash, direction) tuples
"""
if not self.tree or leaf_index >= len(self.leaves):
raise ValueError("Invalid leaf index or tree not built")

proof = []
index = leaf_index

for level in self.tree[:-1]:  # Exclude root
is_right = index % 2 == 1
sibling_index = index - 1 if is_right else index + 1

if sibling_index < len(level):
direction = 'left' if is_right else 'right'
proof.append((level[sibling_index], direction))

index //= 2

return proof

def verify_proof(self, leaf_data: bytes, proof: List[Tuple[bytes, str]],
root: bytes) -> bool:
"""Verify inclusion proof against root"""
current = self._leaf_hash(leaf_data)

for sibling_hash, direction in proof:
if direction == 'left':
current = self._node_hash(sibling_hash, current)
else:
current = self._node_hash(current, sibling_hash)

return current == root

# Usage example
def demonstrate_merkle_verification():
"""
Show how third-party can verify single record
without accessing entire database
"""
tree = MerkleTree()

# Add trade records
trades = [
b'{"order_id": 1, "action": "BUY", "symbol": "EURUSD", "price": 1.0876}',
b'{"order_id": 2, "action": "SELL", "symbol": "GBPUSD", "price": 1.2650}',
b'{"order_id": 3, "action": "BUY", "symbol": "USDJPY", "price": 149.50}',
b'{"order_id": 4, "action": "SELL", "symbol": "EURUSD", "price": 1.0880}',
]

for trade in trades:
tree.add_leaf(trade)

root = tree.build_tree()
print(f"Merkle Root: {root.hex()}")

# Generate proof for trade #2
proof = tree.get_proof(1)

# Third party can verify trade #2 exists without seeing other trades
is_valid = tree.verify_proof(trades[1], proof, root)
print(f"Trade #2 verification: {is_valid}")

# Tampered trade fails verification
tampered = b'{"order_id": 2, "action": "SELL", "symbol": "GBPUSD", "price": 1.2600}'
is_valid_tampered = tree.verify_proof(tampered, proof, root)
print(f"Tampered trade verification: {is_valid_tampered}")

# Output:
# Merkle Root: a1b2c3d4...
# Trade #2 verification: True
# Tampered trade verification: False

4. Time-Ordered Identifiers: UUID v7 (RFC 9562)

Why UUID v7 matters for audit trails:

import time
import os
import struct

def generate_uuid_v7() -> str:
"""
RFC 9562 UUID v7: Time-ordered unique identifier

Structure:
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  48-bit timestamp (ms) │ 4-bit ver │ 12-bit rand_a │    │
│  2-bit var │ 62-bit rand_b                               │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Benefits:
- Sortable by creation time (crucial for audit trails)
- No coordination needed (unlike sequential IDs)
- Database index-friendly
- Globally unique
"""

# 48-bit Unix timestamp in milliseconds
timestamp_ms = int(time.time() * 1000)

# Random bits
rand_bytes = os.urandom(10)

# Construct UUID v7
uuid_bytes = bytearray(16)

# Timestamp (48 bits)
uuid_bytes[0:6] = struct.pack('>Q', timestamp_ms)[2:8]

# Version 7 (4 bits) + rand_a (12 bits)
uuid_bytes[6] = 0x70 | (rand_bytes[0] & 0x0F)
uuid_bytes[7] = rand_bytes[1]

# Variant (2 bits) + rand_b (62 bits)
uuid_bytes[8] = 0x80 | (rand_bytes[2] & 0x3F)
uuid_bytes[9:16] = rand_bytes[3:10]

# Format as string
hex_str = uuid_bytes.hex()
return f"{hex_str[:8]}-{hex_str[8:12]}-{hex_str[12:16]}-{hex_str[16:20]}-{hex_str[20:]}"

# Demonstration: UUIDs are sortable by time
uuids = [generate_uuid_v7() for _ in range(5)]
time.sleep(0.01)
uuids.extend([generate_uuid_v7() for _ in range(5)])

print("UUID v7 values (time-ordered):")
for uuid in sorted(uuids):
print(f"  {uuid}")

5. JSON Canonicalization: RFC 8785

Critical for deterministic hashing:

import json
from decimal import Decimal

def canonicalize_json(obj) -> str:
"""
RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)

