Mechanism Design

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Scoured 13 posts in 7.3 ms

Duality for Optimal Multi-Item, Multi-Bidder Auction Design: Revenue Certificates through Deep Learning

 🗳️Social Choice  Content type: Academic
arxiv.org·

Sandholm Receives SIGecom Test of Time Award

 💻CS Theory  Content type: Academic
cs.cmu.edu·

Discovering expert-level Nash equilibrium algorithms with large language models

 λType Theory  Content type: Academic
nature.com·

Cooperative Capitalism Is the Last Coherent Economic Path Crypto Has Left

 📐Formal Methods
ethresear.ch·

On the Incentive Compatibility of Block Propagation in Bitcoin

 📡Information Theory  Content type: Academic
arxiv.org·

New comment by TPINA7 in "Ask HN: Who wants to be hired? (June 2026)"

 🕸️Network Theory  Content type: Discussion

Evaluating AI Investment Strategies

 📈Economics  Content type: Academic
arxiv.org·

The Tidy House

 📊Heterodox Economics
oreilly.com·

Ambiguous Strategic Classification

 🗳️Social Choice  Content type: Academic
arxiv.org·

Fairness and Strategy-Proofness in Automated Market Makers

 🔍Interpretability  Content type: Academic
arxiv.org·

Extending the El Farol Bar Game with Partial Observability and Incentive Design

 🌀Complexity Science  Content type: Academic
arxiv.org·

Exploring cooperation mechanisms via reinforcement learning in network common-pool resource games

 🌀Dynamical Systems  Content type: Academic
arxiv.org·

Knowledge Index of Noah's Ark

 λType Theory  Content type: Academic
arxiv.org·

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