Rules:
1. No whitespace between tokens
2. Object keys sorted lexicographically
3. Numbers in shortest form (no trailing zeros)
4. Strings use minimal escaping
5. UTF-8 encoding
"""

def normalize_value(v):
if isinstance(v, dict):
# Sort keys lexicographically
return {k: normalize_value(v[k]) for k in sorted(v.keys())}
elif isinstance(v, list):
return [normalize_value(item) for item in v]
elif isinstance(v, float):
# Handle special float cases
if v != v:  # NaN
raise ValueError("NaN not allowed in canonical JSON")
if v == float('inf') or v == float('-inf'):
raise ValueError("Infinity not allowed in canonical JSON")
# Use shortest representation
return float(Decimal(str(v)).normalize())
else:
return v

normalized = normalize_value(obj)
return json.dumps(normalized, separators=(',', ':'), ensure_ascii=False)

# Why this matters:
original = {"b": 1, "a": 2, "c": {"z": 3, "y": 4}}

# Standard JSON: non-deterministic key order
print(json.dumps(original))
# Could be: {"b": 1, "a": 2, "c": {"z": 3, "y": 4}}
# Or: {"a": 2, "b": 1, "c": {"y": 4, "z": 3}}

# Canonical JSON: always the same
print(canonicalize_json(original))
# Always: {"a":2,"b":1,"c":{"y":4,"z":3}}

# This ensures hash(record) is always identical for same data

---

The Sidecar Architecture: Non-Intrusive Integration

The biggest technical challenge wasn’t the cryptography—it was integrating with MT4/MT5 without modifying the platform.

The Problem

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    MT4/MT5 PLATFORM                         │
│                                                             │
│  ┌─────────────┐  ┌─────────────┐  ┌─────────────┐         │
│  │    Core     │  │    Trade    │  │    Log      │         │
│  │   Engine    │  │   Server    │  │   System    │         │
│  │  (Closed)   │  │  (Closed)   │  │  (Closed)   │         │
│  └─────────────┘  └─────────────┘  └─────────────┘         │
│                                                             │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐   │
│  │              MQL4/MQL5 SANDBOX                       │   │
│  │  - No external library imports                       │   │
│  │  - Limited system calls                              │   │
│  │  - No direct network socket access                   │   │
│  │  - Restricted file system access                     │   │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘   │
│                                                             │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

The Solution: Sidecar Pattern

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                        VCP SIDECAR ARCHITECTURE                         │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                         │
│  ┌───────────────────────────┐     ┌───────────────────────────┐       │
│  │      MT4/MT5 TERMINAL     │     │      VCP SIDECAR          │       │
│  │                           │     │                           │       │
│  │  ┌─────────────────────┐  │     │  ┌─────────────────────┐  │       │
│  │  │    VCP Bridge EA    │──┼──►──┼──│   Event Collector   │  │       │
│  │  │                     │  │ WS  │  │                     │  │       │
│  │  │  - OnTrade()        │  │     │  │  - Parse events     │  │       │
│  │  │  - OnTradeTransaction()     │  │  - Validate format   │  │       │
│  │  │  - File export      │  │     │  │  - Queue for proc   │  │       │
│  │  └─────────────────────┘  │     │  └──────────┬──────────┘  │       │
│  │                           │     │             │              │       │
│  │  Trade Events:            │     │             ▼              │       │
│  │  - ORDER_SEND             │     │  ┌─────────────────────┐  │       │
│  │  - ORDER_MODIFY           │     │  │   Hash Chain Eng    │  │       │
│  │  - ORDER_CLOSE            │     │  │                     │  │       │
│  │  - POSITION_OPEN          │     │  │  - Compute SHA-256  │  │       │
│  │  - POSITION_CLOSE         │     │  │  - Link to prev     │  │       │
│  │                           │     │  │  - Generate UUID v7 │  │       │
│  └───────────────────────────┘     │  └──────────┬──────────┘  │       │
│                                    │             │              │       │
│                                    │             ▼              │       │
│                                    │  ┌─────────────────────┐  │       │
│                                    │  │   Merkle Builder    │  │       │
│                                    │  │                     │  │       │
│                                    │  │  - Batch records    │  │       │
│                                    │  │  - Build tree       │  │       │
│                                    │  │  - Publish root     │  │       │
│                                    │  └──────────┬──────────┘  │       │
│                                    │             │              │       │
│                                    │             ▼              │       │
│                                    │  ┌─────────────────────┐  │       │
│                                    │  │   Signature Eng     │  │       │
│                                    │  │                     │  │       │
│                                    │  │  - Sign root        │  │       │
│                                    │  │  - Timestamp        │  │       │
│                                    │  │  - Anchor (opt)     │  │       │
│                                    │  └─────────────────────┘  │       │
│                                    │                           │       │
│                                    └───────────────────────────┘       │
│                                                                         │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

MQL5 Bridge Implementation

//+------------------------------------------------------------------+
//|                                              VCP_Bridge.mq5       |
//|                        VeritasChain Standards Organization        |
//|                             https://veritaschain.org              |
//+------------------------------------------------------------------+
#property copyright "VSO"
#property link      "https://veritaschain.org"
#property version   "1.00"

#include <Trade\Trade.mqh>

// WebSocket connection to VCP Sidecar
int ws_handle = INVALID_HANDLE;
string vcp_endpoint = "ws://localhost:8765/vcp";

//+------------------------------------------------------------------+
//| Expert initialization function                                     |
//+------------------------------------------------------------------+
int OnInit()
{
// Initialize WebSocket connection
ws_handle = WebSocketCreate(vcp_endpoint);

if(ws_handle == INVALID_HANDLE)
{
PrintFormat("VCP Bridge: Failed to connect to %s", vcp_endpoint);
// Fallback to file-based export
return(INIT_SUCCEEDED);
}

PrintFormat("VCP Bridge: Connected to %s", vcp_endpoint);
return(INIT_SUCCEEDED);
}

//+------------------------------------------------------------------+
//| Expert deinitialization function                                   |
//+------------------------------------------------------------------+
void OnDeinit(const int reason)
{
if(ws_handle != INVALID_HANDLE)
{
WebSocketClose(ws_handle);
}
}

//+------------------------------------------------------------------+
//| TradeTransaction function - captures all trade events              |
//+------------------------------------------------------------------+
void OnTradeTransaction(const MqlTradeTransaction& trans,
const MqlTradeRequest& request,
const MqlTradeResult& result)
{
// Build VCP event payload
string payload = BuildVCPPayload(trans, request, result);

// Send to sidecar
if(ws_handle != INVALID_HANDLE)
{
WebSocketSend(ws_handle, payload);
}
else
{
// Fallback: write to file for sidecar to pick up
ExportToFile(payload);
}
}

//+------------------------------------------------------------------+
//| Build VCP-compliant JSON payload                                   |
//+------------------------------------------------------------------+
string BuildVCPPayload(const MqlTradeTransaction& trans,
const MqlTradeRequest& request,
const MqlTradeResult& result)
{
string json = "{";

// Event metadata
json += StringFormat("\"timestamp\":%f,", GetMicrosecondCount() / 1000000.0);
json += StringFormat("\"event_type\":\"%s\",", TransactionTypeToString(trans.type));

// Transaction details
json += "\"payload\":{";
json += StringFormat("\"deal\":%I64u,", trans.deal);
json += StringFormat("\"order\":%I64u,", trans.order);
json += StringFormat("\"symbol\":\"%s\",", trans.symbol);
json += StringFormat("\"type\":%d,", trans.type);
json += StringFormat("\"deal_type\":%d,", trans.deal_type);
json += StringFormat("\"price\":%f,", trans.price);
json += StringFormat("\"volume\":%f,", trans.volume);
json += StringFormat("\"sl\":%f,", trans.price_sl);
json += StringFormat("\"tp\":%f", trans.price_tp);
json += "}";

json += "}";

return json;
}

//+------------------------------------------------------------------+
//| Convert transaction type to string                                 |
//+------------------------------------------------------------------+
string TransactionTypeToString(ENUM_TRADE_TRANSACTION_TYPE type)
{
switch(type)
{
case TRADE_TRANSACTION_ORDER_ADD:      return "ORDER_ADD";
case TRADE_TRANSACTION_ORDER_UPDATE:   return "ORDER_UPDATE";
case TRADE_TRANSACTION_ORDER_DELETE:   return "ORDER_DELETE";
case TRADE_TRANSACTION_DEAL_ADD:       return "DEAL_ADD";
case TRADE_TRANSACTION_DEAL_UPDATE:    return "DEAL_UPDATE";
case TRADE_TRANSACTION_DEAL_DELETE:    return "DEAL_DELETE";
case TRADE_TRANSACTION_HISTORY_ADD:    return "HISTORY_ADD";
case TRADE_TRANSACTION_HISTORY_UPDATE: return "HISTORY_UPDATE";
case TRADE_TRANSACTION_HISTORY_DELETE: return "HISTORY_DELETE";
case TRADE_TRANSACTION_POSITION:       return "POSITION";
case TRADE_TRANSACTION_REQUEST:        return "REQUEST";
default:                               return "UNKNOWN";
}
}

//+------------------------------------------------------------------+
//| File-based export fallback                                         |
//+------------------------------------------------------------------+
void ExportToFile(string payload)
{
string filename = StringFormat("VCP_%s.json",
TimeToString(TimeCurrent(), TIME_DATE));

int handle = FileOpen(filename, FILE_WRITE|FILE_READ|FILE_TXT|FILE_ANSI);

if(handle != INVALID_HANDLE)
{
FileSeek(handle, 0, SEEK_END);
FileWriteString(handle, payload + "\n");
FileClose(handle);
}
}

Python Sidecar Service

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
VCP Sidecar Service
Receives events from MT4/MT5 bridge, processes through VCP pipeline
"""

import asyncio
import websockets
import json
from dataclasses import dataclass, asdict
from typing import Optional
import logging

from vcp_core import HashChainEngine, MerkleTree, VCPSigner

logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO)
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

class VCPSidecar:
def __init__(self, host: str = "localhost", port: int = 8765):
self.host = host
self.port = port
self.hash_chain = HashChainEngine()
self.merkle_tree = MerkleTree()
self.signer = VCPSigner()
self.batch_size = 100
self.current_batch = []

async def handle_connection(self, websocket, path):
"""Handle incoming WebSocket connection from MT bridge"""
client_id = id(websocket)
logger.info(f"New connection: {client_id}")

try:
async for message in websocket:
await self.process_event(message, websocket)
except websockets.exceptions.ConnectionClosed:
logger.info(f"Connection closed: {client_id}")

async def process_event(self, message: str, websocket):
"""Process incoming trade event"""
try:
event = json.loads(message)

# Add to hash chain
record = self.hash_chain.add_record(
event_type=event.get('event_type', 'UNKNOWN'),
payload=event.get('payload', {})
)

# Sign the record
record.signature = self.signer.sign_record(asdict(record))

# Add to current batch
self.current_batch.append(record)

# Build Merkle tree when batch is full
if len(self.current_batch) >= self.batch_size:
await self.finalize_batch()

# Send acknowledgment
ack = {
"status": "ok",
"record_id": record.record_id,
"hash": record.hash
}
await websocket.send(json.dumps(ack))

except json.JSONDecodeError as e:
logger.error(f"Invalid JSON: {e}")
await websocket.send(json.dumps({"status": "error", "message": str(e)}))

async def finalize_batch(self):
"""Finalize current batch with Merkle tree"""
if not self.current_batch:
return

# Add all records to Merkle tree
for record in self.current_batch:
record_bytes = json.dumps(asdict(record), sort_keys=True).encode()
self.merkle_tree.add_leaf(record_bytes)

# Build tree and get root
root = self.merkle_tree.build_tree()

# Sign root
root_signature = self.signer.sign_record({"merkle_root": root.hex()})

logger.info(f"Batch finalized: {len(self.current_batch)} records, root: {root.hex()[:16]}...")

# Store/publish root (implementation depends on anchoring strategy)
await self.publish_root(root, root_signature)

# Reset for next batch
self.current_batch = []
self.merkle_tree = MerkleTree()

async def publish_root(self, root: bytes, signature: bytes):
"""Publish Merkle root (stub - implement anchoring strategy)"""
# Options:
# 1. Store locally
# 2. Publish to blockchain
# 3. Send to transparency log
# 4. Distribute to third-party verifiers
pass

async def run(self):
"""Start WebSocket server"""
logger.info(f"Starting VCP Sidecar on {self.host}:{self.port}")

async with websockets.serve(self.handle_connection, self.host, self.port):
await asyncio.Future()  # Run forever

if __name__ == "__main__":
sidecar = VCPSidecar()
asyncio.run(sidecar.run())

---

Three-Tier Compliance Model

Different trading environments have different requirements. VCP addresses this with a three-tier model:

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    VCP THREE-TIER COMPLIANCE MODEL                      │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                         │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐   │
│  │                      PLATINUM TIER                               │   │
│  │  Target: HFT Firms, Exchanges                                    │   │
│  │  Time Sync: PTP (IEEE 1588)                                      │   │
│  │  Precision: Nanosecond                                           │   │
│  │  Latency Budget: <100μs                                          │   │
│  │  MT4/MT5: Not applicable (different platforms)                   │   │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘   │
│                                                                         │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐   │
│  │                        GOLD TIER                                 │   │
│  │  Target: Institutional Brokers, Prime Brokers                    │   │
│  │  Time Sync: NTP with multiple sources                            │   │
│  │  Precision: Microsecond (±1μs)                                   │   │
│  │  Latency Budget: <1ms                                            │   │
│  │  MT4/MT5: Partial support (server-side)                          │   │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘   │
│                                                                         │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐   │
│  │                       SILVER TIER                                │   │
│  │  Target: Retail Traders, Prop Firms                              │   │
│  │  Time Sync: Best-effort (system clock)                           │   │
│  │  Precision: Millisecond (±1ms)                                   │   │
│  │  Latency Budget: <10ms                                           │   │
│  │  MT4/MT5: FULL SUPPORT ✓                                         │   │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘   │
│                                                                         │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Why Silver Tier Matters

The Silver Tier innovation is what makes VCP practical for MT4/MT5:

# Silver Tier tolerances
SILVER_TIER_CONFIG = {
"timestamp_tolerance_ms": 1000,    # ±1 second acceptable
"hash_algorithm": "SHA-256",       # Same as higher tiers
"signature_algorithm": "Ed25519",  # Same as higher tiers
"merkle_batch_size": 100,          # Flexible batching
"sync_requirement": "best_effort", # No PTP/NTP mandate
}

# This means:
# - Works on standard VPS without specialized hardware
# - No network infrastructure changes required
# - Same cryptographic guarantees as higher tiers
# - Only timing precision is relaxed

---

Performance Benchmarks

From our ABLENET production validation:

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                      PERFORMANCE BENCHMARKS                             │
│                      ABLENET Production Environment                     │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                         │
│  Test Environment:                                                      │
│  - VPS: ABLENET Win2 (2 vCPU, 2GB RAM)                                 │
│  - OS: Windows Server 2019                                              │
│  - MT5: Build 3914                                                      │
│  - Sidecar: Python 3.11 + uvloop                                       │
│                                                                         │
│  Results (1000 trade events):                                          │
│                                                                         │
│  ┌────────────────────────────┬──────────────┬──────────────┐          │
│  │ Operation                  │ Avg Latency  │ P99 Latency  │          │
│  ├────────────────────────────┼──────────────┼──────────────┤          │
│  │ Event capture (MQL→WS)     │ 0.3ms        │ 0.8ms        │          │
│  │ Hash computation (SHA-256) │ 0.02ms       │ 0.05ms       │          │
│  │ Chain linking              │ 0.01ms       │ 0.03ms       │          │
│  │ Signature (Ed25519)        │ 0.05ms       │ 0.12ms       │          │
│  │ Merkle tree (100 leaves)   │ 0.4ms        │ 0.9ms        │          │
│  ├────────────────────────────┼──────────────┼──────────────┤          │
│  │ TOTAL per event            │ 0.78ms       │ 1.9ms        │          │
│  └────────────────────────────┴──────────────┴──────────────┘          │
│                                                                         │
│  Throughput: ~1,200 events/second sustained                            │
│  Memory overhead: ~50MB for sidecar process                            │
│  Disk write: ~200 bytes per event (compressed)                         │
│                                                                         │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Optimization Strategies

# 1. Batch Merkle tree construction
# Instead of per-event trees, batch for efficiency

class OptimizedMerkleBuilder:
def __init__(self, batch_size: int = 100):
self.batch_size = batch_size
self.pending = []

async def add_and_maybe_finalize(self, record):
self.pending.append(record)

if len(self.pending) >= self.batch_size:
root = await self.build_tree_async()
self.pending = []
return root
return None

# 2. Async signature generation
# Ed25519 is fast, but async prevents blocking

async def sign_batch_async(records: list, signer: VCPSigner):
loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
signatures = await asyncio.gather(*[
loop.run_in_executor(None, signer.sign_record, r)
for r in records
])
return signatures

# 3. Connection pooling for WebSocket
# Reuse connections, don't create per-event

class ConnectionPool:
def __init__(self, max_connections: int = 10):
self.pool = asyncio.Queue(maxsize=max_connections)

async def get_connection(self):
return await self.pool.get()

async def return_connection(self, conn):
await self.pool.put(conn)

---

Regulatory Alignment

VCP was designed with regulatory compliance in mind from day one.

EU AI Act (Article 12 & 13)

# VCP directly addresses EU AI Act requirements

EU_AI_ACT_MAPPING = {
"Article 12.1": {
"requirement": "Automatic logging capabilities",
"vcp_implementation": "VCP-TRADE module captures all trade events automatically"
},
"Article 12.2": {
"requirement": "Traceability of AI system operation",
"vcp_implementation": "Hash chain provides complete event sequence"
},
"Article 12.3": {
"requirement": "Logging throughout system lifetime",
"vcp_implementation": "Immutable records with cryptographic timestamps"
},
"Article 13.1": {
"requirement": "Transparency for users",
"vcp_implementation": "Merkle proofs enable independent verification"
}
}

# Penalty for non-compliance: €35M or 7% of global revenue
# Full enforcement: August 2, 2026

MiFID II RTS 25

# "Operators shall be able to EVIDENCE that systems meet requirements"
# Key word: EVIDENCE, not just "claim" or "assert"

MIFID_II_MAPPING = {
"Article 3": {
"requirement": "Synchronization accuracy",
"vcp_silver_tier": "±1ms (exceeds retail requirements)"
},
"Article 4": {
"requirement": "Record keeping",
"vcp_implementation": "Immutable hash chain with Merkle verification"
},
"Article 5": {
"requirement": "Audit trail capability",
"vcp_implementation": "Third-party verifiable proofs"
}
}

SEC Rule 17a-4

# Audit trail alternative requirements

SEC_17A4_MAPPING = {
"Modification tracking": {
"vcp_implementation": "Hash chain - O(n) tamper detection",
"description": "Any modification invalidates all subsequent hashes"
},
"Timestamp accuracy": {
"silver_tier": "±1ms",
"gold_tier": "±1μs"
},
"User identification": {
"vcp_fields": ["OperatorID", "LastApprovalBy", "SignerPublicKey"]
}
}

---

ABLENET Partnership: Why It Matters

This isn’t a theoretical project—it’s production-validated infrastructure.

ABLENET Credentials

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                        ABLENET (K&K Corporation)                        │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                         │
│  Established:    February 1998 (25+ years operation)                   │
│  Uptime:         99.99%+ SLA                                           │
│  Data Centers:   Osaka, Japan (Tier 1/2 class)                         │
│  Bandwidth:      220+ Gbps backbone                                    │
│  Carriers:       NTT Communications, OPTAGE (redundant)                │
│  Specialization: Japan's leading MT4/MT5 VPS provider                  │
│                                                                         │
│  2022 Investment: MSD Enterprise Investment Group                      │
│  - Mitsui & Co. (Japan's largest trading company)                      │
│  - Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (Tier 1 bank)                   │
│  - Development Bank of Japan (Government-backed)                       │
│                                                                         │
│  Note: MSD invested in ABLENET, not VCP/VSO directly.                  │
│        This provides partner credibility, not protocol endorsement.    │
│                                                                         │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

What This Validates

1. Production Feasibility: VCP works in real trading environments
2. Performance: Sub-millisecond overhead is achievable
3. Integration: Sidecar architecture is non-intrusive
4. Scale: Infrastructure can handle thousands of concurrent traders

---

What’s Next

Roadmap

2025 Q4: PoC launch with ABLENET ← WE ARE HERE
2026 Q1: Production deployment (initial customers)
2026 Q2: VC-Certified program launch
- Silver Tier certification
- Gold Tier certification
- Platinum Tier certification
2026 H2: Global expansion
- Additional VPS providers
- Broker integrations
2027+:   Post-quantum migration
- Dilithium signatures (NIST PQC)
- Hybrid classical/PQ mode

How to Get Involved

For Developers:

• Star & fork: github.com/veritaschain
• Review IETF draft: draft-kamimura-scitt-vcp
• Submit PRs for SDK improvements

For Brokers/VPS Providers:

• Contact: [enterprise@veritaschain.o